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Abstract
Information hiding, which embeds a watermark/message over a cover signal, has
recently found extensive applications in, for example, copyright protection, content
authentication and covert communication. It has been widely considered as an ap-
pealing technology to complement conventional cryptographic processes in the field
of multimedia security by embedding information into the signal being protected.
Generally, information hiding can be classified into two categories: steganography
and watermarking. While steganography attempts to embed as much information
as possible into a cover signal, watermarking tries to emphasize the robustness of
the embedded information at the expense of embedding capacity.
In contrast to information hiding, steganalysis aims at detecting whether a given
medium has hidden message in it, and, if possible, recover that hidden message. It
can be used to measure the security performance of information hiding techniques,
meaning a steganalysis resistant steganographic/watermarking method should be
imperceptible not only to Human Vision Systems (HVS), but also to intelligent
analysis.
As yet, 3D information hiding and steganalysis has received relatively less atten-
tion compared to image information hiding, despite the proliferation of 3D computer
graphics models which are fairly promising information carriers. This thesis focuses
on this relatively neglected research area and has the following primary objectives: 1)
to investigate the trade-off between embedding capacity and distortion by consider-
ing the correlation between spatial and normal/curvature noise in triangle meshes; 2)
to design satisfactory 3D steganographic algorithms, taking into account this trade-
off; 3) to design robust 3D watermarking algorithms; 4) to propose a steganalysis
framework for detecting the existence of the hidden information in 3D models and
introduce a universal 3D steganalytic method under this framework.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 describes in detail the background
relating to information hiding and steganalysis, as well as the research problems this
thesis will be studying. Chapter 2 conducts a survey on the previous information
hiding techniques for digital images, 3D models and other medium and also on image
steganalysis algorithms.
Motivated by the observation that the knowledge of the spatial accuracy of the
mesh vertices does not easily translate into information related to the accuracy
of other visually important mesh attributes such as normals, Chapters 3 and 4
investigate the impact of modifying vertex coordinates of 3D triangle models on the
mesh normals. Chapter 3 presents the results of an empirical investigation, whereas
Chapter 4 presents the results of a theoretical study. Based on these results, a high-
capacity 3D steganographic algorithm capable of controlling embedding distortion
is also presented in Chapter 4.
In addition to normal information, several mesh interrogation, processing and
rendering algorithms make direct or indirect use of curvature information. Motivated
by this, Chapter 5 studies the relation between Discrete Gaussian Curvature (DGC)
degradation and vertex coordinate modifications.
Chapter 6 proposes a robust watermarking algorithm for 3D polygonal models,
based on modifying the histogram of the distances from the model vertices to a point
in 3D space. That point is determined by applying Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) to the cover model. The use of PCA makes the watermarking method robust
against common 3D operations, such as rotation, translation and vertex reordering.
In addition, Chapter 6 develops a 3D specific steganalytic algorithm to detect the ex-
istence of the hidden messages embedded by one well-known watermarking method.
By contrast, the focus of Chapter 7 will be on developing a 3D watermarking algo-
rithm that is resistant to mesh editing or deformation attacks that change the global
shape of the mesh.
iii
By adopting a framework which has been successfully developed for image ste-
ganalysis, Chapter 8 designs a 3D steganalysis method to detect the existence of
messages hidden in 3D models with existing steganographic and watermarking al-
gorithms. The efficiency of this steganalytic algorithm has been evaluated on five
state-of-the-art 3D watermarking/steganographic methods. Moreover, being a uni-
versal steganalytic algorithm can be used as a benchmark for measuring the anti-
steganalysis performance of other existing and most importantly future watermark-
ing/steganographic algorithms.
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis and also suggests some potential directions for
future work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the information era, multimedia content (e.g, audio, image, video and 3D com-
puter graphics models) in digital form is being used in a wide range of application
areas. However, at the same time, an increasing number of security problems have
been revealed. For instance, the proliferation of intelligent editing tools can also
facilitate misuse, illegal copying and distribution, plagiarism and misappropriation,
which could seriously ruin the interests of the creator or owner of the multimedia
work. This is creating a strong need for schemes that can efficiently cope with
multimedia security and privacy, including copyright protection and integrity au-
thentication [14].
Previously, security-related issues were commonly addressed using cryptographic
algorithms, such as RSA [15], DSA [16] and ECC [17]. That is, cryptography enables
the security of the message by using a key to encrypt it and hence only the person
who possesses the correct decryption key can decrypt the encrypted message and
read the original message, unless, of course, the encryption system has been broken.
Generally, there are two basic kinds of encryption algorithms: private key and public
key cryptography. The former uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt the message
of interest and is also known as symmetric key cryptography. The latter utilizes a
public key to encrypt the message and a private key to decrypt it and is also known
as asymmetric key cryptography.
Cryptography is being widely used in a wide range of practical applications,
such as ATM cards, computer passwords and electronic commerce; however, it is
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1.1: Illustration of image encryption. (a) original image, (b) encrypted image
by Ye’s method [1], and (c) encrypted image by Gao et al.’s method [2].
ineffective in the context of multimedia data security mainly due to the following
two reasons. Firstly, once the encrypted multimedia data have been successfully
decrypted, cryptography does not offer an efficient way to track its reproduction
or retransmission [14]. In other words, a pirate can purchase the decryption key,
decrypt the date, using the key, to obtain an unprotected copy of the multimedia
content and then proceed to distribute the illegal copies. Secondly, the multimedia
content when encrypted likely undergoes significantly visual degradation and thus
needs decryption before use, which might be computationally expensive. An illus-
tration of image quality degradation as a result of encryption is shown in Fig. 1.1.
Fig. 1.1 (b) and (c) appear to carry meaningless visual information and hence are
of no practical use in real applications prior to decryption.
The above example of image encryption implies the expectation that after adopt-
ing certain protection schemes the visual degradation of multimedia data should not
be beyond a certain tolerance, avoiding incurring a heavy penalty of the content.
Unlike protecting other kinds of data (e.g., a military document or a private mes-
sage) where we make our best effort to conceal the real content of the data itself by
turning it into an unintelligible or unreadable ciphertext, usually there are differ-
ent requirements regarding the protection of multimedia data. Therefore, there is
a need for an alternative scheme to complement cryptography in multimedia data
protection. The alternative should satisfy the following requirements.
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• It is able to make successful solution to a disputation over the ownership of
the multimedia content possible.
• It does not significantly degrade the visual quality of the multimedia data
being protected and should maintain the distortion below the threshold that
our human eyes can tolerate.
Information hiding or data hiding, which refers to the process of imperceptibly em-
bedding a secret message into a cover/host media so as to conceal the content of the
hidden message, is of the above-mentioned properties and has been widely regarded
as a promising solution to multimedia security and privacy.
In the rest of the chapter, we shall describe the background and principles of
information hiding and steganalysis, present the problems we will be investigating
in this thesis and the research plan that helps to cope with these problems.
1.1 Information Hiding
Since 1990s, the investigation of a technology that is able to serve as a complement
to cryptography has attracted extensive attention from both academic and indus-
trial organizations [3, 18]. Information hiding has been widely deemed as a fairly
promising technology to fulfill this purpose. Information hiding works by secretly
embedding a message within a host digital signal. The message to be embedded
can be whatever we want to insert, such as a personal identification code, a com-
pany logo or a to-be-delivered secret information string, depending on the specific
application scenarios. Because of its potential applications, information hiding has
become an emerging research area over the past few decades.
In contrast to cryptography which tries to make the meaning of information
obscure to a person who intercepts it, information hiding technique aims chiefly at
keeping the existence of the information secret or making the embedded information
imperceptible [19]. While cryptography arouses suspicion due to the unreadability
of encrypted information, information hiding avoids this through invisible message
embedding. The embedding of message is achieved by employing human binaural
or perceptual redundancies. More specifically, the redundancies are the details of
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Figure 1.2: A generic framework for message embedding and extraction.
a multimedia signal that a human ear cannot hear or that a human eye cannot
perceive. Basic hiding techniques include modifying the least significant bits of the
pixels of a host image [20,21] and adding tabs and spaces at the end of the lines of
an HTML document [22].
As Fig. 1.2 shows, information hiding usually consists of two procedures: message
embedding and message extraction. The embedding process takes the host/carrier
signal, the secret message and probably the private key as the input and yields
the watermarked/stego signal. It is noted that for security reason, cryptography
is generally incorporated into information hiding systems in case of correct detec-
tion/extraction of the hidden information by an adversary. During distribution,
the watermarked signal may be subject to routine operations, such as compression
and format conversion, or even worse, malicious attacks, such as noise addition and
cropping, by an attacker with the hope of removing the embedded information. The
malicious attack likely occurs when the stego signal has aroused suspicion, or when
it has been detected to carry hidden data by steganalysis techniques [23, 24]. The
extraction process is the inverse of the embedding process. The decoder extracts
the embedded message from the stego signal, or probably the attacked stego one,
with the assistance of the private key and/or the original signal shared with the
embedder.
Fig. 1.3 shows that information hiding, as a general term, encompasses a num-
ber of applications, such as digital watermarking, fingerprinting and steganography.
Among these applications, two important branches that we study in this thesis are
steganography and watermarking.
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1.1.1 Steganography
Steganography is the art and science of covert communications among trusting par-
ties, where the confidential message is embedded imperceptibly about an innocent-
looking cover signal so that nobody apart from the sender and the intended recipient
can detect the existence of the hidden data. The technical term steganography, de-
rived from the Greek words steganos (στγαυo´ς) and graphein (γρα´ϕιυ), literally
means “covered or protected writing” [18,25]. Thus, a steganographic system must
provide a method to embed data imperceptibly, allow the data to be readily ex-
tracted, promote a high embedding capacity, and preferably incorporate a certain
degree of resistance to removal [26].
One can say, whereas classical cryptography is about concealing the content of
messages, steganography is about concealing their presence. In addition, prudent
cryptographic algorithm is based on the assumption that the method employed for
data encryption is known to the public and that security lies in the private key
rather than in the encryption algorithm [27]. However, this principle is not imme-
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diately applicable to steganographic systems. This is the case with cryptography
as well, where many purveyors of such systems keep their mechanisms subject to
nondisclosure agreements [19].
Steganography was already in use thousands of years ago in ancient Greece and
China [23, 26, 28].Regarding modern applications in the digital era, the publishing
and broadcasting industries have become interested in techniques for hiding the
encrypted copyright marks and serial numbers in digital films, audio recordings,
books, and multimedia products [19]. Other applications for steganography include
military communications, where military agencies take advantage of steganographic
technique to make signals difficult for the enemy to detect or jam [3], and medical
imaging systems, where a link between the patient’s image and his/her captions (e.g.,
physician, patient’s name, address and other particulars) is considered necessary [29].
Thus, embedding the patient’s information about the image could be an efficient
safety measure to help solve such a problem.
Modern steganographic algorithms do the utmost to keep the presence of the
hidden message imperceptible and confidential while maintaining high embedding
capacity. Nevertheless, steganography, due to its invasive nature, has to alter the
original cover object at the phase of embedding. This process probably leaves some
traceable clues, that is, disturbance of the statistics of the carrier object [30,31], even
though the alterations may be too slight to perceive. Consequently, these clues pro-
mote another technology referred to as steganalysis, an opposite to steganography,
whose purpose is to detect the existence of the hidden messages; this is analogous
to cryptanalysis applied to cryptography.
1.1.2 Watermarking
Similar to steganography, watermarking refers to the process of inserting messages,
often called as watermark in this circumstance, into a host multimedia signal without
incurring noticeable visual degradation. The main focus of a watermarking system is
to achieve a high level of robustness against attacks. In other words, it is impossible
or fairly difficult to remove the embedded watermark without degrading the stego
object’s visual quality.
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Figure 1.4: Classification of watermarking schemes.
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Figure 1.5: Comparison between the visible and invisible watermark embedding.
(a) original image, (b) watermark, (c) visibly watermarked image by Yang et al.’s
method [4], and (d) invisibly watermarked image by embedding the watermark image
into the original image.
As Fig. 1.4 shows, watermarking can be divided into several categories, depend-
ing on the classification criterion.
• By visibility, the watermark embedded is either invisible or visible, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1.5. Intuitively, the watermark that we cannot perceive by eye
is referred to as visible; otherwise, invisible. To date, invisible watermarking
has been widely studied, and thousands of papers on it have been reported.
The research on visible watermarking, compared with that on invisible water-
marking, has received less attention, but this has changed dramatically over
the last few years [4, 32–37].
• By embedding domain, the watermark can either be inserted into the spatial
domain of the cover signal directly (e.g., the pixel values of an image) [38,39],
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or be embedded into the transform domain obtained by applying certain trans-
formation (e.g., DFT, DCT, and DWT) to the cover signal [14, 40,41]. It has
been observed that the transform-based watermarking methods tend to pro-
vide higher resistance against attacks than the spatial-based ones, so an in-
creasing number of researchers would investigate the watermarking approaches
that embed watermark in the transform domain.
• Depending on extraction method, the watermarking methods can be classified
as blind and non-blind. In the former, the extraction process of watermark is
carried out blindly without reference to the original cover object, or vice versa.
In comparison to non-blind watermarking, blind watermarking obviously has
a relatively wider application scope; however, it offers weaker robustness.
• By adaptivity, the watermarking methods can be divided as adaptive and non-
adaptive. Generally, the watermarking that takes into account the content of
the host medium and varies the watermark strength in different embedding re-
gions to avoid obtrusiveness is regarded as adaptive; otherwise, non-adaptive.
The adaptivity is commonly achieved as a result of taking advantage of the
characteristics of HVS (Human Visual System) [42] and/or HAS (Human Au-
ditory System) [43], each of which is of distinct sensitivity to the changes in
different embedding areas. For example, it is much easier for the HVS to
observe the change in the smooth regions of an image than in the rough areas.
• By goal, the watermarking methods can be classified as robust, fragile and
semi-fragile. Robust watermarking attempts to make the watermark capable
of surviving all kinds of attacks for the purpose of, for instance, copyright
protection. By contrast, a fragile watermark is such a mark that it is readily
altered or destroyed when the stego image is modified. The very sensitivity of
fragile marks to modification leads to their use in authentication applications.
Semi-fragile watermarking is robust to acceptable content preserving manip-
ulations (e.g., JPEG compression) while fragile to malicious attacks. Since it
is, by definition, able to discriminate normal processing from evil attacks, it
has found application in authentication as well.
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1.1.3 Steganography Versus Watermarking
The above descriptions indicate that, while the two terms, namely steganography and
watermarking, are closely related to each other and share a great deal of overlap,
they can yet be distinguished from each other by their own inherent properties or
requirements. More specifically, they distinguish each other in terms of embedding
capacity and robustness and they have distinct application domains.
The main goal of steganography is to hide a message in covert point-to-point
communications between two trustable parties, so steganographic methods espe-
cially emphasize embedding capacity and usually provide weaker robustness against
attacks.
By contrast, the target of watermarking is to hide a message in one-to-many
communications among several parties, and as a result, watermarking schemes often
offer relatively lower embedding capacity and should withstand common operations,
as well as the malicious attacks that attempt to remove or modify the hidden mes-
sage. It is worth mentioning here that embedding capacity is generally achieved at
the expense of robustness, and vice versa.
In summary, we expect watermarking algorithms to be able to survive both
unintentional and malicious attacks, but we do not have such an expectation on
steganographic approaches. Due to their respective inherent properties, steganog-
raphy and watermarking have different applications. Steganography is used in the
applications, for instance covert communications, where the transmission of a large
amount of information is needed. Watermarking is more appropriate for content
authentication, ownership authentication and copy control, where the robustness of
watermark rather than the capacity is more important.
1.2 Steganalysis
In contrast to steganography and watermarking, steganalysis is the art and science of
detecting whether a given medium has hidden message in it, and, if possible, recover
that hidden message. The message is hidden using steganography or watermarking;
this is analogous to cryptanalysis applied to cryptography.
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Steganalysis is indeed a very challenging task, due to the wide diversity of nat-
ural media, the wide variation of data embedding algorithms and usually the low
embedding distortion. Despite these, steganalysis is still possible since data embed-
ding will nevertheless disturb the statistics of a host medium [30]. In other words,
the presence of embedded messages still makes an original cover medium and its
corresponding stego-version different in some aspects, though this presence is often
imperceptible to the human eye or ear.
Depending on the applicability, steganalysis methods can be generally classified
into two categories: specific and universal. While the former aims at breaking a
specific steganographic/watermarking algorithm, the latter attempts to frustrate
all the steganographic/watermarking algorithms. In general, specific approaches
achieve higher detection accuracy as compared to universal ones because they have
prior knowledge of how the specific target method works. Nevertheless, universal
steganalysis is more attractive in practical use since they can work independently
of the embedding technique and even generalize to unknown algorithms.
Steganalysis can be considered as a task of pattern recognition, where it deter-
mines which class (clean medium with no hidden message or stego-medium with
hidden message) a given medium belongs to. As such, a general principle of design-
ing a steganalysis algorithm is to identify and extract features that are particularly
sensitive to data embedding, that is, those features that are able to capture the
variations resulting from embedding. This means that the features extracted from
clean media are expected to be quite different from those from the stego-media [44].
Generally, the larger the difference is, the better the choice of features is considered.
Following feature extraction, a classifier is usually designed to distinguish the
non-marked and marked medium via training the features. Overall, the performance
of a steganalysis system relies heavily on both feature extraction and classifier design.
Typically, an N -dimensional feature vector is generated from each single medium
and thus, each medium is represented as a point by a feature vector in the N -
dimensional space. Naively, it might be expected that N should be as large as
possible for the feature vector to be more effective. However, recent studies [23, 24]
show that a very large value of N is not necessary and that a large N may result in
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high computational costs and/or negative impact on the detection accuracy.
To create a classifier, the feature vectors extracted from a training set of medium
with and without hidden information are fed into a machine learning algorithm in
the hope of separating the two kinds of medium. Thus far, both linear discriminant
analysis (LDA), such as Fisher Linear Discriminant [30], and nonlinear discriminant
analysis, such as kernelised Support Vector Machines (SVM) [45], have been been
successfully employed in prior steganalysis works.
1.3 3D Models
3D computer graphics, in contrast to 2D computer graphics, are graphics that use
a three-dimensional representation of geometric data stored in the computer for
the purposes of performing calculations and rendering 2D images. The process of
creating 3D models can be sequentially decomposed into three basic stages, namely,
modeling, scene layout setup and rendering.
3D modeling is the process of forming the shape of an object. There are a number
of modeling techniques and several 3D model representations, for example, construc-
tive solid geometry, NURBS modeling, polygonal modeling, subdivision surfaces and
implicit surfaces. Here, we deal with polygonal models which are the ubiquitous
standard for surface representation in graphics and visualization applications. Par-
ticularly, triangle meshes play an important role in CAD/CAM applications when
scans of physical objects are processed into triangle mesh models, or when NURBS
surfaces are converted into triangle meshes for fast interactive visualizations.
A 3D polygonal model is formed by a set of 3D points, called vertices, connected
between them with a set of polygons, called faces. A polygon is traditionally a plane
figure bounded by a closed path that is composed of a finite sequence of straight line
segments. These segments are called edges or sides and the points where two edges
meet are the polygon’s vertices. An n-gon is a polygon with n sides. A 3D model
that is composed of 3-gons only is referred to as a triangle mesh, while a 3D model
that is composed of 4-gons only is called a quadrilateral mesh. An an illustration,
Fig. 1.6 shows a triangle model and a quadrilateral mesh.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.6: An illustration of (a) a triangle mesh and (b) a quadrilateral mesh.
The scene layout setup arranges virtual objects, lights, cameras and other entities
on a scene. This step is helpful before rendering an object into an image. Lighting
plays a significant role in during scene setup, and more specifically it is the main
contributing factor to the resulting aesthetic and visual quality of the finished
Following scene layout setup, the rendering stage converts a prepared scene into
an image or an animation from the prepared scene. The two basic operations in
realistic rendering are transport and scattering [46]. While the former is about how
much light gets from one place to another, the latter is about how surfaces interact
with light. Given the complex variety of physical processes being simulated, the
rendering process is generally computationally expensive. Fortunately, due to the
recent breakthroughs in computer processing power, a progressively higher degree
of realistic rendering is possible.
1.4 Problem Statement
Over the past few years, digitization has become incredibly prevalent across a wide
range of sectors of economic and social life. The proliferation of digitized objects
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could, however, lead to various security and privacy issues that require high-level
and immediate attention. The potential issues include, for instance, the protection
of ownership and authorship as well as the authentication of integrity.
Having the above in mind, researchers from both academic and industrial com-
munities have made a great effort to investigate information hiding, which is com-
monly deemed as a replacement of cryptography in the context of digital multime-
dia. Given their immediate practical applications, information hiding algorithms
have been developed for objects of various dimensions, including digital images [40],
text documents [47], audio [48] and video [49]. However, the research into the in-
formation embedding of 3D models has received relatively less attention, although
the proliferation of the 3D graphical models in various application scenarios shows
them to be fairly promising message carriers. As pointed out in [50], this situation
is chiefly due to the difficulties encountered while handling the arbitrary topology
and irregular sampling of 3D meshes, as well as the existence of various intractable
attacks on watermarked 3D models. Moreover, in spite of the advancements of
text/image/audio/video data embedding techniques, they cannot be applied to mark
3D objects directly.
As a result, several of the 3D data hiding algorithms that have already been
proposed have significant shortcomings. In terms of 3D watermarking, most of the
previous watermarking algorithms are indeed robust against common attacks, such
as geometric transformations, noise addition and mesh smoothing, but do not survive
more realistic processing attacks, for instance, mesh editing attacks. Regarding 3D
steganography, most of the existing steganographic approaches have low embedding
capacity. Also, they are not able to control the embedding distortion resulting
from message embedding. One obvious disadvantage of the loss of control over
embedding distortion is that the embedding of message likely results in unpleasant
visual quantity, that is, the level of quality degradation is higher than expected.
As the counterpart of steganography and watermarking, steganalysis attempts
to detect the presence of information embedded through steganography and wa-
termarking methods and hence further stimulate their development. Thus far, a
number of steganalysis approaches have been proposed for detection of message
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hidden over digital images. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no re-
ported steganalysis that is able to work on detecting hidden information within 3D
computer graphics models.
The purpose of this thesis is to mathematically study the tradeoff between em-
bedding capacity and distortion, to develop novel 3D information hiding algorithms
and also to develop 3D steganalysis algorithms as a stimulus to the development
of 3D information hiding. Thus after a comprehensive review of the literature, we
will be conducting research into the following broad topics: 3D steganography, 3D
watermarking and 3D steganalysis.
1.5 Overview
The layout of the thesis reflects the research plan for dealing with the problems as
mentioned above. The main results and the evaluation methodology are discussed.
1.5.1 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 will be reviewing the related work, including steganography, watermarking
and steganalysis algorithms for digital image, video, audio, text and 3D models.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 study the trade-off between embedding capacity and visual
distortion. The results from these three chapters will help to better understand the
relationship between the degradation in 3D visual quality and the modification of
3D geometry and hence help to devise more excellent data hiding algorithms.
As the visual quality of the mesh is mainly governed by the quality of its normal
and curvature information, Chapter 3 will be empirically investigating the degrada-
tion of face normals resulting from perturbation of vertex coordinates.
In Chapter 4, we will theoretically investigate the same problem and propose a
Least Significant Bits (LSB) data hiding algorithm, utilizing this trade-off for achiev-
ing maximum embedding capacity for a given tolerance of normal degradation. As
well as its simplicity, the method has the merits of high-capacity and low-distortion.
Chapter 5 will be looking into how the discrete Gaussian curvature will change
when modifying the geometry of 3D triangle model.
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Following the previous five chapters, we have presented two 3D watermarking
methods, that is, a histogram-based watermarking in Chapter 6 and a Laplacian
coordinates-based watermarking in Chapter 7. Moreover, a specific steganalysis has
been proposed in Chapter 6 to detect the presence of the watermark embedded by
Cho et al. [7].
Chapter 8 introduces a universal 3D steganalysis, so that it can be used for
detecting the existence of the messages embedded by the previous 3D steganography
and watermarking and probably the future algorithms.
We conclude this thesis and suggest some potential research directions in Chap-
ter 9.
1.5.2 Evaluation Methodology
For the proposed steganographic algorithm, it is of a high embedding capacity and
a low visual distortion. The 3D watermarking methods are strongly robust against
routine 3D processing, including rotation, translation, uniform scaling and vertex
re-ordering, as well as malicious attacks, including noise addition, smoothing, quan-
tization and normal mesh editing. In addition to robustness, the proposed methods
are able to offer acceptable embedding capacity without incurring noticeable visual
distortion after embedding.
The efficiency of our proposed watermarking and steganography is evaluated in
terms of embedding capacity, embedding distortion and robustness. We evaluate
the embedding distortion between the original mesh and its corresponding marked
one by root mean square error (RMSE) and Hausdorff distance. The robustness is
verified according to the correlation coefficient between the original message string
and the extracted one. Moreover, we further demonstrate the performance of the
proposed steganographic and watermarking schemes via comparing them to the
state-of-the-art ones.
The performance of steganalysis is measured by accurate detection rate. To
do so, a big training dataset composed of a number of the clean or non-marked
and watermarked 3D models is prepared for obtaining a classifier that is able to
distinguish the non-watermarked and watermarked 3D models and a big test dataset
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composed of a number of the clean or non-marked and watermarked 3D models
is used for validating the distinguishing capacity of the classifier and thus of the
proposed steganalysis algorithm.
Concerning the limitations, the proposed LSB replacement data embedding method
is very fragile and is unable to withstand attacks. Although they have been demon-
strated to be robust against a wide range of attacks, the two proposed watermarking
methods can be improved to achieve better performance. The proposed 3D stegan-
alytic method only detects the messages hidden by those algorithms that embed
information into the mesh geometry, not into mesh connectivity, or into the data
redundancy of polygonal list files.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we conduct a survey of previous work related to this thesis. In
Section 2.1, we review the information hiding algorithms for digital images, including
image steganography in Section 2.1.1 and watermarking in Section 2.1.2.
Next, we survey 3D information hiding techniques from these two perspectives,
discussing 3D steganography in Section 2.2.1 and 3D watermarking in Section 2.2.2.
In Section 2.3, we briefly describe the information hiding approaches for other
media, including video, audio and text.
In addition to information hiding, steganalysis methods are reviewed. Taking
into account the fact that the previous steganalysis methods are mainly targeting
digital images, we only cover the image steganalysis in Section 2.4.
2.1 Image Information Hiding
Over the past few year, we have witnessed remarkable advances in digital image
processing and computational photography, resulting in sophisticated image-editing
software systems. The ease of digital image manipulation has created a need for
information hiding techniques that can, for example, achieve covert communication
and protect copyright ownership. As such, there have been a great deal of research
effort dedicated to the area of information hiding for digital images since 1990s.
As there are many works in this area, for conciseness we will only review the most
representative algorithms here.
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2.1.1 Image Steganography
Among various image steganographic schemes, least-significant bit (LSB) steganog-
raphy, including LSB replacement and matching embedding, is one of the funda-
mental embedding techniques. The two methods are simple and easy to implement,
with the capability of hiding a large amount of secret information in a cover image
without incurring noticeable embedding distortion [51]. They both work by hiding
message bits into the LSBs of pixel values of a cover image. The slight difference
between them is that the first method simply replaces the LSB plane of image pixels
with message bits, while the second method, at random, increments or decrements
a pixel value when the message bit is different from its LSB, or otherwise keeps
the pixel value unchanged. Based on the original LSB steganography, subsequent
research effort has led to certain variants of the technique [52,53].
LSB-based steganography has also been modified so that the message bits can
be inserted into multiple bit planes rather than the least-significant bit plane for
the purposes of higher embedding capacity and/or stronger robustness. A general-
ization of the LSB steganographic method has been proposed in [54] as a lossless
(reversible) data-embedding technique. In the embedding phase, the lowest L levels
of the original pixel values are replaced with the payload vector of L-ary symbols by
quantizing the pixels at L level followed by watermark addition. During extraction,
the watermark payload is extracted by simply reading the lowest L levels of the
watermarked pixel values.
Uniform replacement of the lowest L levels of the original pixels with watermark
payload could incur perceptual embedding distortions in some image regions, due to
the characteristics of the HVS. That is, HVS has a non-linear response to luminance,
so changes that are perceptually unnoticeable or undetectable in one image area
could become visible in another area. That means that we would like to introduce
varying amounts of embedding distortion over different image blocks, depending on
the distortion tolerance, in order to avoid unacceptable quality degradation. As
a result, researchers have proposed some adaptive steganographic approaches that
take into account the HVS features. Yang et al. [55] have extended the original
L least significant bits substitution scheme by using a changeable L rather than a
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fixed L. This approach allows one to adaptively overwrite the insignificant bits with
message bits, thus ensuring that the resulting distortion is globally acceptable.
Instead of inserting the messages into the image pixels directly, the differences
between the pixel values have been used to carry secret information as well. From
another point of view, the difference can be considered as a kind of prediction error.
In the pixel value differencing (PVD) steganography, a cover image is generally par-
titioned into non-overlapping and consecutive groups of several neighboring pixels.
Tian [56] creates a set of pairs, each of which is composed of two neighboring pixels,
and then embeds the data into the difference of the two pixels within each group.
Actually, this embedding results in an expansion of the prediction difference, or er-
ror, between two pixels. The idea of difference expansion has greatly influenced the
development of PVD-based steganography, and in particularly is widely regarded
as a remarkable breakthrough in reversible data-hiding schemes where the original
data and the embedded data can be completely restored after extraction.
Alattar [57] extends Tian’s algorithm using difference expansion of N -sized vec-
tors (N > 2), instead of 2-sized pairs, to increase the hiding ability and the com-
putation efficiency. Kim et al. [58] improve Tian’s algorithm in terms of the size of
the location map indicating the locations of all pixel pairs that have been selected
for difference expansion so as to convey message bits.
There exist some steganography operating in frequency domain rather than spa-
tial domain. Quantization index modulation (QIM) is a commonly employed data
embedding technique that embeds data into frequency coefficients. Noda et al. [59]
have proposed two JPEG steganographic methods using QIM in the discrete cosine
transform (DCT) domain. The two methods approximately preserve the histogram
of quantized DCT coefficients, so that they are able to defend against histogram-
based attacks.
2.1.2 Image Watermarking
In late 1990s, digital watermarking dominated the research in information hiding
due to its wide range of practical applications in, for instance, digital rights man-
agement, secure media distribution and authentication [60]. Generally, the exist-
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ing watermarking methods can be classified into two categories: spatial-based and
frequency-based. The former type of approaches works by modifying the spatial
data, i.e., the image pixel values of an image to embed watermark. The latter type
operates by transforming a host image into frequency domain, followed by altering
the frequency-based data to insert watermark.
Spatial-based Watermarking: One of the early image watermarking ap-
proaches working in the spatial domain is the work by Nikolaidis et al. [38]. They
have presented an additive method that adds a positive integer to the pixels cor-
responding to the 1-valued pixels of a binary watermark pattern. The decision on
whether the image is watermarked or not is carried out using hypothesis testing.
Based on the least-squares (LS) prediction error sequence of the cover image, Kary-
bali et al. [61] have proposed a spatial watermarking, which is robust against linear
filtering and noise attack. The LS prediction error sequence matches quite well the
characteristics of the HVS, in that the errors are expected to be smaller in smooth
areas than in edges and textured areas.
Frequency-based Watermarking: For a good tradeoff between watermark
robustness and invisibility, some image transformations, such as Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form (DWT), have been exploited in previous image watermarking.
Watermark embedding in the Fourier domain has the advantages of being robust
against geometric attacks, such as scaling, rotation and translation etc. Neverthe-
less, there are few Fourier-based watermarking algorithms as yet. One early work
is by Solachidis et al. [62], where the authors insert the watermark over the middle
frequencies of the DFT image domain. The reasons of inserting watermark into
the middle frequencies are based mainly on two considerations. On the one hand,
modifications in the low frequencies of the Fourier transform are likely to cause vis-
ible changes in the spatial domain. On the other hand, image compression could
remove the high Fourier frequencies. Hence, to survive compression and meanwhile
maintain invisible, the watermark should be added in the middle frequency range.
The watermarking in [40, 63] also modifies the middle Fourier frequencies so as to
hide the watermark.
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DCT domain watermarking can be classified into global DCT watermarking and
block DCT watermarking. Cox et al. [14] have presented a global robust water-
marking that embeds the watermark into the large coefficients of the DCT of a
cover image. As the large coefficients represent more perceptually significant com-
ponents of the image spectrum that likely survive after common image processing
operations, such an embedding strategy can achieve higher robustness. Given the
watermarked and the original images, the watermark can be retrieved from the DCT
coefficients of the two images. The method is robust against various image opera-
tions, including image scaling, JPEG compression and dithering. However, it is a
non-blind method, because it requires the availability of the original image during
the extraction of watermark.
Another category of DCT watermarking is block-based, taking advantage of the
local spatial correlation property of images. In block-based watermarking, the host
image is generally divided into several non-overlapping blocks (the commonly used
block size is 8 × 8) and then watermark is independently embedded into the DCT
coefficients of each image block. Huang et al. [64] have introduced a block-based
watermarking scheme in DCT domain, where spatial masking (both luminance and
texture masking) is taken into account during embedding, making the watermark-
ing an adaptive algorithm. The DC (Direct Current) coefficients rather than the
AC (Alternating Current) ones are employed to carry watermark information for
improved robustness of watermark. Several other block-based DCT watermarking
algorithms can be found in [4, 65].
DWT has been used in digital image watermarking more frequently as compared
to DFT and DCT, due to its excellent spatial localization and multi-resolution char-
acteristics, which are similar to the theoretical models of the HVS. Zhu et al. [66]
have proposed proposes a unified approach to watermarking images and videos based
on using the two- and three-dimensional DWT. This method adds the watermark
to all high-pass bands in the wavelet domain, but it does not consider the features
of the HVS. Kaewamnerd and Rao [67] improve the technique in [66], taking into
account the HVS features. Ganic et al. [68] have proposed a hybrid watermarking
technique based on DWT and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). After decom-
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posing the cover image into four bands, the SVD is applied to each band, followed
by embedding the watermark data through modifying the singular values. By ex-
ploiting the significant difference of wavelet coefficient quantization, Lin et al. [69]
have presented a blind watermarking algorithm. The maximum wavelet coefficient
are quantized so that their significant difference exhibits a large energy difference
which is used for watermark extraction.
Embedding into multiple frequency domains could have combined advantages
derived from each single domain, so researchers have investigated and presented
some interesting multiple domain watermarking techniques. Zhao et al. [70] have
presented a dual domain watermarking technique for image authentication and com-
pression. They use the DCT domain for watermark generation and DWT domain
for watermark insertion. The embedded watermark is comprised of two components:
a soft-authenticator watermark for authentication and tampering assessment of the
given image, and a chrominance watermark for improved efficiency of compression.
A DWT-DFT based image watermarking algorithm has been proposed in [71], where
a spread-spectrum-based informative watermark is embedded in the coefficients of
the LL subband in the DWT domain while a template is embedded in the middle
frequency components in the DFT domain. Notice that after applying DWT to an
image, we obtain a set of four subbands, namely, LL, LH, HL and HH. The LL
subbands represent the approximated version of the original at smaller resolution.
The LH blocks contain vertical edge components. Similarly, the HL and HH blocks
contain horizontal and diagonal details, respectively.
2.2 3D Information Hiding
3D information hiding has received relatively less attention and thus fewer schemes
have been reported for hiding data over 3D models, as compared to digital images.
However, recent advances in 3D hardware, data acquisition and processing imply
the advent of 3D as a mainstream communications medium over the next years.
As pointed out in [72], some of the potential applications of 3D computer graphics
models are in digital archives, entertainment, Web3D, MPEG4, and game industry.
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The expected extensive use of 3D content in practical applications means that im-
mediate research attention should be paid to 3D steganography and watermarking.
In what follows, we shall review the recently proposed data embedding strategies
for 3D models.
2.2.1 3D Steganography
Regarding 3D steganographic algorithms, they achieve embedding of information
based either by modifying the geometry, or by changing the connectivity and topol-
ogy, or on taking full advantage of the redundancy in the indexed representation
of a host 3D model. Since steganography favors large embedding capacity, the ma-
jority of the existing 3D steganographic algorithms use as the message carrier the
geometry rather than the connectivity or the representation which usually has lower
embedding capacity.
Geometry-based Steganography: This type of 3D steganographic algorithm
works by means of inserting messages into the geometry of a host 3D model. As
mentioned before, most of the previous 3D steganographic schemes belong to this
category.
The first data embedding technique for 3D geometric objects is by Ohbuchi et
al. [73]. Ohbuchi et al. have described the background and requirements for 3D data
hiding and then proposed two methods: triangle similarity quadruple embedding and
tetrahedral volume ratio embedding.
Cayre et al. [5] have proposed a blind data hiding scheme. The algorithm con-
sists of two steps: 1) establishing a list of triangles of the 3D mesh that will be
used to carry message bits and 2) modifying each admissible triangle in the list
according to the message bit it will carry. The principal idea behind the method is
to consider each triangle as a two-state geometric object, that is, 0 or 1, depending
on the position where the triangle summit vertex is orthogonally projected to its
opposite edge. In order to insert a message bit, they move the projection of a vertex
towards the nearest correct interval of its opposite edge. Inspired by the ideas by
Benedens [74, 75], they deal with the synchronization problem by considering geo-
metrical/topological properties and applying PCA. More specifically, the starting
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of Cayre et al.’s method [5] that embeds the message bit
through moving the projection of a vertex towards the nearest correct interval. (a)
the opposite edge is divided into two intervals and (b) the opposite edge is divided
into four intervals. In both cases, the bits being embedded are all “1”.
triangle in the triangle list is regarded as the triangle with lowest or greatest area.
Alternatively, the initial triangle is one of the six triangles that intersect with the
three principal axes centered at the gravity center of the host 3D mesh. Fig. 2.1
illustrates the embedding process. The use of PCA make the data hiding method ro-
bust against 3D content-preserving operations, but it offers weak robustness against
malicious attacks, such as 3D simplification and re-meshing. In addition, the al-
gorithm has other shortcomings. For instance, it is exclusively suitable for hiding
data over 3D triangle meshes, but not appropriate for data embedding into other
non-triangular meshes with arbitrary topology, because it can be hard to define the
opposite edge of a vertex on a general polygonal mesh. Another drawback lies in its
low embedding capacity, whose upper limit is 1 bit per vertex.
The work by Cayre et al. [5] has greatly influenced the development of 3D
steganography. Based on Cayre et al.’s method, Wang et al. [11] have successfully
increased the embedding capacity to be approximately 3 bits per vertex by using a
multi-level embedding procedure. The improved algorithm decreases visual degra-
dation since it takes into account the characteristics of HVS when executing message
insertion. Moreover, the algorithm is able to carry out data embedding and extrac-
tion quickly, making it suitable for data embedding over large 3D datasets. Wang
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Chao et al.’s state classification [6].
et al. have extended their work in [76], achieving even higher embedding capacity
and lower distortion. The extension has taken into consideration the relationship
between the HVS and the size of the payload in the phase of embedding, thus mak-
ing it an adaptive algorithm. Their main observation is that it is easier to notice
the changes on the smooth surfaces or regions than to observe the modifications on
the rough surfaces. Based on this, it is reasonable to vary the embedding strength
in different surface areas. For the embedder to estimate the degree of smoothness
or roughness, the approach exploits the correlation between neighboring polygons
with respect to the HVS. It is worth mentioning here that the method is the first
3D steganographic scheme that can achieve adaptive message embedding. Addi-
tionally, it is robust against affine transformations and it has high capacity and low
distortion. The main limitation is its poor performance when inserting messages
into models with a smaller number of vertices. This limitation is due to machine
precision errors.
Instead of deeming each triangle as a two-state object, Chao et al. [6] construct
a new coordinate system using the three principal axes obtained by applying PCA
to the cover 3D model. Then, they uniformly divide the line segment, whose two
extreme end points Va and Vb are the furthest projections of the mesh vertices on the
new x, y or z axis into a set of intervals and assign each segment a two-state object
in an interleaved manner. Fig. 2.2 illustrates the state classification process on the
line
−−→
VaVb. Next, each segment is further divided into change region and un-change
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of Chao et al.’s moving direction for embedding [6].
region and the embedding proceeds with either keeping the to-be-embedded vertex
intact, or moving it into the change region of an interval, depending on the message
bit to be inserted and the state of the interval into which the vertex is projected.
To minimize distortion, the moving direction depends on the projected position on
the interval. That is, if the projection is on the left-hand side of the middle of
the interval, the vertex will be moved towards the left into the change region, and
vice versa (see Fig. 2.3). The method achieves high embedding capacity with low
embedding distortion, but it can weakly only resist similarity transform attacks and
is unable to withstand malicious attacks.
Through the evaluation of the algorithm, the embedding capacity of 3D steganog-
raphy has increased from nearly 0.5 bit per vertex in [77], to approximately 39 bits
in [6] and about 50 bits per vertex in [10]. In particular, the steganography by
Yang et al. [10], which will be presented in Chapter 4, appears to outperform any
previous state-of-the-art steganographic methods in terms of embedding capacity
and distortion control.
Other embedding primitives have also been successfully used to carry the mes-
sages. For instance, Wu et al. [78] have proposed an embedding algorithm that
carries out information embedding through modifying
di = vi − ci = (vix − cix, viy − ciy, viz − ciz) (2.2.1)
with
ci =
1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1
nji (2.2.2)
where {nji | 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni} is a set of Ni vertices nji directly connected to the vertex
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vi and (vix, viy, viz) and (cix, ciy, ciz) are, respectively, the coordinates of di and ci in
R3. Wu et al. [79] have inserted the information into the distances from the mesh
vertices to the centroids of their respective neighboring vertices. As those distances
are invariant to similarity transformations, the method can withstand similarity
transformations.
Topology-based Steganography: This category contains 3D steganographic
algorithms based on modifying the connectivity or topological features of a host
3D model to embed data. Their main drawback is that the connectivity can carry
limited information only. Presently, there are only a few 3D connectivity-based
steganographic methods reported in the literature.
Mao et al. [80] have developed a method achieving data hiding through triangle
subdivision. Specifically, they add a new vertex on each of the three edges of a
triangle and then divide the triangle into four sub-triangles after connecting any
two new vertices. This process is equivalent to replacing a longer triangle edge with
two smaller edges. The ratio between the lengths of the two newly introduced edges
has been used to carry a message bit. The approach is blind because it does require
the availability of the original cover model during the message extraction process.
Using minimum spanning tree (MST) and connectivity modification, Amat et
al. [81] have proposed a lossless 3D steganography. The method consists of three
steps. The first step is to construct a MST that covers the vertices of the host 3D
model. Next, the second step necessitates a scanning of the constructed MST to find
and synchronize particular mesh areas for embedding the data. They have used PCA
in the second step, which guarantees that the mesh reorganization does not disturb
the location of the starting vertex and that the starting vertex is dependent only on
the secret key. The final step involves the embedding of the message, which is carried
out via modifying the connectivity of triangles in the selected areas. The method is
distortion-free, in the sense that it does not modify the positions or coordinates of
the mesh vertices during embedding.
Representation-based Steganography: This category of 3D steganographic
algorithms carries out data hiding by exploiting the redundancy in the mesh repre-
sentation. In general, representation-based steganographic methods are distortion-
27
2.2. 3D Information Hiding
free, because they employ representation redundancy for embedding while keeping
the geometry and connectivity of the 3D mesh intact. Similar to connectivity-based
steganography, only few 3D steganographic techniques based on representation have
been proposed. Moreover, representation-based steganography has a more limited
scope than those embedding information on the mesh geometry.
Chen et al. [82] have presented a 3D polygonal steganographic approach that
uses the representation information to embed messages. They embed messages by
modifying the vertex representation order and the polygon representation order,
with respect to the traversal orders. This method is lossless because changing the
order of vertices and polygons arbitrarily in the vertex list and the polygonal list of
the mesh file does not distort the mesh geometry.
Bogomjakov et al. [83] have presented a distortion-free steganography that hides
a message in the indexed representation of a mesh by permuting the order in which
faces and vertices are stored. The permutation is relative to a reference ordering
that encoder and decoder derive from the mesh connectivity in a consistent manner.
Although the permutation of vertices and faces does not affect the geometry of the
mesh, it will affect the rendering performance. Tu et al. [84] have improved the
efficiency in the original mapping of [83], further increasing the average embedding
capacity up to 0.63 bits per primitive. The original mapping in [83] encodes interior
nodes as well as their leaf nodes, so the prefixes of the corresponding bitstreams
are represented twice. By contrast, Tu et al. have overcome this inefficiency by
changing the mapping such that only leaf nodes are encoded.
2.2.2 3D Watermarking
Similarly to image watermarking, 3D mesh watermarking methods can be generally
classified into two categories: spatial-based and transform-based. The methods in the
first category achieve the embedding of the watermark through modifying the spatial
information, such as the geometry and topology of a 3D cover model. The methods
in the second category work by first transferring a 3D model into the spectral domain
and then inserting the watermark into some frequency-based primitives.
Spatial-based Watermarking: During the early stages of the development of
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3D watermarking, fragile watermarking schemes have been proposed for the purposes
of authentication and attack localization. In general, a fragile watermarking should
have the following two properties. The first one is that it should be sensitive even to
slight modifications. The second one is that it should be able to locate and identify
the endured attacks. Although fragile watermarking techniques are not required to
be robust against malicious attacks, it is also expected that they are able to survive
the content-preserving operations. As stated in [85], two problems frequently arise
in the embedding stage: causality and convergence. The causality problem arises
while the neighboring relationship of a formerly processed vertex is influenced by the
perturbation of the subsequently processed neighboring vertices. It results in the
extracted bits being different from the original ones, even in the absence of attacks.
The convergence problem means that the original model may have to be heavily
distorted before some vertices reach a predefined relationship.
In one of the earliest approaches, Yeo et al. [86] have first proposed a fragile
watermarking method to verify 3D meshes. The watermarking method perturbs
each vertex to ensure that two predefined hash functions have the same value on it.
Verification is achieved by a comparison of the values computed by the two hash
functions. One drawback of this method is the causality problem, caused by its
heavy dependence on the order of traversal of the vertices. The proposed scheme
is not able to localize the changes or distinguish malicious attacks from incidental
data processing. The method has both the causality and convergence problems.
To trade off the causality problem in Yeo et al.’s method, Lin et al. [87] have
introduced a new fragile watermarking that is immune to certain shape-preserving
data processing. Their method copes with the causality problem by applying two
different hash functions on the vertex coordinates, without taking into account the
neighbors of a vertex. The method is independent of the order of vertices, so the
hidden watermark is immune to vertex order-dependent attacks, such as vertex
reordering. A 3D mesh authenticating watermarking scheme has been proposed by
Wu et al. in [88]. Their method embeds the watermark bits by adjusting the
positions of the centroids of the mesh faces. The watermark embedded with this
method survives translation, rotation and uniform scaling, but it is sensitive to other
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operations.
Chou [85] have overcome the causality and convergence problems by introducing
a multi-function vertex embedding method and a vertex-adjusting method. In the
former method, the three coordinate components of a marked vertex are assigned and
embedded with different functions of watermark in the watermark embedding stage.
The x coordinate of a vertex is modulated to indicate if it is a marked vertex, while
the y and z coordinates are respectively used to carry the watermark information
and the hash value of the watermark. The latter method aims at overcoming the
afore-mentioned two problems, by means of keeping the barycenters of the marked
vertices unchanged. Another feature of the method is its ability to control the
average distortion as a result of the watermark embedding.
Recently, a semi-fragile watermarking algorithm for the authentication of 3D
models has been proposed by Wang et al. [89] based on integral invariants. For em-
bedding, the method modifies the integral invariants of some of the vertices through
shifting the positions of a vertex and its neighbors. It can survive under rigid trans-
forms and certain noise attacks. More 3D fragile watermarking algorithms can be
found in [90,91].
As mentioned earlier, the literature is primarily concerned with the robustness
of watermark. To increase robustness, rather than inserting the watermark into a
single vertex, Yu et al. [92] have proposed to embed it into a group of mesh vertices.
Specifically, they scramble and divide the vertices into a set of groups according to
a secure key. Each group carries only one watermark bit. The watermark bit is
inserted with a simple additive method that modifies the distances between the ver-
tices of each group to the center of the model. The watermark strength varies taking
into account the local feature of the mesh, thus making the embedded watermark
less visible, but more robust. The watermarking is non-blind since the original 3D
model is required during watermark extraction. It is worth mentioning here that the
method is the very first attempt to insert a watermark in a global and essentially
geometric characteristic of a 3D mesh; the characteristic used here is the distances
from the mesh vertices to the mesh center.
Since the Cartesian coordinates (x, y, z) appear to be sensitive under attacks,
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of Cho et al.’s watermarking [7] that embeds the watermark
through modifying the mean value of the histogram in a bin: (a) the mean value is
decreased to embed a bit “-1”; (b) the assumed uniform distribution in a bin; and
(c) the mean value is increased to embed a bit “+1”. The x- and y- axes stand for
the normalized distances from vertices to the mesh barycenter and the occurrence
probability, respectively.
some researchers have recently attempted to insert watermarks over the spherical
coordinates (ρ, θ, φ). The ρ is the radial component, representing the Euclidean
distance from a mesh vertex to the barycenter of the 3D model. Several properties of
ρ make it a promising candidate as watermark carrier. One of them is its invariance
under various operations, such as 3D rotation and translation. A second property
is that the embedding of ρ is supposed to be robust, in the sense that the values of
ρ approximately represent the shape of the 3D mesh.
Cho et al. [7] have proposed two watermarking algorithms based on modifying the
radial component ρ of the spherical coordinates. The basic ideas of two methods
are almost the same, but the difference is that the first changes the mean of ρ
in one group, while the other alters the variance. Both build a histogram using
{ρi|1 ≤ i ≤ N}, where ρi is the Euclidean distance from the i-th vertex to the mesh
barycenter and N is the number of vertices of a host 3D model. Then, they normalize
all the ρi in each histogram bin, so that the normalized ρ
′
i is 0 ≤ ρ′i ≤ 1. The
embedding of watermark is based on the assumption that the mean of the normalized
distances ρ′i in each bin is approximately 1/2 and the variance is about 1/3. In other
words, they increase or decrease ρ′i depending on the value of watermark bit to be
embedded, making the mean (or variance) of the updated ρ′i in each bin smaller or
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of Cho et al.’s watermarking [7] that embeds the watermark
through modifying the variance of the histogram in a bin: (a) the variance is de-
creased to embed a bit “-1”; (b) the assumed uniform distribution in a bin; and (c)
the variance is increased to embed a bit “+1”. The x- and y- axes stand for the
normalized distances from vertices to the mesh gravity center and the occurrence
probability, respectively.
greater than 1/2 (or 1/3). Fig. 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the watermarking processes for
the two approaches.
Similarly, Zafeiriou et al. [12] have proposed two watermarking schemes in the
spherical coordinate system. Before watermark embedding, they calculate the barycen-
ter, then perform principal axis alignment using PCA and convert the 3D model
from the Cartesian coordinate system into the spherical coordinate. The watermark
embedding is carried out by altering the radial component ρ.
As demonstrated by the experimental results, the watermarking schemes in [7,
12] are resistant to a number of both non-malicious and malicious attacks. Other
methods that exploit spherical coordinates as watermark carriers include those by
Ashourian et al. [93] and Darazi et al. [94].
Regarding other spatial-based robust watermarking techniques that modify the
geometry for watermark insertion, some are particularly worthy of being mentioned
here, even though they could have relatively weaker robustness. Bors [95] has pro-
posed two blind watermarking algorithms that use a neighborhood localized mea-
sure to find vertices that give small embedding distortion and then watermarks
these vertices by local geometric perturbations. Unlike most conventional 3D object
watermarking techniques, where both watermark insertion and extraction are per-
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mesh surface [21]–[23]. Empirically, it was observed that ver-
tices from each strip define a uniform distribution of geodesic
distances. During watermark embedding, the mean or the vari-
ance of distributions of geodesic distances corresponding to the
vertices from each strip is changed according to the bit to be
embedded. The Vertex Placement Scheme (VPS) algorithm is
proposed for displacing vertices on the 3-D object surface as re-
quired by the corresponding histogram mapping procedure. The
vertices are moved on the object surface along directions which
are perpendicular to the geodesic front lines. The message is
embedded when all vertices comply with the marked geodesic
distance distributions. By changing geodesic distances as pro-
posed in this study we ensure a minimal distortion to the ob-
ject shape surface. Section II introduces the geodesic distance
calculation and the FMM method, while Section III details the
stages of the proposed methodology corresponding to the ini-
tialization, histogram mapping, the vertex placement scheme,
and the watermark detection algorithm. Section IV contains the
mesh distortion analysis and provides the bounds for vertex dis-
placement. Section V presents the experimental results, while
Section VI details the conclusions of this research study.
II. GEODESIC DISTANCES ON MANIFOLDS
The proposed graphics watermarking methodology consists
of splitting the object into regions and statistically embedding
a single bit into each region. In order to ensure the robustness
to attacks we consider statistics of distance measures calculated
from the 3-D surface. The Euclidean distance simply calculates
the shortest distance between locations in space without consid-
ering any specific information about the object shape. In con-
trast, the geodesic distance calculates distances along the min-
imal path on the surface of the object [17], [18], [21], [22]. By
displacing vertices along their geodesic distance paths, which
are consistent with the 3-D object shape, we can embed robust
watermarks which do not visibly change the given mesh surface.
In the following, we outline a few concepts about calculating
geodesic distances on manifolds.
We consider an object , as a triangulated manifold which is
represented as a mesh containing vertices
, where is the total number of vertices. The vertices
are joined by edges forming polygons that model the 3-D shape
surface. Let us consider a curve , where
is a parameter, onto the surface of the object, which joins two
different points . The points are located on the object
surface, but they are not necessarily part of its vertex set. There
are a multitude of ways for joining the two given points such
that the connecting curve is completely contained on the surface
of the graphical object. The geodesic distance is the
shortest length over all continuous paths defined by the geodesic
curve between the endpoints and
(1)
where represents the local deriva-
tive of the parametric curve, and is an intrinsic metric,
considered as in this study. A geodesic map calcu-
lates the geodesic distances from all points on the object surface
Fig. 1. Calculation of the geodesic distance, highlighted using pseudo-color,
on the Bunny object. Each strip in (b) is used for embedding a single bit and
is pseudo-colored with a different color, while the region around the source,
which is shown in blue, is trimmed away. (a) Geodesic map. (b) Iso-geodesic
mesh strip generation.
to a set of known source locations. The geodesic map to a single
source point is shown coded using colors on the Bunny object
in Fig. 1(a), where the reference point, representing the source
for evaluating the geodesic distances, is indicated by a small
red (online version) circle on Bunny’s year. The pseudo-color
varies from blue to red, according to the geodesic distance from
the source point. In the following, we consider a single source
location and denote , where is
an arbitrary point on the surface of .
One way for solving (1) is by considering that the distance
function satisfies the intrinsic Eikonal equation [22], which is a
nonlinear partial differential equation given by
(2)
such that there is a start location with , where
and represents the norm. Physically, the solution is
the shortest distance from to using only paths contained in
, where is the propagation speed at location . In the
following, we assume that the propagation speed is constant all
over the mesh and consider . The idea for solving the
Eikonal equation is to find an approximation to the gradient term
which correctly deals with shape variations including folds and
creases [21].
Various solutions have been proposed for calculating the
geodesic distance [18]–[20]. An approximate solution for
solving the eikonal equation (2) on triangulated manifolds is
provided by the FMM [18], [22]. FMM ensures that every
vertex is updated only once by progressively advancing the
front-of-distance calculation in an upwind direction starting
from the source (reference location) . At any time, when
applying this method, the object vertices are split into three
sets: representing the processed vertices, for the vertices
on the geodesic distance front line, and containing the
vertices whose geodesic distance is not calculated yet, such
that , where is the vertex set, and where
the intersection of any two of these sets is empty. Initially, the
source points are labeled as . Neighbors of the source
points are marked as . As soon as a vertex
has its geodesic distance calculated, it is moved from set
to set . The neighbors of are moved to the front set ,
(a)
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trast, the geodesic distance calculates distances along the min-
imal path on the surface of the object [17], [18], [21], [22]. By
displacing vertices along their geodesic distance paths, which
are consistent with the 3-D object shape, we can embed robust
watermarks which do not visibly change the given mesh surface.
In the following, we outline a few concepts about calculating
geodesic distances on manifolds.
We consider an object , as a triangulated manifold which is
represented as a mesh containing vertices
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are joined by edges forming polygons that model the 3-D shape
surface. Let us consider a curve , where
is a parameter, onto the surface of the object, which joins two
different points . The points are located on the object
surface, but they are not necessarily part of its vertex set. There
are a multitude of ways for joining the two given points such
that the connecting curve is completely contained on the surface
of the graphical object. The geodesic distance is the
shortest length over all continuous paths defined by the geodesic
curve between the endpoints and
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where represents the local deriva-
tive of the parametric curve, and is an intrinsic metric,
considered as in this study. A geodesic map calcu-
lates the geodesic distances from all points on the object surface
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on the Bunny object. Each strip in (b) is used for emb ding a single bit and
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varies from blue t red, according to the geodesic distance from
the ource point. In the following, we consider a single source
location and denote , where is
an arbitrary point on the surface of .
One way for solving (1) is by considering that the distance
function satisfies the intrinsic Eiko al equation [22], which is a
nonlinear partial differential equation given by
(2)
such that there is a start location with , where
and represents the norm. Physically, the solution is
the shortest distance from to using only paths contained in
, where is the propagation speed at location . In the
following, we assume that the propagation speed is constant all
over the mesh and consider . The idea for solving the
Eikonal equation is to find an approximation to the gradient term
which correctly deals with shape variations including folds and
creases [21].
Various solutions have been proposed for calculating the
geodesic distance [18]–[20]. An approximate solution for
solving the eikonal equation (2) on triangulated manifolds is
provided by the FMM [18], [22]. FMM ensures that every
vertex is updated only once by progressively advancing the
front-of-distance calculation in an upwind direction starting
from the source (reference location) . At any time, when
applying this method, the object vertices are split into three
sets: representing the processed vertices, for the vertices
on the geodesic distance front line, and containing the
vertices whose geodesic distance is not calculated yet, such
that , where is the vertex set, and where
the intersection of any two of these sets is empty. Initially, the
source points are labeled as . Neighbors of the source
points are marked as . As soon as a vertex
has its geodesic distance calculated, it is moved from set
to set . The neighbors of are moved to the front set ,
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Figure 2.6: The geodesic distances, computed on the Bunny object with respect to
the single source point (indicated by a small red circle on Bunny ear), are highlighted
using pseudo-color. (a) the Geodesic map, where the pseudo-color varies from blue to
red, according to the geodesic distance. (b) Iso-geodesic mesh strip generation. Each
trip defines the region of almost equal geodesic distances and is used for embedding
a single bit.
formed on the 3D object itself, Bennour et al. [96] have proposed a new framework
for watermarking 3D objects via their ntour information. More rece tly, Luo et
al. [97] have presented a new statistical approach that watermarks geodesic distances
calculated with respect to a reference location on the mesh. The embedding and
extraction processes are very similar to those proposed in [7]. The principal idea
behind this type of watermarking is that it ch nges the mean or variance of the
geodesic distances that are grouped into each region. Fig. 2.6 shows the geodesic
map, which was computed on the Bunny model, as well as the regions or trips, each
of which contains almost the same geodesic distances.
A number of 3D watermarking approaches succeed in resisting common process-
ing operations, such as sm othing and noise addition. H wever, they are unable
to survive mesh editing operations, which have been recently considered as being
more realistic than other operations. Here, mesh editing means an operation that
alters the global shape of the 3D model. An example showing the mesh editing is
illustrated in Fig. 2.7.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.7: Illustration of the David model editing. (a) Original model, (b) and (c)
edited versions. The models are from the TOSCA database [8].
Considering the situation above, researchers have recently proposed some water-
marking schemes that are robust against mesh editing. One of them is by Lin et
al. [98], who embed watermark over the significant mesh patches with high curvature
values. Embedding into those regions minimizes the perceptible distortion, because
the HVS is more sensitive to changes in the low-curvature regions. Instead of using
Euclidean distances, geodesic distances are used, which would not be altered sig-
nificantly under mesh editing. This watermarking can survive a range of attacks,
but offers week robustness to non-uniform scaling and shearing. Moreover, it is a
non-blind method that requires some side information for watermark extraction.
Transform-based Watermarking: Another category of robust 3D mesh wa-
termarking methods uses spectral analysis to achieve significant improvements in
both watermark robustness and imperceptibility according to the spread spectrum
communication principle [14]. Multi-resolution analysis, such as DFT, DCT and
DWT, has been widely utilized in early image watermarking with the watermark
inserted into the coefficients obtained by applying these transformations to the host
image. Nevertheless, an efficient and robust spectral analysis tool has not been
proposed for 3D models as yet, and moreover, there is still a lack of a natural
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parametrization for frequency-based decompositions of arbitrary 3D models. As a
result, generalizing the spread spectrum-based watermarking approach to the case
of arbitrary triangle meshes is indeed an acute challenge [99], and it is some re-
cent research work in analyzing meshes that has resulted in multi-resolution surface
representations possessing similar properties as traditional wavelet transforms.
By taking advantage of the edge collapse-based multi-resolution decomposition
proposed by Hoppe [100], Praun et al. [50] have presented a robust, non-blind 3D
watermarking. A multi-resolution set of scalar basis function over the original mesh
is constructed after applying Hoppe’s method. The basis functions that correspond
to large perceptually significant features of the 3D model have been used to carry
the watermark enhancing the watermark robustness. This embedding idea is similar
to image watermarking approaches, where, for example, DCT basis functions with
large amplitudes have often been employed as watermark carriers. This method
has been shown to be robust against various real-world attacks; however, it is a
non-blind method, requiring 3D mesh registration and re-sampling.
Based on subdivision surfaces, Lounsbery et al. [101] have established a theo-
retical basis for applying wavelet analysis to surfaces of arbitrary topological type.
Using this wavelet analysis, Kanai et al. [102] proposed a non-blind watermarking
method by modifying the wavelet coefficients to embed watermark, while Uccheddu
et al. [103] have extended this non-blind approach to be a blind one. One constraint
to these methods is, however, that the input 3D mesh should be semi-regular.
Using the wavelet analysis scheme [104] for irregular meshes, Kim et al. [105]
have designed a watermarking technique that can be applied to both regular and
irregular 3D triangular meshes. In this proposal, the watermark is embedded by
modifying the L2-norm of the wavelet coefficients.
In addition to robust watermarking, wavelet multi-resolution analysis has been
employed to design fragile watermarking algorithms. In order to authenticate semi-
regular meshes, Cho et al. [106] have proposed a wavelet domain-based fragile
method, where the facets in the coarser mesh, which is obtained from applying
wavelet decompositions to the original triangular mesh, are taken as authentication
primitives. This method can withstand similarity transformations. However, as
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pointed out in [99], it may have two drawbacks: causality problem and weak local-
ization capability. Wang et al. [107] have embedded the authentication watermark
by slightly modifying the norms and orientations of the wavelet coefficient vectors.
Their method is robust to the content-preserving attacks, but vulnerable to others
attacks such as local and global geometric modifications and re-meshing.
Several other multi-resolution analysis tools have been utilized to design robust
3D mesh watermarking algorithms too. Yin et al. [108] first construct a Burt-Adelson
pyramid using [109], followed by the watermark insertion into a suitable coarser mesh
representation. Registration and re-sampling are required during watermark detec-
tion to bring the attacked 3D mesh model back into its original location, orientation,
scale, topology and resolution level, thus making this method non-blind.
Several frequency-based watermarking methods have been proposed. Ohbuchi et
al. [13] have proposed a frequency-based robust watermarking method. This method
is considered a classic in the frequency-based watermarking. Before watermark
embedding, the original cover mesh is divided into several patches, each of which is
generated around a seed vertex by incrementally adding all the neighboring vertices
within a given topological distance from the seed vertex. The distance used in this
method is computed by the standard Dijkstra’s algorithm. After patch generation,
the watermark is embedded via additive modulation of the spectral coefficients of
each patch, which are computed from the Kirchhoff matrix [110]. To further improve
robustness, each watermark bit is repeatedly inserted. The method is able to survive
various attacks, including cropping, mesh simplification and smoothing. It is a
non-blind method and thus requires the original mesh at the stage of watermark
extraction. Notice that Taubin et al. [111]’s spectral decomposition has also been
used by Karni et al. [112] for geometry compression.
Cayre et al. [113] have applied this spectral analysis to the watermarking of
3D triangle mesh geometry. The embedding of the watermark is achieved through
modifying the spectral coefficients, obtained from the Laplacian matrix. More re-
cently, Abdallah et al. [114] have presented a spectral graph-theoretic approach to
3D mesh watermarking, where they partition the host 3D mesh into a set of smaller
sub-meshes, compress each sub-mesh using spectral compression [112] and finally
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modify the spectral coefficients of each compressed sub-mesh to insert the water-
mark.
One obvious shortcoming of spectral analysis is its high computational com-
plexity, since it involves the computation of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a
probably large Laplacian or Kirchhoff matrix. This computation is extremely time-
consuming, especially for large 3D models. To settle this issue, the researchers have
proposed to divide the original 3D mesh into several mesh segments and then insert
watermarks into each segment.
Other spectral algorithms that have been proposed and used for robust 3D wa-
termarking include Wu et al. [115]. There, they have presented a fast watermarking
algorithm based on the orthogonalization of a small set of radial basis functions, try-
ing to avoid the complicated numerical computations of previous methods during
multiresolution or spectral mesh analysis. This method can efficiently watermark
very large 3D models.
Yang et al. [9] have proposed a robust watermarking algorithm, aiming at the
robustness against mesh editing. The method will be presented in Chapter 7.
2.3 Video, Audio and Text Information Hiding
This section will provide a brief review of the information embedding techniques for
video, audio and text. We start introducing information hiding schemes for video,
then for audio and finally for text.
Video Watermarking: In general, video signals have large amounts of data
and inherent redundancy between frames, that is, many successive frames are vi-
sually similar to each other. These properties result in video signals being highly
susceptible to pirate attacks, such as frame averaging, frame dropping and interpo-
lation, which are not applicable to digital images. Therefore, video watermarking
is not a simple extension of still image watermarking and designing a video water-
marking that is able to survive a wide range of practical attacks is a particularly
challenging task.
Hartung et al. have first launched the research on video watermarking and
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proposed two methods for raw and compressed videos [116]. In the case of raw
video watermarking, after modulating a binary watermark sequence with a binary
pseudo-noise sequence, they add the modulated signal to the line-scanned digital
video signal, yielding a watermarked video signal. In the case of compressed video
watermarking where the video data is represented in a bitstream, they obtain a set
of 64-sized vectors after applying DCT to the 8 × 8 blocks of the watermark and
doing a zig-zag-scan to the DCT coefficients of each watermark block. Then, they
perform an additive operation, adding each 64-sized vector to its corresponding 64-
sized vector of DCT coefficients of each 8×8 video block, obtaining a marked video.
The two approaches are, in general, sensitive to frame cutting and exchange.
Swanson et al. [117] have presented an object-based watermarking procedure to
embed copyright protection into raw video sequences. They extract objects from the
given host video and embed identical or different watermarks into visually similar
and distinct objects, respectively. In particular, each similar object is associated
with a watermark. As a result, the watermark for each frame changes according
to perceptual characteristics, while simultaneously protecting objects against sta-
tistical analysis and averaging. In [118], they have extended their work by adding
the wavelet transform to the previous embedding framework. To be more precise,
instead of working on the original video frames [117], they apply wavelet transform
to the original frames, producing wavelet coefficient video frames, and embed the
watermark into the resulting wavelet-based frames. Both methods are blind, but
one common drawback is that they consume additional storage space to maintain
an object database that is composed of the objects extracted from the videos. The
database is later used for determining the presence of watermark. In other words,
given a potentially pirated video sequence, they extract an object from it, obtain
a difference signal by subtracting the object from its corresponding similar object
from the database and finally draw a watermark existence decision based on the sim-
ilarity between the extracted signal and the original watermark associated with the
object from the database. Another interesting object-based video watermarking has
been proposed by Bas et al. [119], where the authors use the PCA to orientate the
signature, taking into account object manipulations, such as rotations, translations
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and Video Object Plane (VOL) modifications.
There exist some algorithms that only watermark specific video formats, for
instance, MPEG-4 watermarking in [120,121] and H. 264 watermarking in [122,123].
A survey regarding the current approaches for video content protection systems and
recent advances in the tools and methods for providing security in such systems can
be found in [124,125].
Audio Watermarking: Since the early development stage of audio watermark-
ing, spatial/temporal and frequency masking approaches have been considered for
audio watermarking algorithms, aiming at the inaudibility of the embedded water-
mark.
Tilki et al. [126] have presented a method of encoding a hidden digital signature
of about 35 bits in length into the audio component of a television signal. Based
on the fact that humans are much more sensitive to the lower frequencies, they add
the watermark signal to the Fourier transform coefficients over the middle frequency
bands. Aiming at watermarks that are both inaudible and robust, properties of the
human auditory system (HAS) have been exploited by Swanson et al. [127]. The
method computes the temporal masking and the Fourier-based frequency masking
and uses the two maskings together with the author signature to create a watermark.
The watermark signal is subsequently added to the original audio signal, producing
the watermarked audio signal. The watermark detection requires the availability of
the original audio and is accomplished via hypothesis testing. In other words, the
watermark-like signal extracted from a received audio signal is measured against the
original watermark with respect to a threshold that defines their similarity.
Similarly to image watermarking, DCT and DWT have been successfully used
for audio watermarking too. After applying DCT to the audio signal, Yeo et al. [128]
insert watermark by modifying the resulting DCT coefficients. Wang et al. [129] have
proposed a synchronization invariant audio watermarking, based on both DWT and
DCT. To avoid the synchronization problem, a synchronization code, in addition to a
binary watermark image, is inserted into the audio signal. That is, they divide each
segment of a host audio into two sections; one is used to carry the synchronization
code, while the other is employed to convey the real watermark signal. Another
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interesting self-synchronized watermarking scheme has been introduced in [130],
where the authors combine the synchronization codes and watermark together into
a binary data sequence and then insert the combined binary string into the low-
frequency DWT coefficients of each audio segment. The combination used in the
method enables the hidden data to be equipped with the self-synchronization ability.
There are several other excellent audio watermarking approaches reported in the
literature. Lee et al. [131] use a technique analogous to spread spectrum commu-
nications to insert the watermark in the cepstral domain of the host audio signal,
while Bassia et al. [48] embed the watermark in the time domain.
Text Watermarking: Thus far, there have been relatively fewer works on text
watermarking compared to images and videos watermarking.
Brassil et al. [132] have proposed the line-shift and word-shift text watermarking
algorithms. The first method works by moving the second line up or down depending
on the binary signal to be inserted and keeping the line immediately above or below
(or both) intact. By contrast, the second method performs embedding by moving
a word left or right and keeping the immediately adjacent words unmoved. In both
approaches, the unmoved components serve as reference locations in the decoding
process.
Atallah et al. [133] have proposed the idea of using the semantics and syntax of
the text for inserting the watermark and also a watermarking algorithm that uses
the binary encodings of the words to insert information into the text through per-
forming lexical substitution in synonym sets. Later, they have presented another
two algorithms [134, 135], where the information is inserted into the tree structure
of the text, rather than directly into the text. The difference between the two algo-
rithms is that the first one modifies syntactic parse trees of the cover text sentences,
while the second one uses semantic tree representations. The selection of sentences
that carry the watermark depends only on the tree structure. After selecting the
sentences to embed the watermark, the bits are stored by applying either syntactic
or semantic transformations. Semantic transformations in that work were designed
for preserving the meaning of the overall text, but not necessarily preserving the
meaning of every individual sentence.
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There are some watermarking approaches aiming at inserting watermark into
language-specific texts. For instance, Sun et al. [136] and Liu et al. [137] concentrate
on watermarking Chinese texts, while Meral [138] focus on marking Turkish texts.
2.4 Image Steganalysis
It is not surprising that the advancements in steganography and watermarking have
impelled the development of their counterpart, steganalysis. Thus far, numerous
excellent steganalysis algorithms have been proposed, and they can generally be
classified into two categories: embedding specific and universal. The former aim at
the detection of a message associated with particular steganographic methods, while
the latter aim at the message detection regardless of the embedding algorithm.
2.4.1 Specific Steganalysis
Specific steganalysis is likely to achieve higher detection accuracy than universal
steganalysis because specific methods concentrate on the identification and extrac-
tion of those patterns that are sensitive to a specific or known embedding algorithm
only.
Among various image embedding techniques, least-significant bit (LSB) steganog-
raphy, including LSB replacement and matching embedding, is of great interest to
steganalysis experts. Fridrich et al. [139] have introduced a powerful steganalytic
method for detection of LSB replacement. The method is based on the observation
that the LSB plane in a typical cover image can be predicted to some extent from
the remaining 7 bit-planes, while this prediction becomes less reliable as the LSB
is randomized. The experimental results show that an upper bound for safe LSB
embedding is 0.005 bits per sample for high-quality images and that any LSB-based
hiding method with embedding rate above that bound could be easily detected.
By modeling a finite state machine whose states are selected multisets of sample
pairs called trace multisets, Dumitrescu et al. [140] have presented an alternative
approach to detecting least LSB replacement steganography.
Thus far, fewer detection methods for LSB matching have been proposed. Among
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them, one well-known steganalytic algorithm is by Harmsen et al. [141], who have
proposed using the center of mass (COM) of the histogram characteristic function
(HCF). Ker [142] has achieved higher detection rate by using down-sampled image
for calibration and by using the adjacency histogram instead of the usual histogram.
Most of the steganalysis schemes against LSB steganography work only for de-
tecting information hidden in the least-significant bit plane of an image. Yu et
al. [143] have designed a image steganalysis approach that can detect the message
bits embedded not only in the least-significant bit plane, but also in other less sig-
nificant bit planes.
There exist some steganalysis approaches aiming at other than LSB stegano-
graphic methods. For instance, Fridrich et al. [144] have been focused on the JPEG
steganographic algorithm F5. The key element of their method is the estimation of
the cover-image histogram from the stego-image, which is done by decompressing the
stego-image, cropping it by four pixels in both directions to remove the quantization
artifact in the frequency domain, and re-compressing it using the same quality fac-
tor as the stego-image. Li et al. [145] have concentrated on a recent steganographic
algorithm, i.e., the YASS algorithm, which was designed to resist blind steganalysis
via embedding data in randomized locations. Their steganalysis is based on the
observation that the embedding locations chosen by the YASS embedding scheme
are not randomized enough, making the YASS detectable.
2.4.2 Universal Steganalysis
A major challenge in developing universal steganalytic algorithms is the identifica-
tion of the features that are modified by watermark embedding. Learning-based
steganalysis has been demonstrated as a promising strategy that can ensure uni-
versality. Generally, universal steganalysis follows a two-step framework. The first
step involves feature training to obtain a classifier, where the feature data to be
trained are extracted from a training dataset of both marked and unmarked images.
The second stage consists of computing the features from a test image within a test
dataset, applying the classifier produced in the first phase to the feature vector and
finally making a steganalytic decision.
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Farid [30] has proposed a universal approach that uses a wavelet-like decompo-
sition to build higher-order statistical models of natural images. For each image,
Farid computes the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the wavelet coefficients
and cross-subband prediction errors of wavelet coefficients and creates a 24(n− 1)-
sized feature vector by collecting these statistics. Here, n is the level of wavelet
decomposition applied to images. Fisher linear discriminant analysis (FLD), a class
specific method for pattern recognition, is applied to the feature vectors of a train-
ing set of images with and without hidden messages, resulting in a classifier that
distinguishes between unmarked and marked images. Once the classifier has been
computed, the steganalysis process is straightforward. Given a test image, we just
compute its feature vector, apply the classifier to the feature vector and assign it
to the marked or unmarked category. Lyu et al. [146] have proposed a steganalytic
algorithm using higher-order image statistics. They have extended [30] by extract-
ing a 72(n− 1)-dimensional feature vector from each image and employing support
vector machines (SVM) rather than FLD for building the classifier.
Rather than using empirical probability density function (PDF) moments as
in [30], Xuan et al. [147] use the empirical characteristic function (CF) moments
of the wavelet characteristic functions for steganalysis. Wang et al. [23] extract
features from wavelet coefficients and use the informative features from empirical
PDF and CF moments of subband images for universal steganalysis. These two
kinds of moments have been widely used as features in the steganalysis approaches,
but coefficients from other domains have also been used. Lie et al. [148] analyze the
statistical properties of the spatial and DCT domains to determine the existence of
hidden messages in an image.
2.5 Summary
By searching the literature we realized that several excellent data hiding and ste-
ganalysis algorithms have been proposed. Most of them have concentrated on text,
image, audio or video and relatively little work has been reported on 3D models,
despite their increased prevalence in practical applications. We also notice that
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despite the sophistication of the existing text/image/audio/video data embedding
and detection techniques, they cannot be applied to mark 3D objects directly. We
concluded that research into 3D information embedding and detection can be timely
and have immediate practical implications.
In addition, most of the 3D existing steganographic approaches have low embed-
ding capacity and are not able to control the embedding distortion resulting from
steganography, which could cause unpleasant visual quantity degradation. Regard-
ing 3D watermarking, some previous watermarking algorithms have been demon-
strated to be robust against common attacks, such as geometric transformations,
noise addition and mesh smoothing, but they are not resistant to more realistic
processing attacks, for instance, mesh editing attacks.
As for steganalysis, a number of steganalysis algorithms have been proposed
for detecting the hidden message in digital images; however, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no steganalytic algorithm yet reported for 3D computer graphics
models.
Given the above observations, the main motivation for this thesis is the de-
velopment of 3D information hiding and steganalysis techniques, introducing new
insights into how the embedding distortion and embedding capacity are related, and
proposing novel algorithms.
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Chapter 3
Normal Degradation of Triangle
Meshes: An Empirical Study
As any digital information, the vertex coordinates of a triangle mesh can be seen as
real numbers quantized at a level l, with typical values l = 32 bits (floats), or l = 64
bits (doubles). The choice of the appropriate l is a trade-off between efficiency and
quality. A small l may lead to a significant loss of geometric information while, on
the other hand, a large l may lead to mesh representations with a lot of redundancy,
resulting to unnecessarily large files and consequently, to unnecessarily expensive
computations.
Modifications of these discrete coordinates, as a result for example of applying a
steganographic algorithm, can change the appearance of the rendered mesh in two
ways. Either directly, in the form of a spatial perturbation of the vertices, or indi-
rectly, by changing triangle normals used by the rendering algorithm. Generally, the
induced normal perturbations are much more distractive to the human eye than the
spatial perturbations, see Fig. 3.1. That means that although most mesh processing
operations manipulate spatial information, we are mainly interested in the indirect
effects the spatial manipulation has on the normal information.
This chapter studies empirically the effect of modifying the coordinates of the
vertices of 3D triangle meshes on the face normals. More specifically, we propose a
logistic model to predict the degradation of the face normals as the level of quantiza-
tion decreases. The mesh is degraded by the randomization of each vertex coordinate
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Figure 3.1: Left: The wireframe renderings of a smooth and a noisy mesh. Right:
The flat shaded renderings of the same meshes.
after its t-th significant bit. Notice that we assume that any coordinate bit after the
chosen level of quantization l has a random value, which is equivalent to applying
to them a dithered quantizer rather than the commonly used quantizer that puts
any less significant bit to zero. The normal degradation is computed as a weighted
average of the angle differences between the normals of the original triangles and
the corresponding degraded triangles.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• A logistic model describing the degradation of the normal information of a
triangle mesh as the quantization level decreases.
• A method for computing an appropriate level of mesh quantization when a
tolerance for the accuracy of the normals is given.
The main limitation of our approach is the assumption that our meshes have
no significant amount of noise. We make this assumption implicitly, by regarding
the normals at the highest level of quantization as the most accurate. Thus, even
though geometric noise can be estimated [149], and the effects of noise at different
levels of mesh quantization have been empirically studied [150], this chapter focuses
on the effects of quantization on clean, high quality meshes.
As an application of the proposed normal degradation model, we will compute
appropriate levels l of quantization, given a tolerance for the average accuracy of a
triangle normal, possibly weighted by geometric characteristics of the triangle, such
as its area, or its dihedral angles. Finally, we will demonstrate by several examples
that the claimed optimization is visually meaningful.
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3.1. Prior Work
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the previous
related work. In Section 3.2, we describe a logistic model for normal degradation and
show how it can be empirically computed for a given triangle mesh. In Section 3.3, we
experimentally validate the proposed model. In Section 3.4, we use the degradation
model to compute appropriate quantizations for triangle meshes and experimentally
show that the claimed optimization is visually meaningful. We briefly conclude in
Section 3.5. Material in this chapter has been published in [151].
3.1 Prior Work
The problem of finding appropriate quantization levels for a mesh has been encoun-
tered in the classic predictive mesh compression algorithms of Touma and Gots-
man [152] and Alliez and Desbrun [153]. In predictive encoding, the importance
of removing redundant bits is further magnified by the fact that the predictions
of the least significant bits are less accurate and thus more difficult to compress.
Nevertheless, in all existing work the choice of quantization level is left to the user.
Face or vertex normals are used by most rendering algorithms, from the classic
Gouraud and Phong algorithms, to the more computationally intensive BRDF based
rendering by Walter et al. [154]. Vertex normals can be computed from face normals
in various ways, typically as a weighted mean of the face normals, such as Jin et
al. [155]. If instead the vertex normals are separately encoded as a part of the mesh
file, they are usually represented by vectors with three 32 bit coordinates. Meyer
et al. [156] study the quantization error introduced by such representations and
propose efficient normal encoding methods.
The randomization of the least significant bits of the vertex coordinates adds a
high frequency stochastic component to the geometry of the mesh. Uncertainty in
polygonal meshes has been studied by Pauly et al. [157] and Kalaiah and Varsh-
ney [158]. Yoon et al. [149] propose methods for noise estimations on 3D point sets,
while Sun et al. [159] study laser scan noise. In [160], Sorkine et al. discuss the
visual impact of the high frequency noise introduced by spatial quantization and an
alternative quantization method based on the mesh Laplacian is proposed.
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As Schuchman [161] and Gray and Stockman [162] show, dithering is a tech-
nique with strong theoretical foundations and is commonly used in audio and image
processing, see for example Roads [163] and Akarun et al. [164]. The purpose of
dithering is to avoid coarse quantization artifacts, that is, unwanted regular pat-
terns that may distract the eye or the ear.
The choice of quantization level for the vertex coordinates can be seen as a
choice of level-of-detail. The low level quantizations correspond to coarse meshes
with few triangles and the high level quantizations, which contain more geometric
detail, correspond to fine meshes. In multi-resolution techniques, the level-of-detail
of a mesh can be controlled either by a subdivision algorithm, see for example
Kobbelt et al. [165] and Guskov et al. [166], or by a sequence of unitary mesh
editing operations, such as edge collapses. The latter approach has been successfully
applied into adapting the resolution of a mesh to the camera view, see for example
Hoppe [167], Pasman and Jansen [168] and Hu et al. [169].
3.2 A Logistic Model for Normal Degradation
Given a triangle mesh M, we model the quality of its normal information as a
function of the level of quantization t by
DM(t) = C/(1 + e−a−bt), t ≥ 0. (3.2.1)
DM is the expected average change of the triangle normals, possibly weighted by
geometric characteristics of the triangles, when the t most significant bits of each
vertex coordinate are retained and the less significant bits are randomized. Under
our assumption of a clean, high quality original meshM, DM is seen as the normal
error resulting from the vertex quantization. We notice that we can see Eq. 3.2.1 as
an abstract degradation model and think of t as a real number; however, in practice,
t represents bit positions and thus we are interested in the integer values of t between
0 and 64.
The curve of Eq. 3.2.1 has an inverse ‘S’ shape. Small values of t correspond
to coarse quantizations and large expected normal error, while large values of t
correspond to fine quantizations and small expected normal error. The exact shape
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of the curve depends on the three constants a, b and C. The value of a represents a
quantization threshold, after which some of the normal information of the original
mesh is retained, and b represents the rate at which normal information is retained.
C is a scaling factor controlling the maximum value of DM. We notice that the
maximum of DM should be obtained at t = 0, that is, when all spatial information is
random, in which case the expected average normal error should reach its theoretical
maximum of pi/2. For the usual range of values of a and t = 0, we have found
experimentally that (1 + e−a−bt) ≈ 1 and thus C ≈ pi/2.
Eq. 3.2.1 is a member of the family of the logistic functions. These functions were
initially introduced to model population growth, and have since found numerous
applications in fields ranging from social sciences to engineering. In some of these
applications, logistic functions have been used as degradation models, describing for
example the transition of the state of a machine from working perfectly to total
failure [170].
3.2.1 Logistic Curve Fitting
For a given meshM, its degradation model, that is, the values of the constants a, b
and C, is computed empirically. Specifically, for several integer values of t between
0 and 64, we randomize all vertex coordinates after their t-th bit and compute the
weighted average change of the face normals. This weighted average is considered
a sample from the logistic curve at parameter value t. The curve itself is computed
by applying logistic curve fitting on samples computed at several values of t.
To describe the above fitting process more formally, let the i-th vertex of a given
triangle meshM be given in Cartesian coordinates by vi = (xi, yi, zi) (1 ≤ i ≤ N, i ∈
N), where N is the number of vertices of M. As the coordinates are assumed to
be float-point numbers, they can be represented in double precision format (64-bit
long). After this format conversion the mesh vertices have the form vˆi = (xˆi, yˆi, zˆi),
where xˆi, yˆi and zˆi are binary strings of 64 bits.
Next, we randomize the least significant bits. Specifically, for each vˆi = (xˆi, yˆi, zˆi),
we retain the t (0 ≤ t ≤ 64, t ∈ N) most significant bits of each of xˆi, yˆi and zˆi and
replace the 64− t least significant bits with randomly generated bits. The result is
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a new set of coordinates vˇi = (xˇi, yˇi, zˇi), which are converted into the floating point
coordinates v′i = (x
′
i, y
′
i, z
′
i) of the degraded mesh Mt.
Next, we compare the triangle normals ofM andMt and the normal degradation
is measured as the weighted average of the normal distortion
dis(M,Mt) =
∑M
i=1wi · angle(nˆi, nˆti)∑M
i=1 wi
, (3.2.2)
where M is the number of triangles in M, nˆi and nˆti, are the normals of the i-th
triangle of M and Mt, respectively, angle(nˆi, nˆti) is the smaller angle between nˆi
and nˆti expressed in radians.
If we put wi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M we get the mean average of the normal
distortion. Depending on the application, we might want to weight the average in
Eq. 3.2.2 by the area Ai of the triangles, that is, wi = Ai for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . In this
case, the normal distortion of the larger triangles, which dominate the rendering
process, has a larger weight. A third possibility is to use larger weights for triangles
with small dihedral angles. Such triangles represent the flat areas of the surface
where even very small normal distortions can be immediately perceived as noise.
For a dihedral angle weighted average we used the Gaussian weights
wi =
1√
2piσ2
e
−
(xi − µ)2
2σ2 (3.2.3)
where xi is the smallest of the three dihedral angles of the i-th triangle. In the
experiments, we fixed µ = 0 and σ = 3.5, which gave reasonable results.
Regarding the properties of dis(M,Mt), from
0 ≤ angle(nˆi, nˆti) ≤ pi, 0 ≤ t ≤ 64, (3.2.4)
we get
0 ≤ dis(M,Mt) ≤ pi, 0 ≤ t ≤ 64. (3.2.5)
While it seems quite difficult to improve these deterministic bounds, nevertheless,
regarding the expectations for dis(M,Mt), we can easily see that the expectation
E(dis(M,Mt)) is a decreasing function of t and that E(dis(M,M0)) ≈ pi/2 as al-
ready discussed. Moreover, all our experiments with commonly used triangle meshes
confirm that dis(M,Mt) ≈ 0 as t approaches 64.
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Finally, the last step of the process is to use logistic curve fitting and fit the
logistic model of Eq. 3.2.1 to the samples computed by Eq. 3.2.2.
3.2.2 Estimation of Appropriate Quantization Levels
The proposed logistic model can be used to find the appropriate level of quantization
when a tolerance for the expected normal error is given. Indeed, by solving Eq. 3.2.1
we get
t = −
(
ln
C − D(M,Mt)
D(M,Mt) + a
)
/b (3.2.6)
The parameters a, b and C are experimentally computed as described in Section 3.2.1.
We substitute the normal error predicted by the model, i.e. D(M,Mt), with the
given tolerance and compute the appropriate level of quantization t from Eq. 3.2.6.
Eq. 3.2.6 can be further simplified by assuming C = pi/2 and a fixed tolerance
that would be acceptable for all intended applications. For example, for a normal
error tolerance of  = 1◦ (≈ 0.01745 radians), which is acceptable in most visualiza-
tion applications, after using the ceiling function to convert t to an integer, Eq. 3.2.6
becomes
t = d−(4.489 + a)/be (3.2.7)
Thus, using the proposed logistic model, we are able to figure out the suitable
quantization level easily, once the normal error D(M,Mt) and the two parameters
a and b are given.
3.3 Validation and Quantization Levels
In this section we experimentally validate the proposed logistic model and compute
the appropriate levels of quantization based on this model. The former is to test the
accuracy of the model, that is, to measure the difference between the prediction of
the model D(M,Mt) and the observed average normal distortion dis(M,Mt). By
contrast, the latter is to find out the appropriate level of quantization, subject to a
given normal degradation.
The validation experiment was conducted on a set of synthetic and natural 3D
triangle mesh models consisting of the Fandisk, Bunny, Dragon, Lucy and MPII
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Table 3.1: Mesh details and the results of the logistic model fitting. For each of
the mean average disav(M,Mt), area weighted average disar(M,Mt) and dihedral
angle weighted average disan(M,Mt), the top, middle and bottom rows show the
values of a, b and C, respectively.
Fandisk Bunny Dragon Lucy MPII Geometry
M 12946 69666 100000 525814 70761
disav(M,Mt)
22.863 22.300 18.865 23.503 14.628
-1.168 -1.154 -0.927 -1.081 -0.685
1.573 1.570 1.571 1.571 1.569
disar(M,Mt)
23.108 22.127 20.874 21.887 11.600
-1.184 -1.148 -1.077 -1.028 -0.703
1.573 1.570 1.572 1.571 1.568
disan(M,Mt)
22.864 22.315 19.095 23.307 14.624
-1.168 -1.153 -0.939 -1.071 -0.684
1.573 1.570 1.569 1.572 1.571
Geometry. The mesh details and the results of the fitting process are summarized
in Table 3.1. We notice that in all cases the value of the threshold a is relatively
large, meaning that 8-bit or even 12-bit mesh vertex quantizations result to the
loss of almost all normal information. This is in contrast to the resiliency of the
volumetric properties of the corresponding shapes, given that in 12-bit, or even 8-bit
voxelizations, the shapes are still clearly recognizable. We also notice that the large
value of a means that C ≈ pi/2 for each of the test meshes, as expected.
The comparisons between the predictions of the logistic model D(M,Mt) and the
corresponding experimental observations dis(M,Mt) are shown in Fig. 3.2. The lo-
gistic model fits five data points computed at t = 12, 16, 20, 24 and 28 (see Eq. 3.2.2).
From Fig. 3.2, we see that the red and blue curves of D(M,Mt) and dis(M,Mt),
respectively, are almost identical. That means that the proposed logistic model can
successfully predict the quality of the triangle normals. The difference between the
two curves are generally small, except at the high slope part of the curves. We notice
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Table 3.2: Appropriate quantization levels. For each of the mean average
disav(M,Mt), area weighted average disar(M,Mt) and dihedral angle weighted av-
erage disan(M,Mt), the left, middle and right columns correspond to  = 1◦,
 = 5◦ and  = 10◦, respectively.
disav(M,Mt) disar(M,Mt) disan(M,Mt)
Fandisk 24 22 22 24 22 22 24 22 22
Bunny 24 22 22 24 22 22 24 22 22
Dragon 26 24 23 24 22 22 26 24 23
Lucy 26 25 24 26 25 24 26 25 24
MPII Geometry 28 26 25 23 21 20 28 26 25
that the higher error at the high slope part of the curve was predictable, given that
small misalignments at the horizontal direction can cause large discrepancies at the
vertical direction. We also notice that quantizations corresponding to that part of
the curve are not of direct interest in practical applications because their normal
error is very large.
Fig. 3.2 shows that the logistic functions fit nicely the data from the five test
models, except for the MPII Geometry model for some values of t for the case of
area weighted average. The problem with the MPII Geometry model is caused by
the high variance of the normal degradation, which as a result cannot be modeled
effectively. In particular, for some values of t, the normal degradation variance of
the very large triangles is also very large and dominates the area weighted average.
We notice that the MPII model is the only one of our test models with very large
triangles, as it contains triangles spanning whole sides of the building. Fig. 3.3 shows
the variance computations for the test models.
As mentioned before, the proposed model is quite efficient in estimating the suit-
able mesh quantization level, given a normal degradation. Indeed, the appropriate
levels of quantization t can be yielded by simply rounding t in Eq. 3.2.6 to the nearest
integers towards infinity. For example, for  = 1◦, the levels t for the five models of
the validation experiment, computed according to Eq. 3.2.7, are shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Left: Comparison between the average normal distortion observations
disav(M,Mt) and the logistic model predictions. Middle: Comparison between the
area-weighted average of normal distortion observations disar(M,Mt) and the lo-
gistic model predictions. Right: Comparison between the dihedral angle-weighted
average of normal distortion observations disan(M,Mt) and the logistic model pre-
dictions. The models used here are Fandisk, Bunny Dragon, Lucy and MPII Geom-
etry (from top to bottom).
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Figure 3.3: Left: Variances of the average normal distortion observations
disav(M,Mt). Middle: Variances of the area-weighted average of normal distor-
tion observations disar(M,Mt). Right: Variances of the dihedral angle-weighted
average of normal distortion observations disan(M,Mt). The models used here are
Fandisk, Bunny Dragon, Lucy and MPII Geometry (from top to bottom).
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The appropriate levels of quantization for  = 5◦ and 10◦ can be computed analo-
gously. We notice that, as expected, different models may have different appropriate
level of quantization. For example, when the tolerance is  = 1◦ and we consider
the mean average of the normal distortion, the relatively simple Fandisk model can
be represented by 24 bits per vertex coordinate without significant loss of normal
information, while the more complex Lucy and MPII Geometry require 26 and 28
bits, respectively. We also notice that, in most models, the appropriate quantization
level does not depend on the chosen averaging method. A notable exception is the
MPII Geometry which consists of some extremely large and some extremely small
triangles and the results of the area weighted averaging method diverge.
To judge the visual significance of the claimed optimisation of t, the left col-
umn of Fig. 3.4 shows renderings of the original meshes quantized at 64 bits per
vertex coordinate and the middle column renderings of their respective appropriate
quantizations for a small tolerance of  ≈ 1◦ when the mean averaging method is
used. We notice that in all cases the appropriately quantized meshes are almost
indistinguishable from the originals, and any possible degradation has been kept to
visually acceptable levels.
To further demonstrate the relevance of our results, the right column of Fig. 3.4
shows renderings of the same meshes quantized at a coarser level corresponding to
a tolerance of  ≈ 10◦. In practice that means that they are quantized at a level
that is 2 or 3 bits coarser than the ones on the middle column. We notice that in
all cases except the Dragon the degradation of the normal information is visually
significant. The only exception is the Dragon model which does not show significant
signs of degradation as a result of the coarser than appropriate quantization. The
reason is that the original Dragon model is already noisy and thus, its original
normal information has already a large random element which is not affected by the
quantization. This salient point is further illustrated in Fig. 3.5 where close ups of
the Fandisk and the Bunny at appropriate and suboptimal levels of quantization
are shown. Finally, we notice that a given level of quantization (t = 24) may be
appropriate for one mesh (Fandisk) and significantly suboptimal for another (Lucy).
Fig. 3.5 shows close-ups of the models in Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Left: The original Fandisk, Bunny, Dragon, Lucy and MPII Geome-
try meshes quantized at 64 bits per vertex coordinate. Middle: Finely quantized
meshes at 24, 24, 26, 26 and 28 bits per vertex coordinate, respectively ( ≈ 1◦).
Right: Coarsely quantized meshes at 22, 22, 23, 24 and 25 bits per vertex coordi-
nate, respectively ( ≈ 10◦).
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Figure 3.5: Close-ups of the models in Fig. 3.4.
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3.4 Practical Applications
In this section we briefly discuss how the proposed logistic model for mesh degrada-
tion can be used to enhance existing mesh steganography/watermarking and mesh
compression algorithms, help to evaluate such algorithms and inform their further
development.
The goal of steganography is to embed a confidential message on a carrier signal,
here a mesh model, in such a way that no one apart from the sender and the intended
recipient can detect the existence of the hidden message. The challenge in designing
a good steganographic algorithm lies in balancing the two conflicting requirements of
high embedding capacity and low embedding distortion. That is, one has to maximise
the length of the message that can be embedded on a given mesh and simultaneously
minimize the visual impact of that embedding.
We notice that the proposed logistic model describes a trade-off between embed-
ding capacity, in the form of unused bits in the vertex coordinates, and distortion,
in the form of normal degradation. Therefore, it can directly be used to inform least
significant bit steganographic algorithms about the embedding capacity of the car-
rier. More specifically, for a given carrier meshM, we first compute the parameters
a, b of the logistic degradation model, as described in Section 3.2. Then, for a certain
distortion tolerance D(M,Mt) we compute the appropriate level of quantization t
using Eq. 3.2.6. Finally, the 64 − t least significant bits of each vertex coordinate
are replaced with the message bits to be hidden.
The proposed logistic model can also be used in conjunction with mesh compres-
sion algorithms, as discussed in the Introduction. In particular, it can be used to
inform the user’s choice of level of quantization t for the vertex coordinates. After t
has been determined, the compression algorithm will only keep the t most significant
bits of each coordinate and the coarse mesh will be compressed and transmitted. At
the receiver end, the coarse mesh will be decoded and 64 − t random bits will be
appended to the t most significant bits of each coordinate. Such a process would be
completely analogous to dithering, as used in signal encoding and compression.
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3.5 Summary
We have proposed a logistic model for estimating the degradation of face normals in
3D triangle meshes caused the quantization of vertex coordinates. As demonstrated
by the validation experiments, the behaviour of the proposed model is satisfac-
tory and its predictions for the normal degradation are good approximations of the
respective experimental values. We have also discussed how the proposed model
might be utilized in a number of applications, especially those requiring the esti-
mation of an appropriate quantization level for vertex coordinates, as for example
mesh steganography/watermarking and mesh compression. Regarding algorithmic
complexity, the algorithm runs in linear time O
(
n
)
as its time execution is directly
proportional to the number of vertices n, i.e. time grows linearly as the vertex
number increases.
Given the simplicity of the logistic model, such formula might be simpler and
easier to compute than the formulas that we will in Chapter 4, which does not
assume a logistic model for normal degradation.
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Chapter 4
Normal Degradation of Triangle
Meshes: A Theoretical Study
While the previous chapter presents an empirical study of normal degradation of 3D
triangle models based on fitting a logistic model to the curve of normal degradation,
this chapter is based on direct computation approximating the normal degradation.
We first compute in closed form the expectation for the angle θ between the
new and the old normal when uniform noise is added to a single vertex of a triangle.
Next, we propose and experimentally validate an approximation and lower and upper
bounds for θ when uniform noise is added to all three vertices of the triangle. In all
cases, for small amounts of spatial noise that do not severely distort the mesh, there
is a linear correlation between θ and simple functions of the heights of the triangles
and thus, θ can be computed efficiently. The addition of uniform spatial noise to
a mesh can be seen as a dithered quantization of its vertices. We use the obtained
linear correlations between spatial and normal noise to compute the level of dithered
quantization of the mesh vertices when a tolerance for the average normal distortion
is given.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• An exact closed-form formula, and a linear approximation of it, for the expec-
tation of the angle between the old and the new normal when noise is added
to a single vertex of a triangle.
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• An approximation, and heuristic lower and upper bounds, for the expecta-
tion of the normal perturbation when noise is added to all three vertices of a
triangle.
• The fast computation of the dithered quantization level of a vertex when a
tolerance for the degradation of the normals is given.
• A data hiding algorithm that can claim maximum capacity for the given tol-
erance of normal degradation.
The main limitation of the first contribution comes from the error of the linear
approximation, which is small but not negligible for small amounts of added noise.
Moreover, the error increases significantly when the amount of added noise becomes
large. The approximation of the error is also a limitation of the second contribution.
Moreover, the upper and lower bounds are heuristic and we have no mathematical
proof that they always hold.
Regarding the third contribution, the extra limitation is the assumption that
adding uniform spatial noise with support the shape of a cube is equivalent to
dithered quantization. This is only approximately true when the edges of the cube
do not align with the axes of the coordinate system.
The main limitation of the high-capacity data hiding method is its fragility, that
is, it cannot survive attacks without loss of information.
Concerning the application, we can compute optimal levels i of dithered quanti-
zations of the mesh vertices using the developed theoretical model, when a tolerance
for the normal degradation is given. Another application lies in 3D steganography,
where the message bits could be inserted into the i less significant bits.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we study the
expected change of the normal when a small amount of noise is added to a single
triangle vertex. Based on this result, we in Section 4.1 also derive heuristic bounds
and an approximate formula for the expected normal change when a small amount
of noise is added to all three vertices of the triangle. In Section 4.2, we validate the
bounds and the approximation by comparing them to the average normal change
on test meshes when actual noise is added to the mesh vertices and also measure
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A(0,0,0) B(1,0,0) 
C(0,h,0) 
y 
x 
z 
Figure 4.1: Left: Adding noise to a single triangle vertex. Right: Normal orbits
on the Gaussian sphere.
the time performance of the proposed algorithm. In section 4.3, we present two
potential applications. Material in this chapter has been published in [10].
4.1 Normal Noise Estimation
In our model, the noise added to a vertex P of the triangle mesh is described by a
random variable u with distribution p(u), u ∈ R3 . To measure the effect of the
added random variable on the normal of a triangle T incident to P , we compute the
expectation E(θ(u)) for the angle θ(u) between the normal of T and its normal after
u has been added to P . The expectation is given by
E(θ(u)) =
∫
Ω
p(u)θ(u)du (4.1.1)
where Ω is the support of p(u).
The expectation in Eq. 4.1.1 can be computed by standard numerical integration
methods for any given probability distribution that may appear in practice, for ex-
ample the Gaussian or the uniform distributions. In what follows, we study uniform
noise with cubic shaped support. In practice, such types of noise are the result of
the randomization of the least significant bits of the vertex coordinates and appear
in applications such as dithered quantization and data hiding. In particular, we will
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compute the integral in Eq. 4.1.1 in a closed form and find local linear approxima-
tions of it. To simplify the notation we will write θ instead of θ(u) when the context
removes any ambiguity.
4.1.1 Adding Uniform Noise To a Single Vertex
Let T = ABC be a triangle. We will compute E(θ) when u is added to the vertex C
with p(u) the uniform distribution with support a cube of edgelength 2l, centered
at C with one face parallel to ABC, see Fig. 4.1 (left). In this case, p(u) is equal
to the constant 1/8l3 inside the cube and zero outside.
By a basis change of the Cartesian xyz coordinate system, including scaling,
we may assume without loss of generality that A = (0, 0, 0), B = (1, 0, 0) and
C lies in the xy-plane. We notice that moving C + u parallely to the x-axis by
adding a displacement t ~AB does not change E(θ) because the two triplets of points
(A,B,C + u) and (A,B,C + u+ t ~AB) define the same plane, hence have the same
normal. That means that without loss of generality we may assume that C =
(0, h, 0), where h is the height of ABC at C, see Fig. 4.1 (left).
Intuitively, the above simplification of the problem is based on the fact that if
we fix A,B and add the random variable u to C then E(θ) depends on the distance
h of C from AB only. Formally, the simplification is a consequence of the equality
θ(u) = θ(u+ t ~AB) (4.1.2)
giving, ∫
Ω+t ~AB
(1/8l3)θ(u+ t ~AB)du =
∫
Ω
(1/8l3)θ(u)du (4.1.3)
Let u = (x, y, z), we have
θ =

arctan(|z|/(h+ y)), if y > −h
pi/2, if y = −h
pi + arctan(|z|/(h+ y)), if y < −h
(4.1.4)
The simple form of the components of Eq. 4.1.4 allows the computation of E(θ) in
closed form. First, we notice that because of the invariance of θ when u is reflected
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Figure 4.2: Left: Plot of E(θ) and its tangent at 0, h = 1. Right: A close-up of
the graph.
through the xy-plane, it suffices to compute E(θ) for z ≥ 0 only. Moreover, the
invariance of θ when a vector parallel to the x-axis is added to u means that we do
not have to integrate along x.
For l < h, which is the main case as it represents the tolerable amounts of noise,
we get
E(θ) =
1
2l2
∫ l
−l
∫ l
0
θ dz dy
=
1
2l2
∫ h+l
h−l
∫ l
0
arctan(z/y) dz dy (4.1.5)
and the definite integral can be directly computed from the indefinite integral∫∫
arctan(z/y) dy dz =
yz arctan(z/y) + [(z2 − y2) log(y2 + z2) + y2]/4 + c (4.1.6)
giving,
E(θ) =
1
8r2
log
((
(1− r)2 + r2)1−2r(1 + r)2(r+1)2(
(1 + r)2 + r2
)1+2r(
1− r)2(1−r)2
)
+
1 + r
2r
arctan(
r
1 + r
)−
1− r
2r
arctan(
r
1− r) (4.1.7)
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Table 4.1: The linear approximation of E(θ).
l/h .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
E(θ)− (l/2h) .0001 .0006 .0021 .0049 .0092
where r = l/h.
The case l > h in Eq. 4.1.4 differs from the case l < h only by a constant and
one just has to add
1
2l2
∫ 0
h−l
∫ l
0
pi dz dy =
pi(r − 1)
2r
(4.1.8)
to Eq. 4.1.7 to compute E(θ) for that case. In both cases it turns out that E(θ)
depends on the quotient l/h rather than the individual values of h and l, meaning
that the expectation is scale invariant.
Simple computations, using del’Hospital’s rule when necessary, show that the
derivative of E(θ) at r = 0 is equal to 1/2. Fig. 4.2 shows the graph of E(θ) and
its tangent at 0. We notice that for relatively small values of l/h, the tangent
approximates well the curve of E(θ) and can be used as an approximation of its
value by
E(θ) ' r/2 = l/2h (4.1.9)
Table 4.1 shows the differences between the curve of E(θ) and its tangent at 0 for
several values of l/h. For the rest of the chapter we will mostly use this approximate
value of E(θ), even though the exact value can be computed from Eq. 4.1.7.
4.1.2 Adding Noise to All Three Vertices
The next step is to find heuristic bounds for E¯(θ), the expectation for the angle
between the old and the new normal when noise is added on all three vertices of
T . We also compute a point estimate of E¯(θ), using a simple linear function of the
expectations E(θ) computed on the three vertices T as described in Section 2.1.
Let h1 ≤ h2 ≤ h3 be the heights of T at A,B and C, respectively and let
E(θ1) ≥ E(θ2) ≥ E(θ3) be the corresponding expectations when noise is added to a
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single vertex of the triangle. We propose
Emin(θ) = E(θ1) (4.1.10)
as a heuristic lower bound for E¯(θ).
The heuristic argument is that if after adding noise to one of the triangle’s
vertices we proceed and add noise to the other two vertices too, we will increase the
spatial uncertainty and thus increase the expectation for the normal perturbation
E¯(θ). To see the same argument from a slightly different angle, a lower expectation
for θ would mean that the normal of the triangle with noise on its three vertices is
a better estimate of the original normal than the normal of the triangle with noise
on a single vertex. As we cannot improve the estimate by adding more noise, we
expect that E¯(θ) ≥ E(θ1) ≥ E(θ2) ≥ E(θ3).
For the heuristic construction of an upper bound for E¯(θ), we treat the normal
pertubations from the addition of noise on each vertex as independent. This is a
valid assumption when the amount of noise added to each vertex is small and does
not change significantly the heights of T . Under this independence assumption, an
obvious upper bound for E¯(θ) is the sum
E(θ1) + E(θ2) + E(θ3) (4.1.11)
We notice that for an equilateral triangle T we have
E(θ1) + E(θ2) + E(θ3) = 3 Emin(θ) (4.1.12)
meaning that for the equilateral and almost equilateral triangles that are common
in high quality meshes the pair of bounds in Eq. 4.1.10 and Eq. 4.1.11 is not tight
enough in the sense that the quantization problems we deal with in the applications
will have more than one solution. Indeed, in such problems the quantization levels
are integers solutions in a logarithmic space of basis 2 and, ideally, for a unique
solution we would like the lower and the upper bounds to differ by a factor of 2
at most. For the construction of a sharper heuristic upper bound, we sum the
expected normal perturbations on the Gaussian sphere, using the fact that when
noise is added to a single vertex, the trajectory on the Gaussian sphere of the
possible normal perturbations is a circle.
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Assume that the normal of T maps to the top of the Gaussian sphere P . By
adding noise to the vertex A only, the orbit of the perturbed normal on the Gaussian
sphere is a maximal arc with center at P . Let Aθ be a point on that arc such that
Arc(PAθ) = E(θ1). Similarly, if we add noise to the vertex B only, the orbit of
the perturbed normals is a maximal arc with center at P , and let Bθ be a point on
that arc such that Arc(PBθ) = E(θ2). The point Cθ is constructed similarly, see
Fig. 4.1 (right). For a small l, the points P , Aθ, Bθ, Cθ are almost coplanar and
we can approximate Aθ, Bθ, Cθ with their projections A
′
θ, B
′
θ, C
′
θ on the tangent of
the Gaussian sphere at P . Working on that tangent plane instead of the sphere, we
expect the angle corresponding to the sum
max{± ~PA′θ ± ~PB′θ ± ~PC ′θ} (4.1.13)
to be an upper bound because Eq. 4.1.13 will choose for each vector the direction
that will maximise the sum.
Working on the tangent plane at P , we notice that the angles of the intersection
of the the three lines PA
′
, PB
′
, PC
′
are equal to the angles of the intersection of
the heights of the triangle which are equal to the angles of the triangle. We also
notice that the lengths of the vectors of Eq. 4.1.13 are proportional to the inverses
of the triangle’s heights, meaning that they are proportional to the triangle’s edges.
Simple arguments show that if ha is the smallest height of the triangle
max{± ~PA′θ ± ~PB′θ ± ~PC ′θ} = 2 ~PA′θ ' 2 ~PAθ (4.1.14)
and the proposed upper bound becomes
Emax(θ) = 2 ~PAθ = 2 Emin(θ) (4.1.15)
Finally, for obtaining a point estimation of E¯(θ) we use the simple linear approxi-
mation
Eappr(θ) = η · (E(θ1) + E(θ2) + E(θ3)) (4.1.16)
The constant η is estimated experimentally. To estimate η we simulated the addition
of a small amount of noise, l = 2−10 in particular, to the vertices of an equilateral
triangle of size 1, and after averaging over a large number of experiments we found
the value η = 0.608.
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Notice that, based on Eq. 4.1.9, Eq. 4.1.16 can be written as
Eappr(θ) = η · l · (
1
2h1
+
1
2h2
+
1
2h3
) =
η · l
2ρ
(4.1.17)
where ρ is the radius of the incircle of T . In other words, a consequence of the
approximation Eappr(θ) is that, for small amounts of noise, E(θ) is linear to the
inverse of the radius ρ of the incircle.
4.2 Tests and Validation
In this section we test the obtained bounds and approximations on several well-
known triangle meshes that are available online and measure the time performance
of the proposed algorithm.
4.2.1 Validation
Let
Emesh(θ) =
∑M
j=1 E¯j(θ)
M
(4.2.18)
be the average normal degradation over the triangles of a mesh. Here, M is the
number of triangles of the mesh and E¯j(θ) denotes the expectation E¯(θ) for the
normal degradation of the j-th triangle.
To validate the accuracy of the bounds and the point approximation, we replaced
E¯j(θ) in Eq. 4.2.18 with Emin(θ),Emax(θ) and Eappr(θ), respectively, and compared
it with the average normal degradation we computed experimentally using synthetic
added noise.
The amounts of added noise were powers of 2, that is, l = 2−i. The values of l
were small enough for the linear correlation between E¯(θ) and l/h to be strong. The
results are summarized in Fig. 4.3. As expected, Emin(θ) and Emax(θ) bound E¯(θ)
from below and above and thus Emesh(θ) too. Moreover, Eappr(θ) provides a good
approximation of the experimental results. Notice that the graphs in Fig. 4.3 are
drawn for values of i that are large enough for the linear approximation in Eq. 4.1.9
to be valid.
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Figure 4.3: Validation results for Heart, Bunny, Chair, Lucy, MPII Geometry and
Welsh Dragon. The x-axis corresponds to the values of i. The y-axis is in radians.
In some cases, if the mesh contains many small and skinny triangles the linear
approximation may not be valid even for relatively large values of i. Fig. 4.4 (left)
shows that in the MPII Geometry model Eappr(θ) is below the lower bound Emin(θ)
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Figure 4.4: For the MPII Geometry model, the linear approximation of the expec-
tation gives poor results even for relatively high values i > 20. However, the use of
the exact expectation gives satisfactory results even for the lower range 12 ≤ i ≤ 18.
even for levels of quantization i > 20. In these cases, one should use the exact
expectation in Eq. 4.1.7 instead of the approximation in Eq. 4.1.9. Indeed, Fig. 4.4
(right) shows that the use of the exact expectation gives satisfactory results even
for the range 12 ≤ i ≤ 18.
4.2.2 Time Performance
Regarding its computational complexity, the algorithm is linear with the number of
triangles. Given a normal degradation tolerance , our current non-optimized Matlab
implementation on an Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 3.00 GHz processor with 2GB memory
calculates the optimal quantization level for the 2M triangles of the Welsh Dragon
in 56 seconds. Apart from programming optimizations, we can significantly speed
up the computation by using the much simpler Eq. 4.1.10 instead of Eq. 4.1.17.
Indeed, as Eq. 4.1.17 is between the lower bound in Eq. 4.1.10 and the upper bound
in Eq. 4.1.15, and as the lower and the upper bounds differ by 2, the results of
Eq. 4.1.10 will differ from the results of Eq. 4.1.17 by one bit at most.
Finally, we note that the linear correlation between spatial and normal noise
can be used without any computational cost as a rule of thumb that one extra bit
will halve the normal error. This simplicity is the main motivation for using the
approximations for all the examples, instead of using the exact formula in Eq. 4.1.7.
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4.3 Applications
In this section we discuss how the proposed method can be used for obtaining optimal
dithered quantizations as well as for adaptive high-capacity mesh data hiding.
4.3.1 Optimal Dithered quantizations
A simple dithered quantizer for the mesh vertices retains the i most significant bits
of each vertex coordinate and replaces any less significant bit with random bits.
Such dithered quantizers avoid the blocky artifacts created by quantizers that set
all less significant bits to zero.
Given a tolerance  for the average normal degradation Emesh(θ), the bounds
and the point estimate of Section 4.1 can be used to compute optimal levels for the
dithered quantization of the vertices. The main assumption is that the random-
ization of all bits that are less significant than bit k can be approximated by the
addition of uniform noise with cubic support of edgelength 2l = 2−k.
In particular, we can compute the optimal level of quantization i as
i = arg max
k∈Z
{k | Emesh(θ) ≤ } (4.3.19)
where, depending on the application, the average Emesh(θ) is computed using the
lower bound Emin(θ), or the upper bound Emax(θ), or the estimate Eappr(θ). For
instance, if we use Emin(θ), from Eqs. 4.1.9, 4.1.10, 4.2.18 and 4.3.19, we get
i =
⌈
− 2− log2
( M · ∑M
j=1 1/h
′
j
)⌉
(4.3.20)
Similarly, if we use Eappr(θ), then from Eqs. 4.1.17, 4.2.18, and 4.3.19, we obtain
i =
⌈
− 2− log2
( M · 
η ·∑Mj=1 1/ρj
)⌉
(4.3.21)
In the above two equations, d·e stands for the mathematical ceiling function and
h′j and ρj are the minimum height and the incircle radius of the j-th triangle,
respectively.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results for several values of the tolerance . The quan-
tization levels for MPII Geometry were computed using the exact Eq. 4.1.7 instead
of Eq. 4.1.17.
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Table 4.2: For each of Emin(θ), Eappr(θ) and Emax(θ), the left, middle and right
columns show the quantization levels corresponding to  = 0.1◦,  = 1◦ and  = 10◦,
respectively.
#Tri Emin(θ) Eappr(θ) Emax(θ)
Heart 37690 15 11 8 15 12 9 16 12 9
Bunny 69666 16 12 9 16 13 9 17 13 10
Chair 6664 17 14 10 17 14 11 18 15 11
Lucy 525814 18 14 11 18 15 11 19 15 12
MPII Geometry 70761 20 16 12 20 16 13 21 17 13
Welsh Dragon 2210635 19 15 12 19 16 13 20 16 13
We notice that the size of the mesh influences the quantization level. The reason
is that the number of triangles in the common natural meshes is correlated to their
average size, with the large meshes mainly consisting of small triangles with normals
that are more sensitive noise. For an information-theoretic explanation, we can
say that larger meshes contain more geometric detail, which requires more bits
per vertex coordinate for its representation. The shape of the mesh triangles also
influences the level of quantization. In particular, after taking the number of mesh
triangles into account, the CAD meshes Chair and MPII Geometry, which have a
significant portion of skinny triangles, require more bits per coordinate compared to
scan meshes such as Lucy and Welsh Dragon which mainly consist of well shaped
triangles. For an information-theoretic explanation, CAD meshes usually contain
more information per triangle than the scan meshes and thus, require more bits per
vertex coordinate.
Table 4.3 shows that the experimental values of the normal degradation com-
puted as
ψi =
∑M
j=1 angle (nˆj, nˆ
i
j)
M
(4.3.22)
where nˆj and nˆ
i
j are the normals of the j-th triangle of the original mesh and
the mesh quantized at i bits, respectively. For a given tolerance , the level of
quantization i is the one corresponding to Eappr(θ) as shown in Table 4.2. We notice
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Table 4.3: The experimental values of normal degradation ψi corresponding to the
quantization levels given by the Eappr(θ) column in Table 4.2
 = 0.1◦  = 1◦  = 10◦
Heart ψ15 = 0.111 ψ12 = 0.884 ψ9 = 7.064
Bunny ψ16 = 0.099 ψ13 = 0.750 ψ9 = 12.276
Chair ψ17 = 0.099 ψ14 = 0.851 ψ11 = 7.461
Lucy ψ18 = 0.105 ψ15 = 0.837 ψ11 = 13.543
MPII Geometry ψ20 = 0.092 ψ16 = 0.892 ψ13 = 6.496
Welsh Dragon ψ19 = 0.123 ψ16 = 0.982 ψ13 = 7.684
that, in all cases, the experimental results differ from the prescribed tolerance by a
factor smaller than two, meaning that the computed quantization levels differ from
the optimal for that tolerance levels by one bit at most. On the other hand, we also
notice that in four cases the experimental normal degradation exceeds the tolerance,
even though the quantization levels corresponding to Eappr(θ) happen to be the same
as the ones corresponding to Emin(θ). At the beginning of this chapter, we discuss
several limitations of the method that might be responsible for this discrepancy.
Optimally quantized test meshes for several values of  are shown in Fig. 4.5
and close-ups of some of them are shown in Fig. 4.6. As expected, for all test
meshes, the quantizations corresponding to tolerances  = 0.1◦ and  = 1◦ are
almost indistinguishable between them and visually equivalent to the originals. By
contrast, the meshes that have suffered an average  = 10◦ normal degradation are
of noticeably inferior visual quality.
In some applications, the average normal degradation over all mesh triangles
may not be a satisfactory indicator of mesh quality. One such case is when the size
or the shape of the mesh triangles is not uniform across the mesh. Another issue
limiting the visual relevance of the average normal degradation is that the human
eye sensitivity to normal perturbations depends on the smoothness of the surface
areas where the degradation occurred. In particular, the eye is more sensitive to
normal perturbations in the smoother regions of a surface. Hence, some applications
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Figure 4.5: For each mesh group, the left, middle and right show the dithered
quantized meshes for  = 0.1◦,  = 1◦ and  = 10◦, respectively.
might require a normal degradation tolerance that is smaller at the smoother areas
of the surface. In such cases, computing a separate optimal level of quantization for
each mesh vertex may give a more satisfactory solution.
To do this, we use the Gaussian curvature κn given by
κn = 2pi −
vn∑
i=1
αn,i, 1 ≤ n ≤ N (4.3.23)
as a measure of mesh smoothness at a mesh vertex, where N is the number of the
mesh vertices, vn is the degree of the n-th vertex and αn,i is the i-th angle incident
the n-th vertex. The smaller the absolute value |κn| is, the flatter the surface at the
vicinity of the n-th vertex.
The normal degradation tolerance j at the j-th triangle is given by
j = min
n
{α− φ(κn;α, µ, σ) + 0}, 1 ≤ j ≤M (4.3.24)
where φ(x;α, µ, σ) is the Gaussian function with peak value α, mean µ and
standard deviation σ, the minimum is over the three vertices of the j-th triangle
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Figure 4.6: Close-ups of the quantized Heart, Bunny, Lucy and Welsh Dragon mod-
els in Fig. 4.5. The left, middle and right columns correspond to  = 0.1◦,  = 1◦
and  = 10◦, respectively.
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Figure 4.7: Vertices with high and low quantization levels are shown in red and blue
color, respectively. From left to right: the ranges of the quantization levels are [6,
20], [4, 21], [12, 26] and [2, 32] bits per vertex coordinate.
and 0 is the threshold of normal degradation that is considered acceptable for a
planar surface. The quantization level i of each triangle is then computed by
i = arg max
k∈Z
{k | E¯j(θ) ≤ j} (4.3.25)
Finally, the quantization level of a vertex is computed as the maximum level of
quantization of the incident triangles.
Fig. 4.7 shows adaptive quantizations corresponding to parameter values α =
0.7979, µ = 0, σ = 0.5, 0 = 0.0017 ' 0.1◦) and E¯j(θ) approximated by Eappr(θ). As
expected the scanned meshes tend to have a more uniform and smooth distribution
of quantization levels compared to the CAD meshes. Despite the higher cost of
computing an adaptive, curvature depended quantization, the method is still local
and thus, linear in complexity with respect to the size of the mesh.
4.3.2 Adaptive High-Capacity Data Hiding
The challenge in designing a good data hiding algorithm lies in balancing two con-
flicting requirements: high embedding capacity and low embedding distortion. The
obtained relations between spatial and normal noise describe a trade-off between
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Table 4.4: For each of  = 0.1◦,  = 1◦ and  = 10◦, the left and the right columns
show the average embedding capacity in bits per vertex and the ratio of non-zero
components in the corrective vector e to the number of mesh vertices, respectively.
 = 0.1◦  = 1◦  = 10◦
Heart ≈ 48.59 1.28× 10−3 ≈ 58.40 1.22× 10−2 ≈ 68.26 1.59× 10−1
Bunny ≈ 46.79 1.15× 10−4 ≈ 56.14 1.37× 10−2 ≈ 67.58 5.46× 10−1
Chair ≈ 41.26 3.25× 10−2 ≈ 51.46 2.93× 10−4 ≈ 60.66 1.27× 10−1
Lucy ≈ 39.85 1.62× 10−3 ≈ 49.88 1.61× 10−2 ≈ 59.74 1.54× 10−1
MPII ≈ 37.63 6.69× 10−4 ≈ 47.60 2.61× 10−2 ≈ 57.34 2.13× 10−1
Dragon ≈ 37.61 1.99× 10−3 ≈ 47.00 2.77× 10−4 ≈ 56.01 5.99× 10−3
embedding capacity, in the form of unused bits in the vertex coordinates, and visual
distortion, in the form of normal degradation. As such, they can be directly used to
inform least significant bit data hiding algorithms about the embedding capacity of
the carrier for a given distortion tolerance.
To make the data hiding algorithm blind and robust against vertex permutation,
we use two orderings pi1(·) and pi2(·) of the vertex set, which are obtained from
the projections of the sets of unmarked v and marked v′ quantized vertices onto
their respective first principal axes. These two orderings will assist the extraction
process in finding the embedding order of the message bits, avoiding thus potential
synchronization problems. The details of the embedding and extraction algorithms
are as follows.
Embedding: Given the carrier triangle mesh with set of vertices v = (v1, v2, · · · , vN),
represented in 32 bits, and a normal degradation tolerance , we compute the vector
i = (i1, i2, · · · , iN) of quantization levels as in Section 4.3.1. All unused vertex co-
ordinate bits are set to zero. The message bits are embedded by a bit-replacement
operation. More specifically, to mark the j-th vertex, we retain the ij most signifi-
cant bits and the c least significant bits of its coordinates and sequentially replace
the other 32− ij−c bits with message bits. The embedding uses the vertex ordering
pi1(v). The vertex set obtained this way is denoted by v
′ = (v′1, v
′
2, · · · , v′N).
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The c least significant bits of the vertex coordinates of v′ will carry side informa-
tion recording changes in the quantization levels between the vertices of the marked
and unmarked meshes. In particular, we compute the vector of quantization lev-
els i′ = (i′1, i
′
2, · · · , i′N) of v′ and from it and the original quantization levels i the
corrective vector
e = (i1 − i′1, i2 − i′2, · · · , iN − i′N) (4.3.26)
We sort the components of e according to the ordering pi2(·) and pi2(e) is com-
pressed and embedded into the c least significant bits of the vertex coordinates of v′.
The embedding follows the vertex ordering pi2(v
′). Notice that e can be compressed
very efficiently, see Table 4.4. Thus, we can always use c = 1 and embed it in the
least significant bits of the vertex coordinates.
Extraction: Given the marked mesh and the normal degradation tolerance , the
key for extracting the message bits is to recover the orderings pi1(·) and pi2(·).
To compute pi2(·), we set the c least significant bits of the marked mesh to zero
and quantize the resulting vertex set, which is a permutation of v′, as in Section 4.3.1.
The quantized vertices are projected onto their first principal axis. Notice that
because the first principal axis is invariant under vertex permutation the ordering
obtained from the projection is pi2(·). Having recovered pi2(·), the corrective vector
pi2(e) is obtained by extracting and decompressing the c least significant bits of the
input marked mesh in the order of pi2(·).
To recover pi1(·), we first obtain the permuted quantized levels pi2(i) of the original
mesh by
pi2(i) = pi2(e) + pi2(i
′) (4.3.27)
Next, we quantize the vertices of pi2(v
′) at the original levels pi2(i), obtaining the
pi2(·) ordering of the unmarked quantized vertices. Using again the invariance of first
principal axis under vertex permutation, the projection of the unmarked quantized
vertices on their first principal axis gives pi1(·).
Having recovered pi1(·), we can now extract the message from the marked ver-
tices pi1(v
′) and the quantization levels pi1(i) of the unmarked vertices. To extract
information from the j-th vertex, we just remove the ij most significant bits and the
c least significant bits of its coordinates and consider the remaining 32− ij − c bits
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Figure 4.8: The left, middle and right columns show the marked meshes for
 = 0.1◦,  = 1◦ and  = 10◦, respectively.
as the embedded message.
Fig. 4.8 shows the models of Bunny and Lucy marked with various normal degra-
dation tolerances . The quantization levels were computed using Eq. 4.3.25 with
equal j =  for all triangles. As expected, the meshes with lower degradation toler-
ance are of higher visual quality. In particular, the embedding distortion is almost
invisible for  = 0.1◦ and  = 1◦, while it is clearly visible for  = 10◦.
Table 4.4 reports the embedding capacity of each of the test meshes under various
degradation tolerances, and the ratio of non-zero components in the corrective vector
e to the number of mesh vertices. Capacity results for 16 or 24 bit quantizations of
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the same meshes, which often appear in practice, can be obtained from the results
in Table 4.4 after subtracting 16 or 8 bits per coordinate, respectively, provided
that these coarser quantizations do not degrade the normal beyond the prescribed
tolerance.
We notice that, as expected, the capacity increases monotonically with , which
implies that the extra capacity is achieved at the expense of increased embedding
distortion. As expected, in terms of capacity the proposed method outperforms all
of the previously reported algorithms [5, 6, 9, 12, 171] for hiding information in the
geometry of a 3D mesh.
Discussion: The main advantages of the proposed data hiding algorithm are:
• It is a high-capacity method which, for  = 1◦, is able to embed at least 10 more
bits per vertex than the current state-of-the-art for embedding information on
mesh geometry [6].
• It gives the user control over the trade-off between capacity and embedding
distortion. That is, we can embed the appropriate payload knowing that we
do not violate the application’s requirements on visual quality.
The main disadvantage of the algorithm is its fragility. Indeed, even slight attacks
may lead to the loss of most of the embedded information. It is worth mentioning
here that, to exactly recover the hidden message, the proposed algorithm requires
fixed number of vertices with no requirement on mesh connectivity, because changing
(increasing or decreasing) the number of vertex edges will not alter the order of
message extraction, which is the same as that of message embedding.
4.4 Summary
We have studied the relationship between spatial and normal noise in a triangle
mesh. We have explicitly computed the expected angle E(θ) between the old and
the new normal when a small amount of uniform random noise with cubic support of
edgelength 2l is added to a single vertex. We have noticed that for small amounts of
noise there is a linear correlation between E(θ) and l/h which allows the development
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of simple heuristic methods for estimating E(θ) when noise is added to all three
vertices of the triangle.
Based on the obtained results, two possible applications have been mentioned. As
a first application, we have applied the normal perturbation estimators to compute
optimal levels of dithered quantizations of the mesh vertices when a tolerance for
the accuracy of the normals is given. As a second application, we have proposed an
adaptive high-capacity data hiding algorithm for 3D triangle meshes. The algorithm
computes for each vertex the appropriate dithered quantization level i, retains the
i most significant bits of each vertex coordinate and hides the secret message into
the less significant bits.
In the future, we plan a similar study of the relationship between spatial noise and
the accuracy of the discrete curvatures of a mesh. Preliminary findings of this study
are presented in Chapter 5. The aim, again, is to develop methods for estimating
mesh quality when a dithered quantizer is applied to the vertex coordinates.
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Chapter 5
Curvature Degradation of Triangle
Meshes
The previous two chapters investigated the impact of changing the mesh vertex
coordinates of 3D triangle models on face normals, providing an understanding of
how spatial accuracy of mesh vertices relates to normal information. This chapter
looks into the relation between spatial accuracy of mesh vertices and the Discrete
Gaussian Curvature (DGC) defined on these vertices.
The strategy we follow for finding asymptotic results on the changes of DGC
caused by spatial pertubations identifies three principal directions on the vertex
v, and does approximate asymptotic computations independently for each of these
three directions. The assumption is that any other direction of the spatial displace-
ment vector will result to a behaviour of DGC change that will be asymptotically
between these three cases. Our computations are based on several heuristic as-
sumptions about the behaviour of DGC under vertex displacement. Moreover, the
computations only cover the simplest case of adding a displacement vector on a sin-
gle mesh vertex. To verify whether the computations generalize well when uniformly
random displacement vectors are added to all mesh vertices, we experimented on
a representative set of large irregular triangle meshes. The experimental results
show the initial asymptotic computations to be valid regarding displacements in
the normal direction, but invalid on tangential directions. We proposed a simple
explanation for this singular behaviour of DGC under tangential noise and updated
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Figure 5.1: The discrete Gaussian curvature as the angle deficit around a vertex.
our initial assumptions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we present the
results of the asymptotic computations related to the change of the DGC when a
random displacement is added to a single vertex of the mesh. Section 5.2 experimen-
tally evaluates the computations and our modelling assumptions. Finally, we briefly
conclude in Section 5.3. Material in this chapter has been submitted to Eighth In-
ternational Conference on Mathematical Methods for Curves and Surfaces, 2012 for
consideration.
5.1 Curvature Degradation
The most commonly used discretisation of the Gaussian curvature at a vertex v of
a triangle mesh is defined as
κv = 2pi −
N∑
i
αi (5.1.1)
where αi is the i-th angle adjacent to the vertex v and N is the number of triangles
adjacent to v, or the valence of v (see Fig. 5.1). Our aim is to obtain an approximate
computation of the expectation of κv when a uniformly random displacement is
added on v. The main difficulty with such a computation is that if we treat every
vertex in the 1-ring neighbourhood of v as an independent variable, then we have
to do the computations in a 3N -dimensional space.
To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we first observe that the disc of
the one ring-neighbourhood of v is a developable surface and the DGC is equal to
2pi−θ, where θ is the angle of development at v. Our strategy is to approximate the
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Figure 5.2: Vertex displacement in the normal direction. Left: The pair of diamet-
rically opposed triangles we use to measure the change in the development angle of
the elliptical cone. Right: The triangle before and after the displacement.
disc of the 1-ring neighbourhood with a simpler developable surface and compute
the change in θ caused by the displacement of v on this simplification. For that
purpose we only need to approximate the polygon of the 1-ring neighbours of v with
a curve S and then compute the angle of development of the cone defined by the
vertex v and the directrix S. In this chapter, the polygon is approximated by an
ellipse E , and thus θ becomes the angle of development of an elliptical cone. The two
axes of E can be seen as the two principal directions of the boundary of the 1-ring
neighborhood of v, and together with the normal of E form the three directions on
which we do the computations. To further simplify the problem, we assume that
the projection of v on the plane of E is on the centre of E , that is, we have a right
elliptical cone.
In the next step, we approximate E with a polygon with small edges of length δ.
To simplify the problem even further, instead of considering triangles with one vertex
v and a small base of length δ anywhere in E , we consider a pair of triangles with the
centres of their bases at the intersection of E with its major axis, see Fig. 5.2 (left).
The heuristic justification for that simplification is that while the displacement of
v will cause some of angles incident to v to get larger and other smaller, a pair of
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Figure 5.3: Vertex displacement in the direction of the major axis of E . Left:
The pair of diametrically opposed triangles we use to measure the change in the
development angle of the elliptical cone. Right: The triangle before and the two
triangles after the displacement.
diametrically opposite triangles will be enough to capture the asymptotic behavior
of the change of θ.
In the case of displacement in the normal direction we notice that the configura-
tion of the pair of triangles is symmetric and we only have to compute the difference
γ−γ(), where γ is the original angle at v, while γ() is the angle after the displace-
ment of v, see Fig. reffig:chap5compNormal (right). After some straightforward but
not trivial computations, we find that for small δ, asymptotically, the difference is
given by
γ − γ() ∼ 4h
r2 + h2
γ ∼ O(). (5.1.2)
The next case is when the displacement is parallel to the major axis of E , see
Fig. 5.3 (left). In this case there are two different triangles with one vertex v′ and
their base on E . Thus, we have to compute 2γ−γ+()−γ−() for small δ, see Fig. 5.3
(right). Similarly to the first case, straightforward but not trivial computations show
that
2γ − γ+()− γ−() ∼ 4r
2
(r2 + h2)2
γ2 ∼ O(2). (5.1.3)
The computations in the third direction, which is parallel to the minor axis of
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Figure 5.4: Experimental results of DGC degradation when the noise with strength
level 2−t is added to all the vertices of the Bunny, Horse, Brain and Chair models.
E , are slightly more complicated but similar to the second case and result is again
O(2).
Regarding algorithmic complexity, the algorithm is linear to the number of mesh
vertices.
5.2 Validation
First we want to validate the modelling assumptions and simplifications behind our
computations. In a first experiment, we consider a regular right hexagonal pyramid
with height and radius equal to one, we add several amounts of random noise either
in the normal or in the tangential direction, measure the absolute value of the
difference in the DGC, and for each amount of random noise we plot the average.
We use a logarithmic scale, that is, we plot log2 κ¯dif , where κ¯dif is the average of
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Figure 5.5: Experimental results of DGC degradation at the apex of a regular right
hexagonal pyramid when the noise with strength level 2−t is added to the apex.
the absolute value of the difference of the DGC.
From Fig. 5.4 it is clear that in both cases log2 κ¯dif is linear, meaning that κ¯dif
is asymptotically polynomial. It should be noticed however that in the tangential
case the behaviour of the model is subquadratic which means that the asymptotic
expectation O(2) has not been fully validated.
We also notice that the behaviour of the models is polynomials even for very
small values of t, where we do not expect our modelling assumption to hold. We
believe that this is a result of the high regularity of the pyramid. We also notice
that for very large levels of quantisation, at the right end of Fig. 5.5, the curve levels
off as a result of the limited accuracy of the machine arithmetic.
In the second experiment, we experimentally validate the proposed approxima-
tions, obtained in Section 5.1 by adding a random displacement to a single mesh
vertex, on large irregular models with random displacements added to all vertices.
The validation experiment was conducted on a set of synthetic and natural 3D
triangle mesh models consisting of the Bunny, Horse, Brain and Chair.
Fig. 5.4 shows the experimental results of DGC degradation with respect to the
various values of t when a uniformly random displacement with average strength level
2−t is added along normal, tangent and arbitrary directions of the mesh vertices. The
normal of a vertex was computed as the mean average of the normals of the triangles
incident to that vertex. As expected from Eqs. 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, Fig. 5.4 shows that
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Figure 5.6: Fitting results for the Bunny and Horse models when the noise is added
to the normal direction of the mesh vertices.
the change of the DGC is approximately linear to t when the average value of the
random displacement 2−t is small. We also notice that the DGC change after vertex
displacement in any direction is almost equal to the DGC change after displacement
in the normal direction. This was also expected given that the DGC change in the
normal direction is asymptotically larger than these caused by displacements in the
tangential directions.
However, we can also notice that the curve corresponding to displacements in the
tangential direction, after a sharp drop at the coarse levels of quantisation, becomes
a line parallel to that of the normal direction. That seems to suggest that Eq. 5.1.3
does not generalize when all mesh vertices are perturbed, or we would have obtained
a line with a slope almost twice the slope of the line corresponding to the normal
direction, that is, a behaviour similar to the one shown in Fig. 5.5. We believe that
this phenomenon has a simple explanation, namely that the perturbation of the
neighbours of the vertex v causes a slight perturbation of the tangent plane at v,
and thus when a random displacement at the original tangential direction is added,
in reality it also contains a small normal component. Eventually, that small normal
component dominates the behaviour of the DGC change.
The implication of the above observation is that while vertex displacements in the
normal and tangential directions have measurably different impact on the DGC, they
both have the same asymptotic behaviour. In practice, that means that smoothing
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Table 5.1: Mesh sizes and the parameters of the linear fitting model when noise is
added to the normal direction of the mesh vertices.
#Vertex a b
Bunny 34835 -1 5.05
Dragon 19851 -1 5.46
Brain 18375 -1 1.85
Chair 3413 -1 7.84
or a mesh evolution algorithms who move vertices in the tangential direction only
have indeed a gentler impact on the mesh curvature as intended, however the gain
in curvature accuracy is by a constant only amount of bits.
Fig. 5.6 shows least square fitted lines for the experimental results from the
Bunny and the Horse, for the normal direction and for l ≥ 12. We notice that this
linear fit is very good. The figure suggests that the linear model for the expected
curvature degradation
κ¯dif = −a · t+ b, t ≥ 0 (5.2.4)
should be very accurate for sufficiently large levels of quantisation t. In Table 5.1
we report the numerical values of the a and b in Eq. 5.2.4 for the four test models,
together with mesh sizes. Most characteristically, in the two decimal digits accuracy
we used to report the results, the slope of all lines is exactly -1, as predicted by
Eq. 5.1.2.
5.3 Summary
We studied the changes in the DCG of the vertices of a triangle mesh resulting
from spatial random vertex displacements modelling a dithered quantiser. In the
simplest case of adding a random displacement to a single vertex, even though
the asymptotic computations are based on some strong simplifying assumptions,
experimental validation shows them to be very accurate. Moreover, the results
on the computed and the experimentally observed asymptotic behaviours seem to
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extend to the most interesting case of adding random displacements to all mesh
vertices, even though in the case of displacements in the tangential direction this
extension is not trivial.
The preliminary work presented in this chapter, naturally introduces two char-
acteristic numbers associated with a triangle mesh. The first is the intercept of the
linear model of DGC degradation caused by displacements at the normal or at any
direction, that is, the value of b in Eq. 5.2.4. The second is the distance between
the two parallel lines modelling DGC degradation in the normal and tangential
directions, respectively.
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Chapter 6
Histogram-based 3D Robust
Watermarking
In this chapter, we propose a robust watermarking algorithm for triangle mesh mod-
els based on the modification of the histogram of vertex coordinates in a spherical
coordinate system computed by applying PCA to the cover model. The histogram is
invariant under transformations such as rotation, translation and vertex reordering,
and hence our watermarking method is robust against these attacks. The proposed
method carries out blind watermark extraction. Experimental results demonstrate
the excellent performance of our method in terms of resistance to a wide range of
attacks, as well as its superiority over similar existing methods.
The proposed method can been seen as a modification of the watermarking
algorithm proposed by Cho et al. [7]. The main motivation behind the modified
algorithm was the observation that the original Cho et al.’s algorithm is vulnerable
to a specific steganalytic attack we developed while our new algorithm is designed
to be resistant to that attack.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• A watermarking approach robust against a wide range of attacks, based on
modifying the histogram of the radial coordinate of the mesh vertices in a
spherical coordinate system.
• A specific steganalytic algorithm against Cho et al.’s watermarking [7].
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The main limitation of the first contribution is that the proposed watermarking is
not resistant to mesh editing/deformation operations that change the global shape of
mesh. Indeed, such operations could change the radial coordinates significantly and
thus their histogram significantly. The main limitation of the second contribution
is the limited scope of the proposed steganalytic algorithm. Indeed, it is a specific
method and only works when applied to detect the messages hidden by Cho et al.’s
watermarking.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 describes in details
the embedding process, while Section 6.2 briefly presents the extraction algorithm.
Section 6.3 presents the experimental results, demonstrating the performance of our
method. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.
6.1 Embedding Process
Following Cho et al. [7], the system embeds the watermark in the spherical rather
than the Cartesian coordinates. However, there are two main differences between
the proposed embedding process and the original algorithm in Cho’s et al. [7]. The
first difference is that in our algorithm the origin of the spherical coordinate system
is not the barycentre of the vertices. Instead, the origin is a point computed on
the principal axis of the set of vertices, a choice that increases the variance of the
radial coordinates of the mesh vertices, and thus, the robustness of the algorithm.
The second and most important difference is the way the histogram of the radial
coordinates is modified to embed message bits. Our choice of embedding technique
makes the algorithm robust against the steganalytic attack we devised for breaking
the original Cho et al. [7].
Next we describe the two stages of the proposed algorithm, first the coordinate
system transformation and then the watermark embedding.
6.1.1 Coordinate System Transformation
Let (xi, yi, zi) denote the Cartesian coordinates of the i-th vertex of a triangle mesh
with N vertices. After computing the point (x¯, y¯, z¯) and translating the origin of the
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coordinate system to that point, we compute the spherical coordinates (ρi, φi, θi) of
(xi, yi, zi) by
ρi =
√
(xi − x¯)2 + (yi − y¯)2 + (zi − z¯)2
φi = cos
−1 zi − z¯√
(xi − x¯)2 + (yi − y¯)2 + (zi − z¯)2
θi = tan
−1 yi − y¯
xi − x¯
(6.1.1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , ρi ∈ [0,+∞), φi ∈ [0, pi], θi ∈ [0, 2pi), see [172].
One obvious choice for (x¯, y¯, z¯) is the barycentre of the vertex set of the original
model as in [7]. However, the set of radial coordinates P resulting from this choice
of origin might not be a satisfying message carrier when watermarking 3D models
resembling a uniformly sampled sphere. Indeed, the barycentre of a uniform sample
from a sphere is the centre of that sphere and the variance of P is zero. As a result,
for models resembling a uniformly sampled sphere, which are very common in prac-
tice, the variance of P will be very low, affecting the robustness of the watermarking
method.
Instead, we are looking for a point (x¯, y¯, z¯) as the origin of the spherical coor-
dinate system that will result to a set of radial coordinates P with high enough
variance to allow for robust watermarking, but not excessively high variance which
might increase the distortion of the marked model when the watermarking algo-
rithm changes the radial coordinate of mesh vertices to alter the histogram of P .
Moreover, if we want the watermaking algorithm to the able to withstand a certain
attack, the computation of the origin should also be robust against that attack.
The proposed choice for computing the origin is based on averaging vertices pro-
jected on the principal, an operation that is invariant under common affine transfor-
mations and reasonably stable under small vertex perturbations. More specifically,
we project the mesh vertices onto their principal axis and then compute (x¯, y¯, z¯)
as the average of the half of the vertex set lying at the most right-hand side of
the principal axis. Notice that by averaging the right most half of the verices on
the principal axis we shift the origin away from the barycentre and, generally, we
increase the variance of P . We have empirically found that the proposed averaging,
which in a regular setting places the origin in a position splitting the projection of
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the mesh on its principal axis at about three quarters, gives a high but not exces-
sively high variance of P , resulting thus in a good trade-off between robustness and
distortion for the watermarking algorithm.
6.1.2 Watermark Embedding
The proposed algorithm embeds the watermark by changing the histogram of P .
To embed a watermark bit wi ∈ {−1,+1}, we take two neighboring bins of the
histogram and possibly transfer some elements from one bin to another. The details
of the embedding process are described as follows.
Step 1: The first step is to build a histogram with K bins B = {Bk : 1 ≤ k ≤ K}
for P = {ρi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. To do so, we construct Bk by classifying all the elements
ρi ∈ P into the K bins based on
Bk = {ρi : ρmin + (k − 1) ·∆ρ ≤ ρi < ρmin + k ·∆ρ} (6.1.2)
where ρmin and ρmax are the minimum and the maximum of P , and
∆ρ = (ρmax − ρmin)/K (6.1.3)
is the range size of each bin. We also assume that ρmax ∈ BK . The histogram of P
is produced by counting the number of elements in each bin Bk.
Step 2: In this step, we insert watermark message bits by modifying the his-
togram computed in Step 1. Starting from the second bin B2, we arrange any two
adjacent bins into pairs as (B2,B3), (B4,B5), · · · and then proceed to hide a water-
mark bit wi into each embeddable pair. A pair (Bk,Bk+1) is considered embeddable
if
|Bk|+ |Bk+1| ≥ 1 (6.1.4)
where |x| denotes the number of elements of the set x.
Notice that the proposed method does not utilize the bins B1 and BK to carry
watermark. As it will become apparent later, this ensures that the watermark can
be extracted with no reference to the original model. Since B1 and BK are excluded
from watermarking and since one pair of bins is required to carry one message bit,
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if the bin number K is odd, we need to exclude one more bin from the embedding
process, here, we choose BK−1.
A watermark bit wi is embedded in an embeddable pair (Bk,Bk+1) by increasing
the values of some radiuses ρi ∈ Bk, or decreasing the values of some radiuses
ρi ∈ Bk+1, depending on the value of wi. Specifically, to insert wi = −1, we increase
the values of the nmov largest elements ρi of Bk, pushing them into Bk+1 through
ρ′i = ρ
k+1
min +
∆ρ
arg min
n
{n : ρk+1min + ∆ρ/n < ρk+1max, n ∈ N, n ≥ 3}
(6.1.5)
where ρ′i is the vertex radius in the marked mesh corresponding to ρi and ρ
k+1
min and
ρk+1max denote the minimum and the maximum radiuses in Bk+1. The basic idea is to
try to create a histogram difference between Bk and Bk+1 by updating nmv radiuses
ρi in Bk. That is, we attempt to achieve
|B′k+1| − |B′k| ≥ nthr (6.1.6)
for the marked bins B′k and B′k+1, where nthr ≥ 1 is an integer threshold controlling
the tradeoff between robustness and distortion. We separate the following three
cases:
Case 1: If |Bk+1|−|Bk| ≥ nthr, then nmov = 0, meaning no alteration is required.
Case 2: Else if |Bk|+ |Bk+1| < nthr, then nmov = |Bk|, meaning all the radiuses
in Bk will be transferred into Bk+1 by updating them according to Eq. 6.1.5.
Case 3: Else if |Bk|+ |Bk+1| >= nthr, then nmov is given by
nmov =
⌈
(|Bk| − |Bk+1|+ nthr)/2
⌉
(6.1.7)
Notice that by choosing to move the largest elements of Bk into Bk+1, we keep the
embedding distortion to a minimum.
The process of embedding wi = +1 over an embeddable pair (Bk,Bk+1) is com-
pletely analogous. We create a histogram difference between Bk and Bk+1 by de-
creasing if needed the values of the nmv smallest radiuses in Bk+1.
For all non-embeddable pairs (Bk,Bk+1), we do not embed any watermark bits
into them and hence keep their radiuses ρi intact.
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6.2 Extraction Process
Given a watermarked mesh model, the watermark extraction process is straightfor-
ward and can be carried with no reference to the original mesh.
From the given marked mesh, we compute the set of watermarked radiuses P ′ =
{ρ′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} using Eq. 6.1.1. After classifying the radiuses in P ′ into K bins
using Eq.6.1.2 and 6.1.3, we obtain the set of watermarked bins B′ = {B′k : 1 ≤ k ≤
K}. Notice that, given K, the range size of each watermarked B′k is the same as the
range size ∆ρ of the original bins in (see Eq. 6.1.3). This is because the fist and the
last bins B1 and BK have not been altered by the watermarking process, and thus
the minimum ρ′min and maximum ρ
′
max radiuses after watermarking are equal to the
minimum ρmin and maximum ρmax radiuses before watermarking, giving an efficient
solution to the synchronization problem. However, notice that the number of bins
K should be passed to the extraction algorithm as side information.
In the next step, shadowing the embedding process, the extraction algorithm
forms the pairs of bins (B′2,B′3), (B′4,B′5), · · · and identifies the embeddable pairs
(B′k,B′k+1) that carry watermark messages. Recall that embeddable are the pairs
satisfying |Bk| + |Bk+1| ≥ 1. We find the corresponding pairs watermarked pairs
(B′k,B′k+1) by checking if
|B′k|+ |B′k+1| ≥ 1 (6.2.8)
based on the invariance of the number of elements in a bin pair during watermarking
|B′k|+ |B′k+1| = |Bk|+ |Bk+1| (6.2.9)
which is a consequence of the embedding strategy that swaps radiueses inside pairs
of bins only.
Finally, each embedded watermark bit w′i is sequentially extracted from each
embeddable pair (B′k,B′k+1) by
w′i =
−1 if |B
′
k+1| ≥ |B′k|
+1 otherwise
(6.2.10)
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Figure 6.1: Original cover mesh models: (a) Bunny, (b) Rabbit, (c) Venus, (d)
Dragon and (e) Cow.
Table 6.1: Model details and parameter setting.
Model #Vertices #Faces nthr
Bunny 34835 69666 43
Rabbit 70658 141312 80
Venus 100759 201514 100
Dragon 50000 100000 75
Cow 2904 5804 8
6.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed watermarking algorithm
and compare it against the variant of Cho et al.’s algorithm based on shifting the
mean values of the radiuses in a bin. The evaluation includes a distortion analysis, a
robustness analysis against various attacks and a study of its steganalytic properties.
In the tests, we use a small representative set of well-known 3D models, consisting
of the Bunny, Rabbit, Venus, Dragon and the Cow, see Fig. 6.1. The parameters
used are listed in Table 6.1. The algorithm has linear time complexity O
(
n
)
as the
runtime grows linearly as the vertex number n increases.
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Figure 6.2: Embedding distortion measured as the RMSE (left) and the Hausdorff
distance (right) for 200, 300 and 400 bins.
6.3.1 Distortion Analysis
For measuring the amount of distortion caused by the embedding of the water-
mark we utilize two widely used quantitative measures: the root mean square error
(RMSE) and the Hausdorff distance between the original and the marked mesh. We
compute these two measures with the Metro tool [173]. Notice that this subsection
is only concerned with distortion analysis, that is, we do not apply any attacks to
the watermarked models.
Fig. 6.2 plots the RMSE and the Hausdorff distance for various values of the bin
number K. We notice that both measures of distortion are small, indicating that
the proposed watermarking introduces a small only amount of degradation to the
carrier model. We also notice that an increase of K results to an increase of the
RMSE and the Hausdorff distance, that is, to larger amounts of distortion. The
reason for this is that by increasing K we decrease the bin step ∆ρ (see Eq. 6.1.3)
and hence decrease the modulation of the radiuses ρi when they are transferred from
one bin to an adjacent.
To gauge the visual significance of these distortion measurements, in Fig. 6.3 we
show several marked mesh models corresponding to K = 400. Any distortion caused
by the insertion of the watermark is hardly noticeable; however, after zooming in we
can observe some artifacts in the smooth areas of the mesh. Fig. 6.4 show close-ups
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Figure 6.3: Watermarked mesh models under K = 400: (a) Bunny, (b) Rabbit, (c)
Venus, (d) Dragon and (e) Cow.
Figure 6.4: Close-ups of the original and watermarked Bunny and Rabbit models.
For each mesh group, the left and right figures show the original and marked models,
respectively. The watermarked models are from Fig. 6.3.
of the watermarked Bunny and Rabbit in Fig. 6.3.
Regarding the embedding capacity, which can be traded-off for distortion, we
notice that the maximum length of the watermark bit sequence is b(K − 2)/2c,
however for large values of K this maximum capacity is usually unachievable. The
reason is that some bin pairs (Bk,Bk+1) do not contain any radiuses, i.e., |Bk| +
|Bk+1| = 0, making the pair non-embeddable.
6.3.2 Robustness Analysis
The proposed method is obviously robust against distortionless attacks such as ver-
tex reordering, translation, rotation, uniform scaling and their combinations because
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Figure 6.5: Results of attacking the marked Bunny model by: (a) adding A = 0.50%
noise, (b) Laplacian smoothing of 50 iterations (λ = 0.02) and (c) 8-bit quantization.
the histogram of the radiuses ρi is invariant under these attacks. For analyzing
the robustness of the watermark against malicious attacks such as noise addition,
smoothing and quantization, we use the standard measure of the correlation coeffi-
cient
C(w,w′) =
∑
i(wi − w¯) · (w′i − w¯′)√∑
i(wi − w¯)2 ·
∑
i(w
′
i − w¯′)2
(6.3.11)
where w¯ and w¯′ denote the means of the original watermark sequence w and the
detected watermark sequence w′, respectively.
We performed these using the 3D mesh watermarking benchmark [174]. In the
tests, we fixed K = 400 and carried out attacks with varying strength. Fig. 6.5
shows a marked Bunny model under various attacks.
Noise Addition: To measure the robustness under noise addition attacks,
pseudo-random additive noise was added to the vertex coordinates (xi, yi, zi) of each
test model according to (resp. yi, zi)
x′i = xi + ai · d¯ (6.3.12)
where d¯ denotes the average distance from vertices to object center, and ai is the
noise strength and is a pseudo-random number uniformly distributed in interval
[A,A] with A the maximum noise strength. The four levels of noise strength used
in the test are: A = 0.05%, 0.10%, 0.25%, 0.50%. For each level, we conducted
five experiments with different seeds, generating five different noise patterns and we
report the average of the five results in Fig. 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Robustness against different levels of noise attack (%). The figures on
the left and middle plot the distortion of the marked models as a result of adding
noise to them. The figure on the right plots the correlation coefficients C(w,w′),
where w′ is the message extracted from the noisy marked model.
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Figure 6.7: Robustness against different levels of smoothing attack. The figures on
the left and middle plot distortion of the marked models as a result of smoothing
them. The figure on the right plots the correlation coefficients C(w,w′), where w′
is the message extracted from the smoothed marked model.
As expected, in each model the inserted watermark degrades gradually as the
noise strength increases. Even for strength levels as high as 0.25%, the correlation
C(w,w′) has a value that is larger than 0.70 for all the test models expect Venus.
Notice that a noise attack at level 0.25% will degrade significantly the visual quality
of the carrier model, meaning that even though the watermark may be removed, the
model will be of no use for the attacker.
We also notice that the Dragon model appears to be exceptionally robust against
the noise attack as C(w,w′) ≈ 0.95 even when the noise level reaches A = 0.25%.
We believe that this is due to the fact that Dragon is the most ‘complex’ amongst
these test models and the histogram of the radiouses has the highest variance.
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Figure 6.8: Robustness against quantization attack. The figures on the left and
middle plot the distortion of the marked models as a result of quantizing them. The
figure on the right plots the correlation coefficients C(w,w′) for various levels of
quantization, where w′ is the message extracted from the quantized marked model.
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Figure 6.9: Left: The relationship between the embedding distortion measured by
RMSE and the bin number K. Right: The relationship between the robustness
measured by the correlation coefficient and the bin number K. The robustness was
measured against a noise attack of noise level A = 0.30%.
Smoothing Attack: To evaluate robustness against smoothing attacks, we
applied to the marked models 10, 30 and 50 iterations of Laplacian smoothing [175],
fixing the deformation factor at λ = 0.02. The results are shown in Fig. 6.7. Again,
the high values of the correlation coefficients C(w,w′) imply that the proposed
watermarking method is able to survive mesh smoothing as well.
Quantization Attack: To evaluate robustness against quantization attacks, we
quantized the Cartesian coordinates of the marked models at 8, 9 and 10 bits and
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6.10: Illustration of the original Hank, the watermarked Hank and its de-
formed versions. (a) original Hank, (b) watermarked Hank, (c) deformation of (b),
and (d) deformation of (b).
tried to retrieve the embedded watermark w′ from the quantized models. Fig. 6.8
shows the correlation coefficients. As expected, the robustness decreases with the
level of quantization because a lower level quantization degrades more the model.
One limitation of the proposed watermarking is its weak robustness against mesh
deformation attacks that change the global shape of a 3D model. Fig. 6.10 shows
the original model Hank from Blender 2.49 [176], the watermarked Hank and the
deformed versions of the marked Hank. While we are able to recover the embedded
watermark bits perfectly from the marked Hank in Fig. 6.10 (b), we cannot extract
the message bits from the deformed versions Figs. 6.10 (c) and (d) of Fig. 6.10
(b), i.e., we obtain the correlation coefficients C(w,w′) = −0.029 for Fig. 6.10 (c)
and C(w,w′) = 0.225 for Fig. 6.10 (d). This is expected, because such a mesh
deformation alters the model significantly and thus the distances between the mesh
vertices and the model center change greatly. Given this limitation, we proposed
a Laplacian coordinates-based 3D watermarking in Chapter 7 able to survive mesh
deformation attacks.
6.3.3 Robustness w.r.t Bin Number K
In this subsection, we briefly study the relationship between the robustness and
the bin number K. Fig. 6.9 shows that both the embedding distortion measured by
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Figure 6.11: Experimental comparison between Cho et al.’s method and the pro-
posed method. (a) noise addition attack and (b) Laplacian smoothing attack
(λ = 0.02).
RMSE (left) and the correlation coefficients (right) decrease as K increases. That is,
while the use of a smaller K reduces the distortion, it also decreases the robustness of
watermark. This was expected given that distortion and robustness are conflicting
requirements.
6.3.4 Comparison with Cho et al.’s method
Finally, we compare the proposed watermarking scheme with the mean based variant
Cho et al. [7] in terms of robustness. Fig. 6.11 (left) compares the robustness of
the two methods against noise addition attacks. Generally, the proposed methods
exhibits better robustness properties than Cho et al.’s against this type of attack.
Fig. 6.11 (right) compares the robustness of the two methods against smoothing
attacks. Again, the proposed method seems to perform better. In both experiments,
for Cho et al.’s method we used the parameter settings recommended in [7].
6.4 Anti-steganalysis Properties
In this section, we present a steganalytic algorithm we developed for Cho et al.’s
mean based scheme and show that the proposed modification exhibits a superior
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Figure 6.12: Scatter plot of the mean values mk for (a) the clean Bunny and (b) the
watermarked Bunny with K = 200 bins.
anti-staganalytic behaviour against that method.
Let B˜′k = {ρ˜k,j : j = 1, 2, 3, ...} denote the k-th (1 ≤ k ≤ K) bin of the normalized
marked vertex norms ρ˜k,j in Cho et al.’s watermarking. The main idea of the
steganalytic algorithm is based on the observation that the watermark embedding
will result in a 2-clustering of the mean values m¯k
m¯k =
1
|B′k|
∑
j
ρ˜k,j (6.4.13)
of the bins B˜′k. As an example, Fig. 6.12 illustrates the scatter plot of {m¯k : 1 ≤
k ≤ K} for the original and the watermarked Bunny, for K = 200.
However, if K is unknown, a case that appears often in practice, the means values
m¯k obtained by a poor estimate of K may not exhibit the same clustering behaviour.
Fig. 6.13 illustrates this problem, demonstrating the need for an algorithm that will
accurately estimate K.
The proposed algorithm is based on an exhaustive search through possible values
of K and for each K we classify the mean values {m¯k : 1 ≤ k ≤ K} into two clusters.
We use a standard clustering algorithm fitting the data {m¯k : 1 ≤ k ≤ K} with a
mixture of two Gaussians N (µK,i, σ2K,i), i = 1, 2 with means µK,i and variances σ2k,i.
If C and C˜ denote the two clusters, we measure the degree of separation between C
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Figure 6.13: Scatter plot of the mean values mk of the marked Bunny for (a) a
100 bin histogram and (b) a 240 bin histogram. In both cases the watermarked
algorithm used K = 200 bins.
and C˜ as the Bhattacharyya distance DK of the two Gaussians of the mixture
1
8
(µK,2 − µK,1)2
[σ2K,1 + σ2K,2
2
]−1
+
1
2
ln
(σ2K,1 + σ
2
K,2)/2
σK,1σK,2
. (6.4.14)
Notice that the use of the Bhattacharyya to measure the distance between discrete or
continuous probability distributions is quite common in practical applications [177].
Assuming that the more accurate estimates of K will most likely yield higher degrees
of separation DK between C and C˜ than the poor estimates of K (see Fig. 6.12
and 6.13), we estimate K as
K ′ = arg max
K
{DK : K ∈ [Kmin, Kmax], K ∈ N} (6.4.15)
where Kmin and Kmax define the range of K we would like to consider. Notice that
the whole process is not very computationally demanding since for each value of
K we only construct the bins {B˜′k : 1 ≤ k ≤ K} and compute the mean values
{m¯k : 1 ≤ k ≤ K}. Additionally, we do not need heavy computational cost, as
the search space [Kmin, Kmax] is small. In our experiments, we fix Kmin = 1 and
Kmax = 500 since larger values of K create many empty bins that are unable to
carry watermark messages and the watermarking algorithm itself fails.
After obtaining our estimate K ′ of K the next task is to decide whether the
mesh has been watermarked. Recall that Cho et al.’s mean based watermarking
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Table 6.2: Comparison of resistance against steganalysis. Column “Accuracy of K”
shows the accuracy rate of the estimations of K. Column “Accuracy” shows the
accuracy rate of watermark detection.
Methods #Bits #Marked models Accuracy of K Accuracy
Cho’s
64 443 96.84% 94.58%
100 386 96.63% 93.01%
Ours
64 377 0.65% 6.63%
100 371 0 6.74%
algorithm embeds a watermark bit in such a way that m¯k > 0.5 or m¯k < 0.5 (see
Fig. 6.12 (right)), depending on the value of the watermark bit. Consequently, if
the model being considered is indeed watermarked, it should satisfy
min
ci∈C
{ci} > 0.5 > max
c˜i∈C˜
{c˜i}
abs
(
min
ci∈C
{ci}+ max
c˜i∈C˜
{c˜i} − 1
)
≤ 
(6.4.16)
assuming, without loss of generality, that the elements in C are larger than the
element in C˜. We also require
abs
( |C|
K ′
− |C˜|
K ′
)
= abs
(2 |C|
K ′
− 1
)
≤ ′ (6.4.17)
The rationale behind the second requirement is the assumption that the watermark
bits follow the uniform random distribution, hence, C and C˜ should contain almost
equal numbers of elements, i.e., |C| ≈ |C˜|.  in Eq. 6.4.16 and ′ in Eq. 6.4.17 are
two user-specified thresholds. In the experiments we used  = 0.15 and ′ = 0.03.
In summary, the two main steps of the proposed steganalytic algorithm are: 1)
find an estimate K ′ of K by maximizing the separation of the two clusters, using
Eqs. 6.4.14 and 6.4.15; and 2) for the estimated K ′, check if Eqs. 6.4.16 and 6.4.17
are simultaneously satisfied or not.
To test the steganalytic algorithm, we constructed two large 3D databases: one
is composed of clean models, most of which are from Princeton’s University repos-
itory [178], while the other consists of marked models resulting from applying Cho
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et al.’s and our watermarking algorithms to the clean models in the first database.
Notice that the use of a large bin number K might make some 3D meshes unable to
carry the watermark, so we may end up with a different number of marked models
for different K’s (see Table 6.2).
Regarding Cho et al.’s watermarking method, Table 6.2 shows that the proposed
steganalysis in most cases estimates correctly the bin number K and then detects the
existence of watermark with high accuracy. Regarding our proposed watermarking
method, the steganalysis fails, mainly because the estimates of the bin number K
are very poor. As a result the detection accuracy is very low; more specifically,
around 6%.
Even though the proposed steganalytic algorithm was specifically designed to
target Cho et al.’s watermarking, we note that our attempt to also test it on our
algorithm was a decision justified by the similarities between the two approaches,
rather than an arbitrary one. In particular, we notice that when, for example, our
algorithm moves elements from bin B˜′k to bin B˜′k+1 to the right, the expected mean
inside this pair of bins also shifts to the right. Thus, when we watermark a histogram
with K bins, we would expect a 2-clustering in the means of bin pairs, that is, a
clustering in the means of the histogram with K/2 bins.
The reason that such a 2-clustering goes largely undetected is that our algorithm
would move elements from B˜′k to B˜′k+1 and thus, shift the mean of the pair to the
right, only if bin B˜′k has more elements than bin B˜′k+1. That is, it will only shift to
the right the means of bin pairs that are expected to be biased towards the left. In
other words, the modulation of the normalized radiuses, instead of being a source
of bias, tends to remove existing bias inside bin pairs and thus, it is more difficult
to detect statistically.
6.5 Summary
We have presented a robust, blind watermarking algorithm which embeds a wa-
termark on a 3D model by altering the histogram of the radial coordinates of the
model’s vertices. The algorithm has been demonstrated to be robust against com-
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mon attacks to 3D models. Also, it is able to survive the operation that changes
the mesh connectivity. The method is a modification of the watermarking algorithm
proposed by Cho et al. [7], and compared to the original algorithm exhibits a better
robustness distortion trade-off. Most characteristically, compared to Cho et al.’s
watermarking, the proposed method exhibits stronger resistance against a specific
steganalytic algorithm which we devised and also presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 7
Laplacian Coordinates-based 3D
Watermarking
As demonstrated by theoretical arguments or experiments, many existing 3D wa-
termarking algorithms are able to withstand common attacks, such as geometric
transformations, addition of noise and mesh smoothing. However, they have not
taken into account the robustness of the watermark against mesh editing attacks
that could be applied to 3D models to change the global shape of the mesh.
We believe that, in many cases, the assumption of a mesh editing attack is more
realistic than the assumption of a noise addition, or a smoothing attack. Indeed,
even if the attacker can use smoothing or noise addition to remove the watermark
without degrading the visual quality of the model, still they would probably want to
alter the global shape of the model through mesh editing in order to, either disguise
the appropriation of the model, or to create a model fit for their purpose.
In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with the robustness against the
above-mentioned type of mesh editing attacks. The watermarking method is based
on modifying the Laplacian coordinate vectors (x, y, z). The basic idea is to embed
the watermark into the histogram of the lengths of (x, y, z). The main reason of
using the Laplacian coordinate lengths is due to their invariance property under mesh
editing that deforms the global shape, as well as other common attacks, including
translation, rotation, uniform scaling and vertex reordering. To encode a watermark
bit, we change the heights of two adjacent histogram bins via transferring some
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elements from one bin to another. The watermark extraction is very simple and can
be carried out blindly, with no reference to the original mesh.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• A new polygonal mesh watermarking method based on Laplacian coordinates.
• A demonstration that the algorithm is robust against editing operations alter-
ing the global shape of the mesh.
The main limitation is that the proposed watermarking scheme targets the resis-
tance against mesh editing attacks only, so it offers weak robustness to other attacks,
including mesh simplification and remeshing.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The preliminaries and the basic
ideas of the proposed watermarking are presented in Section 7.1. The details of
watermark embedding and extraction are described in Section 7.2 and Section 7.3,
respectively. The experimental results are presented and discussed in Section 7.4.
Finally, we conclude in Section 7.5. Material in this chapter has been published
in [9].
7.1 The Watermarking Algorithm
In this section we introduce the basic notation and terminology and then give an
overview of the proposed algorithm.
7.1.1 Preliminaries
Let M be a polygonal mesh model with N vertices and let V and E denote the
sets of vertices and edges of M, respectively. Let vi be the vertex indexed by i, its
position described in Cartesian coordinates by [xi yi zi] (written as a row vector).
The 1-ring neighbor of the vertex vi is denoted by
N (vi) = {vj|(vi, vj) ∈ E, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N} . (7.1.1)
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For each vertex vi, the vectors of the Laplacian coordinates Li = [x
′
i y
′
i z
′
i] are the
rows of the matrix
L = M×

x1 y1 z1
x2 y2 z2
...
...
...
xN yN zN
 (7.1.2)
where M is the Kirchhoff matrix [110] given by
Mi,j =

|N (vi)| if i = j
−1 if vj ∈ N (i) 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
0 otherwise
(7.1.3)
The use of a different discrete Laplacian, as for example the one used for mesh editing
in [179], would lead to a watermarking algorithm of comparable performance.
The Cartesian coordinates of the vertices are obtained from the Laplacian coor-
dinates by M−1×L. For numerical stability, as M may be not invertible, we update
the M in Eq. 7.1.3 by
Mi,j =
Mi,j −  if i = jMi,j otherwise 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (7.1.4)
where  > 0 is a small real number.
The proposed watermarking method embeds the watermark into the histogram
of the lengths of the Laplacian coordinate vectors
di = ‖Li‖ =
√
x′i
2 + y′i
2 + z′i
2 1 ≤ i ≤ N (7.1.5)
These lengths are then classified into K bins Bk, according to
Bk = {di|dmin + δ(k − 1) ≤ di < dmin + δk} (7.1.6)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. The dmin and dmax are the minimum and maximum
elements of d = {d1, d2, · · · , dN} and
δ =
dmax − dmin
K
(7.1.7)
is the size of the bin. We also assume that dmax ∈ BK .
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Figure 7.1: Histograms of the lengths of the vectors of the Laplacian coordinates of
the Rabbit model with (a) K = 200 and (b) K = 500 bins.
The histogram of d is produced by counting the number of elements in each bin
Bk. Two examples for the Rabbit model for the values of K = 200 and K = 500 are
shown in Fig. 7.1. The figure indicates that many bins are empty.
7.1.2 Overview of The Algorithm
We assume that the watermark is a bitstring. Each bit (wj = −1 or + 1) is inserted
into a pair of bins (Bk1 ,Bk2) with k1 6= k2. However, in order to ensure exact
watermark extraction, some pairs of bins will not be used. A pair of bins (Bk1 ,Bk2)
is valid if it satisfies
f(Bk1 ,Bk2) = |Bk1 ∪ Bk2| = |Bk1|+ |Bk2| ≥ nthr (7.1.8)
with k1 6= k2 and |X| denoting the number of elements of X. Here, nthr is an
embedding threshold.
A pair of bins that is not valid is called invalid. The proposed method does not
utilize the bins B1 and BK , and thus, (Bk,B1) and (Bk,BK) are always invalid. As
it will become apparent later, this requirement ensures that the watermark can be
extracted with no reference to the original model.
Assuming that (Bk1 ,Bk2) is valid, we insert one watermark bit wj into this pair
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by, if necessary, moving some elements from Bk1 into Bk2 or vice-versa, such that|Bˆk1| < |Bˆk2| if wj = −1|Bˆk1| ≥ |Bˆk2| if wj = +1 (7.1.9)
where Bˆk1 and Bˆk2 are the k1-th and k2-th bins after the watermarking operation.
To move an element di from one bin to another, we either enlarge or reduce its value
so as to push it to the other bin. Notice that no element movement operation is
applied when |Bk1| < |Bk2| and wj = −1, or |Bk1| ≥ |Bk2| and wj = +1.
Finally, the watermark bit wj is extracted from the pair of bins (Bˆk1 , Bˆk2)
wj =
−1 if |Bˆk1| < |Bˆk2|+1 if |Bˆk1| ≥ |Bˆk2| (7.1.10)
7.2 Watermark Embedding
In order to embed the watermark, we first alter the set of Laplacian lengths d,
computing a new set dˆ
dˆ = {dˆ1, dˆ2, · · · , dˆN} (7.2.11)
carrying the watermark. Then, through a minimization process, a set of Laplacian
vectors Lˆ with lengths dˆ is realized, and eventually the corresponding Cartesian
coordinates are computed.
7.2.1 The Computation of dˆ
As the bins B1 and BK are excluded from the embedding process, and as we need
one pair of bins to embed one message bit, if K is odd we need to exclude one more
bin from the embedding process (here we chose BK−1). Thus, the maximum index
of a bin used for watermarking is
Kˆ = 2
⌊K − 2
2
⌋
+ 1 (7.2.12)
For any di inside the bins B1, BK or BK−1 (when K is odd), we have dˆi = di,
that is, no changes are made.
115
7.2. Watermark Embedding
For the rest of the bins, in order to reduce the embedding distortion and hence
improve the visual quality of the marked mesh, the watermark bits are inserted into
pairs of adjacent bins (Bk1 ,Bk2) with k2 = k1 + 1. That gives a set of (Kˆ − 1)/2
candidate bin pairs (B2,B3), (B4,B5), . . . , (BKˆ−1,BKˆ).
For any such pair, if f(Bk,Bk+1) < nthr, then the pair is invalid and we do not
embed a watermark bit, that is, dˆi = di.
If f(Bk,Bk+1) ≥ nthr, then the pair is valid and the watermarking process de-
pends on the relation between Bk, Bk+1 and the bit wj. Without loss of generality
we assume that wj = +1, as the case wj = −1 is completely analogous. We separate
two cases:
Case 1: If |Bk| ≥ |Bk+1|, then no alteration of the Laplacian lengths is required,
and thus, dˆi = di.
Case 2: If |Bk| < |Bk+1|, then we have to transfer some elements from Bk+1 to
Bk. We order the elements of Bk+1 in ascending order
di1 ≤ di2 ≤ · · · ≤ di|Bk+1| (7.2.13)
and update the first n elements in Eq. 7.2.13 by
dˆi =
d if di ∈ {di1 , di2 , ..., din}di if di ∈ (Bk+1 − {di1 , di2 , ..., din}) ∪ Bk (7.2.14)
where
d =

∑
di∈Bk di
|Bk| if |Bk| > 0
2dmin + δ(2k − 1)
2
if |Bk| = 0
(7.2.15)
is the average value of elements in Bk if Bk is non-empty, or the average of the
lower limits of Bk and Bk+1, if Bk is empty. Notice that by transferring the smallest
elements of Bk+1 into Bk, we keep the distortion of the mesh to a minimum.
The number n of points transferred from Bk+1 to Bk is given by
|Bk+1| −
⌊f(Bk,Bk+1)− 1
2
⌋
+
⌊f(Bk,Bk+1)− 1
nrobust
⌋
(7.2.16)
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Figure 7.2: Histogram changes as a result of watermarking the Horse and Rabbit
models with K = 300 bins. (a) non-watermarked histogram of Horse, (b) wa-
termarked histogram of Horse, (c) non-watermarked histogram of Rabbit and (d)
watermarked histogram of Rabbit.
where the parameter nrobust controls the tradeoff between robustness of the water-
mark and distortion of the mesh. If the number of points to be transferred, as
computed by Eq. 7.2.16, exceeds the number of points in Bk+1, then we just transfer
all the contents of Bk+1 into Bk.
7.2.2 Distortion Minimization and Watermarked Mesh Gen-
eration
Next we compute a set of Laplacian coordinates Lˆ realizing the computed set of
lengths dˆ. This is an undetermined problem and we solve it by minimizing the
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distance between the Laplacian coordinates before and after watermarking. For
computational efficiency we minimize that distance at each vertex separately, that
is, we minimize
‖Lˆi − Li‖2 = (xˆ′i − x′i)2 + (yˆ′i − y′i)2 + (zˆ′i − z′i)2 (7.2.17)
subject to
xˆ′2i + yˆ
′2
i + zˆ
′2
i = dˆ
2
i (7.2.18)
From Eq. 7.2.17 and Eq. 7.2.18, we observe that this minimization problem is
equivalent to finding a point (xˆ′i, yˆ
′
i, zˆ
′
i) on a sphere S of radius dˆi centered at the
origin that is closest to the given point (x′i, y
′
i, z
′
i). This means that (xˆ
′
i, yˆ
′
i, zˆ
′
i) is
the projection of (x′i, y
′
i, z
′
i) on S. As S is centered at the origin, the projection of
(x′i, y
′
i, z
′
i) on it is given by
xˆ′i =
x′idˆi√
x′2i + y
′2
i + z
′2
i
yˆ′i =
y′idˆi√
x′2i + y
′2
i + z
′2
i
(7.2.19)
zˆ′i =
z′idˆi√
x′2i + y
′2
i + z
′2
i
Finally, the Cartesian coordinates of the watermarked model Mˆ are computed
from its Laplacian coordinates by M−1 × Lˆ.
Fig. 7.2 shows the alteration of the histograms of the Horse and Rabbit models
with K = 300 bins. A comparison between the non-watermarked and the water-
marked histograms indicates that their global shapes are similar.
7.3 Watermark Extraction
Given a watermarked polygonal mesh model Mˆ in Cartesian coordinates, the wa-
termark extraction is very simple and can be carried out blindly, with no reference
to the original mesh M.
First, we obtain the 1-ring neighbors of each marked vertex vˆi and construct the
weighted Laplacian matrix M using Eq. 7.1.3 and Eq. 7.1.4. After calculating the
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watermarked Laplacian coordinates, we compute the lengths dˆ of the coordinate
vectors.
Then, we classify the elements in dˆ into K bins Bˆk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, using Eq. 7.1.6
and Eq. 7.1.7. Since the first and the last bins B1 and BK have not been altered
by the watermarking process, the minimum dˆmin and maximum dˆmax of dˆ (after
watermarking) are equal to the minimum dmin and maximum dmax of d (before
watermarking). That is, given the total number of bins K, the step size δ used in
the watermark extraction process is the same as the step size used in the watermark
embedding process. This is an efficient solution to the non-synchronization problem.
However, dˆmin and maximum dˆmax may change significantly when the watermarked
mesh Mˆ has suffered from malicious attacks. If this is the case, we form the bins
using only those dˆi that satisfy dmin ≤ dˆi ≤ dmax and Eq. 7.1.7.
In the next step, we disregard the bins Bˆ1 and Bˆk (k > Kˆ), which do not
carry watermark, and form the pairs (Bˆ2, Bˆ3), (Bˆ4, Bˆ5), · · · , (BˆKˆ−1, BˆKˆ). From the
embedding process, we know that only pairs (Bk,Bk+1) satisfying f(Bk,Bk+1) ≥ nthr
have been used as watermark carriers. Based on the equation
f(Bk,Bk+1) = f(Bˆk, Bˆk+1) (7.3.20)
which is a consequence of the embedding strategy that swaps vertices inside pairs
of bins only, we can find the pairs that carry watermark by checking if
f(Bˆk, Bˆk+1) ≥ nthr (7.3.21)
That means that we do not need the knowledge of the original meshM to compute
the pairs of bins that carry watermark.
Finally, each embedded watermark bit wj is sequentially extracted from each
pair (Bˆk, Bˆk+1) by
wj =
+1 if |Bˆk| ≥ |Bˆk+1|−1 if |Bˆk| < |Bˆk+1|
7.4 Experimental Results
The proposed method has been implemented using Matlab based on Gabriel Peyre´’s
code [180]. The 3D mesh models used in the experiments, namely, the Bunny, Rabbit,
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
Figure 7.3: Original mesh models used in the experiments. (a) Bunny, (b) Rabbit,
(c) Horse, (d) Dragon, (e) Elephant, (f) Hand, and (g) Hank.
Horse, Dragon, Elephant, Hand and Hank, are shown in Fig. 7.3. The watermark
bits are produced randomly with uniform distribution, using the Matlab function
randint. The parameter  in Eq. 7.1.4 that ensures the invertibility of the Laplacian
matrix M is fixed at  = 0.00001.
The algorithmic complexity of the proposed watermarking algorithm is linear to
the number of mesh vertices. In our Matlab implementation, which is not optimized
for time efficiency, it takes few minutes (for instance, approximately one minute for
the Bunny model) to watermark the test meshes on a PC running on an Intel Core
2 Duo T6570 2.1 GHz processor with 2 GB memory.
The parameters used in the experiment are reported in Table 7.1. Notice that the
parameters nthr and K need to be passed to the watermark extraction algorithm. In
a real installation framework, we can avoid the necessity of passing nthr and K to the
extraction algorithm by always fixing nthr at a constant and using a K proportional
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Table 7.1: Parameter setting and experimental results. C is the embedding capacity
of the model in bits. In each test, the number of actually changed bins is 2C.
Model N K nthr nrobust C
Bunny 34835 498 46 5 21
Rabbit 70658 1010 46 5 102
Horse 19851 284 46 5 22
Dragon 50000 715 46 5 103
Elephant 24955 498 46 5 25
Hand 17117 245 46 5 52
Hank 15488 150 70 5 30
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 7.4: Watermarked mesh models. (a) Bunny, (b) Rabbit, (c) Horse, (d)
Dragon, and (e) Elephant.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.5: Illustration of the watermarked Hand and its deformed versions. (a)
watermarked Hand, (b) deformation of (a), and (c) deformation of (a).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.6: Illustration of the watermarked Hank and its deformed versions. (a)
watermarked Hank, (b) deformation of (a), and (c) deformation of (a).
to N , that is, K = dN/Nce, where Nc is a constant. In most experiments, nthr = 46
and the parameter K was computed this way with Nc = 70.
7.4.1 Evaluation of the Visual Degradation
A first desirable characteristic of a watermarking method is the transparency of
the watermark. That is, we expect the embedded watermarks to be imperceptible.
Our first experiment evaluates the visual impact of the mesh alterations caused by
watermarking.
Fig. 7.4, Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6 show the test models after watermarking. We found
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.7: Illustration of Cho et al.’s [7] watermarked Hank and its deformed
versions. (a) watermarked Hank, (b) deformation of (a), and (c) deformation of (a).
that it is fairly difficult to observe any undesirable artifacts on the watermarked
models, even upon close inspection. In addition, the watermarked models shown in
Fig. 7.4, Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6 and the corresponding originals shown in Fig. 7.3 are
visually indistinguishable. We conclude that the proposed watermarking method is
capable of preserving the visual quality and the global shape of the cover models.
7.4.2 Evaluation of Robustness
A watermarking method should be capable of surviving unintentional or malicious
attacks, preventing the removal of the embedded watermark by an adversary. To
evaluate the robustness of the proposed method, we apply the attack to the water-
marked model and attempt to extract the watermark from the attacked model. The
standard measures of robustness are the normalized correlation (NC) and the cor-
rect detection rate (CDR), which are obtained by a comparison between the original
watermark string and the extracted one. In this chapter, two types of attacks were
conducted: distortion-free geometric transformations and mesh editing operations.
Note that we do not measure the robustness against some other common attacks,
such as noise addition and cropping, as the visual alterations resulted from such
operations are usually at an unacceptable level.
As expected, the watermark is perfectly robust against vertex reordering and ge-
ometric transformations, including translation, rotation and uniform scaling. This is
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Table 7.2: Evaluation of the robustness of the proposed algorithm against mesh
editing operations.
Model NC CDR
Fig. 7.5 (b) 0.93 0.96
Fig. 7.5 (c) 0.73 0.86
Table 7.3: Evaluation of the robustness of the proposed algorithm against mesh
noise insertion and Laplacian smoothing for Bunny.
Attack NC CDR
Noise Insertion 0.85 0.93
Laplacian Smoothing 0.26 0.64
because the watermark carrier, that is, the histogram of the lengths of the Laplacian
coordinate vectors, is invariant under these operations, except uniform scaling. Al-
though uniform scaling may deform the histogram, the watermark survives because
both embedding and extraction are based on relationships between histogram bins
that are invariant under uniform scaling.
Regarding vicious attacks, we only consider mesh editing operations that are
likely to be applied to the 3D models in practice. We carried out such operations
using the popular Character Rigging tool of the well-known 3D editing software
Blender 2.49 [176]. Some instances of the mesh models undergoing deformation are
shown in Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6. In both examples, the shapes of the deformed models
are meaningful and can still be used in practical applications. Table 7.2 lists the
robustness results under mesh editing for the two models. We notice that we obtain
high values of NC and CDR, even for severely edited models. The reason is that
even though the mesh editing operations modify the global shape of the models, the
watermark carrier, i.e., the histogram of the lengths of the Laplacian coordinates
vectors, is almost unchanged. We conclude that we are able to correctly extract most
of the embedded watermark bits, and hence, the proposed watermarking method
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Figure 7.8: Embedding capacity versus (a) number of bins K, with fixed embedding
threshold nthr = 60 and (b) embedding threshold nthr, with fixed K = 1000. In both
cases, nrobust = 5.
offers satisfactory resistance against editing attacks.
Notice that the proposed watermarking is specially designed to survive mesh
editing attacks that deform the global shape of a 3D model and thus that it may
offer relatively weaker robustness to other types of operations, such as noise insertion
and Laplacian smoothing. This is because the lengths of Laplacian vectors could
change significantly when those operations are applied. As Table 7.3 shows, we
obtain lower values of NC and CDR from the attacked Bunny, which was generated
by adding noise and applying Laplacian smoothing to the marked Bunny as shown
in Fig. 7.4 (a).
7.4.3 Embedding Capacity
The data in the second and fourth columns of Table 7.1 imply that, for each of
the test models, the embedding capacity does not attain its theoretical maximum
b(K − 2)/2c, indicating that the method cannot embed a watermark bit into every
bin pair. This happens because many bins are empty, and because some bin pairs
do not meet the embedding condition in Eq. 7.1.8, see also Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2.
Regarding the real embedding capacity of the method, the two crucial parameters
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Table 7.4: Comparison with previously proposed methods. Here, |v| and |w| repre-
sent the numbers of the mesh vertices and watermark bits, respectively; the symbols
× and √ indicate that the method can weakly survive and can survive (similarity
transformation, reordering or mesh editing) attacks, respectively; nlayers is an em-
bedding parameter. The previous approaches used for comparison include those by
Cayre et al. [5], Wang et al. [11], Chao et al. [6], Zafeiriou et al. [12], Cho et al. [7]
and Ohbuchi et al. [13].
Method Domain Capacity Extraction Similarity Reordering Editing
Cayre spatial ∼|v| B √ × ×
Wang spatial 3|v| B × × ×
Chao spatial 3nlayers|v| B × × ×
Zafeirio spatial |w| B √ √ ×
Cho spatial |w| B √ √ ×
Ohbuchi frequency |w| NB √ √ ×
Ours frequency |w| B √ √ √
are the number of bins K and the embedding threshold nthr. Fig. 7.8 (a) shows
the embedding capacity for variable K and fixed nthr = 60. As expected, the
embedding capacity increases monotonically with K, as a larger K means that more
bin pairs are available for watermarking. Fig. 7.8 (b) shows the embedding capacity
for variable nthr and fixed K = 1000. As expected, the embedding capacity decreases
monotonically with nthr, as a greater nthr means that more bin pairs become invalid.
7.4.4 Comparison and Discussion
We compared the proposed method with existing watermarking and steganographic
algorithms. The results of the evaluation are summarized in Table 7.4. We notice
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Table 7.5: Performance comparison between ours and Cho et al.’s [7] methods.
Model Method NC CDR
Fig. 7.6 (b) Proposed 0.87 0.93
Fig. 7.7 (b) Cho’s 0.49 0.73
Fig. 7.6 (c) Proposed 0.93 0.96
Fig. 7.7 (c) Cho’s 0.19 0.60
that steganographic methods have higher embedding capacity but weaker robustness
compared to the watermarking ones. In fact, steganographic methods are quite
sensitive to mesh alterations and even a slight processing could cause the complete
removal of the embedded message. As such, they are not appropriate for applications
such as digital content protection and authentication. By contrast, watermarking
methods show higher levels of robustness, at the expense of their embedding capacity.
We claim that the proposed method outperforms other schemes in terms of ro-
bustness under common shape-changing editing operations. The reason is that the
watermark primitives used by previous schemes, for example, the vertex norms used
by Cho et al. [7], are sensitive to changes of the global shape. In contrast, the
histogram of the lengths of the Laplacian vectors is less sensitive to such operations.
Table 7.5 summarizes the experimental comparison between the proposed method
and Cho et al.’s method [7], regarding robustness to mesh editing. We implemented
Cho et al.’s watermark algorithm that alters the distribution of vertex norms, de-
fined as the distances between the vertices and the center of the mesh model. In
the experiment, the same bit string was embedded to the Hank model using Cho et
al.’s and our method, respectively. For Cho et al.’s algorithm, we set the watermark
strength factor α = 0.04 and the bin number to 30, while for our algorithm we
used the parameter values listed in Table 7.1. Then, using Blender, we deformed
Cho’s and ours watermarked models, trying to obtain edited models with the same
appearance, see Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7. Table 7.5 shows that our approach achieves
higher NC and CDR values, and hence, it is more robust.
The Ohbuchi et al. [13] method is weakly resistant against mesh editing attacks
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because the watermark is embedded in the low frequencies of the spectrum of the
Laplacian. However, variants of their method using medium or high frequencies
as watermark carriers could be more resistant to mesh editing attacks. Moreover,
their method outperforms ours in that it is robust against a wider range of attacks,
including mesh simplification and remeshing. On the other hand, their method is
a non-blind scheme and requires the original mesh for watermark extraction. That
makes it unsuitable for a range of practical applications where such information can
not be provided to the extraction algorithm.
7.5 Summary
We have proposed a watermarking algorithm for polygonal meshes based on the
histogram of the lengths of Laplacian coordinate vectors. The watermark extraction
is carried out blindly without reference to the original model. The proposed method
is robust against translation, rotation, uniform scaling and vertex reordering as a
result of using primitives that are invariant under these operations to carry the
watermark. Most importantly, the proposed method is robust under common mesh
editing operations that change the global shape of the mesh. However, it may not be
able to survive mesh editing attack that changes the mesh connectivity since such an
attack could modify the Laplacian coordinates significantly and thus the histogram
of the lengths of Laplacian vectors greatly. We believe that mesh editing is the
logical choice of a malicious attacker aiming at the unauthorized use of copyrighted
material, and thus, the research on watermarking methods that are robust against
such attacks can have immediate practical implications.
The main limitation of the proposed watermarking technique is its weak resis-
tance against other attacks, such as mesh simplification, remeshing and topological
changes. Such operations may change the Laplacian coordinates significantly, and
consequently alter the watermark carrier, i.e., the histogram of the lengths of the
Laplacian coordinate vectors, to the extent that the embedded watermark is de-
stroyed.
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Discriminative Features
Extraction for 3D Steganalysis
In this chapter, we propose a steganalytic method for triangle meshes, adopting a
framework which has been successfully developed for image steganalysis. The main
idea is that even though the presence of the watermark is often imperceptible to the
human eye, it may nevertheless disturb the natural statistics of the 3D signal and
thus become detectable.
We implement this idea by computing for each mesh a characteristic feature
vector capturing geometric information extracted from its Cartesian and Laplacian
coordinates, its dihedral angles and face normals. For the extracted feature vector to
have sufficient for our purposes discriminative power, we do not compute it directly
on each mesh, but on the difference between the mesh and a filtered copy of it called
the reference mesh. This technique is known in the literature of image steganalysis
as calibration. Here, the reference mesh is produced by applying one iteration of
Laplacian smoothing.
In [144], where calibration was introduced, the reference image was deemed to
serve as an approximation of the original image before the embedding of the water-
mark. However, as [181] points out, this approximation does not need to hold for
the calibration to work. Instead, what we expect from the calibration is to erase
a part of the changes introduced by watermarking, without altering the cover sig-
nificantly. Then, as a result, the difference between a mesh and its reference will
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be distinctively larger for watermarked than for clean models. From this point of
view, what our experiments demonstrate is that when one of the five test water-
marking/steganographic algorithms is used, the difference between a mesh and its
smoothed version is distinctively larger for marked meshes, when a certain well-
chosen statistical measure of that difference is used.
After the extraction of the feature vector, a supervised learning algorithm based
on Quadratic Discriminate Analysis is applied to a training set of feature vectors
from unmarked meshes and meshes marked by a given watermarking/steganographic
algorithm, yielding a steganalytic classifier for that particular method. We also
obtained a universal steganalyzer by training the classifier on a set of meshes marked
by all five watermarking/steganographic test algorithms.
The main contribution of this chapter is a steganalytic technique for triangle
meshes, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first 3D steganalytic method
in the literature. Our experiments show that the method can be successfully used
as a benchmark for the anti-steganalysis performance of existing and future 3D
steganographic/watermarking algorithms.
Regarding the limitations of the proposed technique, we notice given that there
are no other steganalytic methods to compare our results against, it is difficult to
judge the significance of the obtained accuracy rates. However, we may assume that
as it is the case with image steganalysis too, one may achieve higher accuracy rates
by devising algorithms targeting specific steganographic/watermarking methods.
A second limitation is that the proposed steganalytic method only targets algo-
rithms that hide information into the mesh geometry. Even though such algorithms
are the mainstream of 3D steganography/watermarking, it should be noted that
there are also algorithms hiding information into the mesh connectivity, or into the
data redundancy of polygonal list files encoding triangle meshes. In its current form,
our method cannot detect watermarks inserted by such algorithms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We describe in detail the method
concerning how to compute feature vectors from 3D models in Section 8.1. The
steganalysis results are presented and discussed in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 concludes
this chapter. Material in this chapter has been submitted to ACM Transactions on
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Multimedia Computing, Communications and Applications for consideration.
8.1 Triangle Mesh Steganalysis
Given a target watermarking/steganographic algorithm, the steganalytic algorithm
extracts N -dimensional feature vectors Fi from a training set of clean and water-
marked models
Fi = (fi,1, fi,2, · · · , fi,N) (8.1.1)
where i is the index of the model in the training set and N = 208 in the chapter.
These feature vectors are the input of a supervised learning algorithm, which pro-
duces a classifier associated with the target watermarking/steganographic method.
8.1.1 Normalization
In a pre-processing step, the model is normalized by a coordinate system change
before feature extraction. We apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the
vertex coordinates, and align the xyz axes of the coordinate system with the three
principal directions q1, q2 and q3, respectively, assuming, without loss of generality
that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 for the corresponding eigenvalues. After this coordinate sys-
tem transformation, we uniformly scale the model into the unit cube centered at
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5).
The normalization ensures that the feature vector Fi of each model is invariant
to affine transformations. Also, normalization restricts the values of each component
fi,j of Fi to a limited range and thus, prevents the large feature values dominating
the smaller values. Notice that because of using PCA, we are not able to specify the
orientation of the axes of the new coordinate system. That means that all extracted
features should be invariant under an orientation change of any of the axes.
8.1.2 Calibration
The reference mesh M′ we use for calibration is produced by applying one iteration
of Laplacian smoothing on the original mesh M. We use a standard Laplacian
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operator corresponding to the Kirchhoff matrix [110] with entries
Ri,j =

val(vi) if i = j
−1 if vj ∈ N (i) 1 ≤ i, j ≤ V
0 otherwise
(8.1.2)
where vi is the vertex indexed by i, val(vi) and N (i) denote the valence and the
1-ring neighborhood of vi, and V is the number of mesh vertices.
We have found that this simple calibration process works well against all water-
marking algorithms we have tested the proposed method on. Moreover, its simplic-
ity gives a reasonable expectation that the experimental results will generalize well
against other watermarking algorithms that have been proposed, or will be proposed
in the future.
8.1.3 Feature Extraction
The computation of the feature vector Fi is a two-step process: extracting features
and computing components of Fi. More specifically, we first compare the original
and the reference models and compute vectors with components corresponding to
mesh vertices, edges or faces. Next, these vectors are processed to produce the
components of the feature vector Fi.
Regarding the vertex vectors, we compute the absolute values of the differences
of the x, y and z coordinates of M and M′, as well as the length of the vector
of Cartesian coordinate differences. Essentially, these components are the absolute
values of the Laplacian coordinates and the length of the vector of Laplacian coor-
dinates of M. Next, we obtain four more vectors by computing the same absolute
differences but on the Laplacian rather than the Cartesian coordinates of M and M′.
The computations are done separately on vertices with valence less than, equal, or
greater than six, excluding all boundary vertices. That is, we treat separately ver-
tices that are topologically convex, planar, or concave in the combinatorial Gaussian
curvature sense [182]. The total number of vectors obtained from the mesh vertices
is 24.
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Figure 8.1: Comparison of the histograms before and after embedding with the
variance-based watermarking in [7] on the Stanford Bunny. The y axis shows the
frequency. The histograms were constructed from the x component of Laplacian
coordinates (Left), the differences of the lengths of Laplacian coordinate vectors
(Second from Left), the differences of the dihedral angles (Second from Right)
and the differences of the angles between face normals (Right).
Regarding the edges of the mesh, we compute the vector of the absolute values
of the differences of the dihedral angles between M and M′. Finally, regarding
mesh faces, we compute the vector of the angles between the normals of M and M′,
obtaining a total of 26 vectors from vertices, edges, and faces.
Fig. 8.1 shows the changes in the histograms of the extracted features induced by
the variance-based watermarking in [7] when applied on the Stanford Bunny. The
observed large differences in the shape of the histogram between the clean and the
marked Bunny model illustrate in a nutshell why the proposed method works.
8.1.4 The Feature Vector Fi
From each of the 26 vectors computed in the previous section, we compute eight
components of the feature vector Fi, creating a vector of dimension N = 208. Let
f be one of these 26 vectors. The first four components of Fi corresponding to f
are the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of log(|f |). Notice that these four
statistical characteristics are commonly used in image staganalysis [30] as vector
shape descriptors. The purpose of the log transform is the reduction of the range of
the values and also an increase in the weight of small positive values.
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For the other four components, we first build the histogram of f with
H =
⌈
max(f)−min(f)
h
⌉
(8.1.3)
bins, where the size of the bin is given by the Freedman–Diaconis rule [183]
h = 2
IQR(f)
n1/3
, (8.1.4)
where IQR(·) denotes interquartile range and n is the number of components in
f . By counting the number of elements in each bin, we obtain the frequency vector
n = (n1, n2, · · · , nH) and its difference vector n′ = (n2−n1, n3−n2, · · · , nH−nH−1).
Then, the four remaining components of Fi obtained from f are the mean, variance,
skewness and kurtosis of log(|n′|).
We notice that the dimension of the vector Fi is relatively low, compared for
example with the PEV-274 [184], which has dimension 274 and is used for image ste-
ganalysis. Indeed, given that images are structurally simpler than triangle meshes,
one would expect that a good discriminative feature vector for meshes would have a
higher dimension. Nevertheless, the proposed feature vector works well in practice.
8.1.5 The Classifiers
We train the classifiers using the feature vectors extracted from a training set of 3D
models with and without watermarks. Before training the classifiers, the features
are scaled into comparable dynamic ranges. More specifically, for any component
f of the feature vector, we find its minimum fmin and maximum fmax values on
the set of all training models. For any training or test model, we scale the feature
component f by
f¯ =
f − fmin
fmax − fmin (8.1.5)
Notice that f¯ ∈ [0, 1] for all training models, while it is expected that f¯ will also
fall in [0, 1] for most test models. This scaling process prevents the features with
large numerical ranges from dominating those with small numerical ranges and thus
greatly improve classification accuracy [23].
Finally, the classifier is obtained via quadratic discrimination that fits multivari-
ate normal densities with covariance estimates stratified by group [185]. Notice that
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the simpler Fisher Linear Discriminant has been successfully employed in prior ste-
ganalysis work [30]; however, we have empirically found that in our case it is slightly
outperformed by the quadratic discrimination. We have also tested Adaboost clas-
sifiers based on Linear and Quadratic Discriminants, but there was no improvement
on the results.
When the classifiers for each target embedding method have been computed, the
steganalysis process is straightforward. Given a test 3D model, we just compute
its feature data, apply the classifier for a particular steganographic method to the
feature data and assign it to one of the two categories: unmarked by that method
or marked by that method.
8.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we experimentally validate the proposed steganalytic algorithm
against five well-known embedding techniques. They include Least Significant Bit
modification, the high capacity steganographic scheme based on Principal Axis pro-
jection [6], two watermarking methods proposed in [7] which modify either the mean
or the variance of the vertex norms inside the bins of a histogram, and the water-
marking method in [9].
Regarding LSB modification, for each vertex we compute the number of modi-
fiable bits using [10], making the expectation of the normal distortion to be lower
than a threshold . Regarding the parameter setting of Chao’s steganography [6],
we use nlayers = 10 for the number of layers and nintervals = 10000 for the number
of intervals. Regarding the mean and variance-based watermarking methods in [7],
the incremental step size is fixed at ∆k = 0.001 and the number of bins at 64, while
we vary the value of the strength factor α for different models. In particular, α is
a random number within the ranges [0.02, 0.06] and [0.12, 0.20] for mean-based and
variance-based watermarking, respectively. Notice that the purpose of varying α is
to simulate the situation of incurring different amounts of embedding distortion to
different 3D models. Finally, for [9], the embedding threshold is set at nthr = 46,
the robustness threshold at nrobust = 5, while the number of bins is equal to dV/70e,
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Figure 8.2: Some of the models of the experimental dataset.
where V is the number of mesh vertices.
All algorithms have been implemented in MATLAB and C++ and tested on a
PC running on an Intel Core 2 Duo T6570 2.1 GHz processor with 2 GB memory.
The training stage requires longer computational time than the test stage does.
That is, the algorithmic complexity for training m 3D models is O
(
m ·n), while it is
O
(
n
)
for testing a single model. Here, n is the number of edges for a 3D model. In
our current non-optimized implementation, it takes about 40 minutes to compute
the feature vectors in the training dataset and less than one second to construct a
classifier. Notice that this one-off training process is the computational bottleneck of
the algorithm. After the classifiers have been computed, it takes about six seconds
to analyze a test model with 10,000 vertices.
The experimental dataset consists of the 360 models in Princeton Shape Bench-
mark [186] and four models from the Stanford 3D Scanning Repository. We assumed
that all these 364 downloadable models were unmarked. Notice that the 3D models
in the dataset vary greatly in overall shape and size. Fig. 8.2 illustrates a part of
the experimental dataset.
136
8.2. Experimental Results
Table 8.1: Clean and marked models in the training and test datasets.
Method
Training Dataset Test Dataset
#Clean #Marked #Clean #Marked
Cho’s Mean 260 267 104 92
Cho’s Variance 260 255 104 98
Laplacian-based 260 263 104 101
Chao’s 260 262 104 100
LSB 260 262 104 100
All Methods 260 350 104 118
8.2.1 Specific Steganalyzer
To construct a steganalyzer specific for each one of the five embedding methods,
training and test datasets were produced separately. Table 8.1 shows the number of
clean and marked models in both datasets for each watermarking method.
Regarding the output of the experiments, apart from measuring the accuracy of
the constructed steganalyzers, we would also want to be able to detect any possible
large information redundancy in the feature vector Fi, which could indicate that our
selection of features was not optimal. For that reason we use PCA to reduce the
dimension of Fi. Figs. 8.3 and 8.4 plot the detection accuracy of the steganalyzers,
computed on the test sets of the five implemented embedding techniques, against
the number of principal components retained from the feature vector. We notice
that the right choice of number of principal components boosts in all cases the
accuracy to above 80%. However, the figures also show near optimal rates when
all components of Fi are retained, meaning that each component of Fi is likely to
contribute positively to the process.
From Fig. 8.4 we deduce that, as expected, the detection accuracy increases
monotonously with the amount of embedding-induced distortion. That is, we obtain
better results on marked models with large distortion. The comparison of Figs. 8.3
and 8.4 indicates that, in descending order, the anti-steganalysis performance of
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Figure 8.3: Detection accuracy plotted against the number of principal components
for Cho’s mean and variance-based watermarking methods [7], Yang’s Laplacian
coordinates based watermarking [9] and Chao’s high-capacity steganography [6]
(from left to right). Here, TPR and FPR indicate true positive rate and false positive
rate, respectively.
the five tested methods ranks as follows: Yang’s watermarking, Chao’s steganogra-
phy, Cho’s mean-based watermarking, LSB modification and Cho’s variance-based
watermarking, where the accuracy rate is greater than 90%.
8.2.2 Universal Steganalyzer
In addition to the five specific steganalyzers, we also constructed a universal stegan-
alyzer. The training set was created by randomly selecting 260 clean models from
the dataset, creating 350 marked models by randomly selecting clean models from
the training set and marking them with a randomly chosen embedding algorithm,
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Figure 8.4: Detection accuracy plotted against the number of principal components
for LSB steganography [10] with expected normal distortion of  = 1◦,  = 2◦ and
 = 5◦ (from left to right). Here, TPR and FPR indicate true positive rate and false
positive rate, respectively.
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Figure 8.5: Average detection rate for all five embedding methods, plotted against
the number of retained principal components. Here, TPR and FPR indicate true
positive rate and false positive rate, respectively.
and finally mixing them all together into a training set of 610 models.
Fig. 8.5 shows the average detection rate for the five embedding methods, against
the number of principal components retained from the feature vector. The accuracy
is about 75%. Moreover, the figure indicates that a near optimal detection rate is
achieved when all components of Fi are used, which again means that each compo-
nent of Fi is likely to have played a useful role in the steganalysis process.
A comparison of Figs. 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 shows that, as expected, the universal
steganalyzer achieves lower detection rates compared to the specific steganalyzers.
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Nevertheless, the main motivation for creating a universal steganalytic algorithm
is that it can be used as a benchmark for measuring the anti-steganalysis perfor-
mance of other existing and most importantly future watermarking/steganographic
algorithms.
8.3 Summary
We have presented a steganalytic algorithm for the detection of hidden messages
in triangle meshes. The algorithm has been evaluated on five state-of-the-art 3D
watermarking/steganographic methods with satisfactory accuracy rates. We think
that the high success rate may be partly due to a certain lack of sophistication in
the current state-of-the-art of 3D watermarking/steganography and that algorithms
with better anti-steganalytic performance should be developed.
140
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize the work covered in this thesis covers and discuss the
contributions and limitations. Finally, we outline the possible directions for future
work.
9.1 Summaries
In Chapters 1 and 2, we have discussed the context of the thesis background within
the broader areas of information hiding and steganalysis, have stated the research
problem and presented the findings of the survey of prior research related to the
thesis.
In Chapters 3 to 5, we have studied how the face normals and the Discrete
Gaussian Curvature (DGC) will degrade when modifying the vertex coordinates of
3D triangle models. Using these results, we presented a simple application on LSB-
based 3D steganography. The proposed steganographic method has two apparent
advantages over the existing techniques, namely, high-capacity and the ability to
control the embedding distortion.
In Chapters 6 and 7, we proposed two novel algorithms for watermarking 3D
models. The algorithm in Chapter 6, which is based on the histogram of the radial
distances of the mesh vertices, has been experimentally shown to withstand a wide
range of attacks to 3D models, such as noise addition, quantization and smooth-
ing. The algorithm in Chapter 7, which is based on the histogram of the norms
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of the Laplacian coordinates, has been specially designed to be resistant to editing
operations that alter the global shape of the 3D mesh.
In Chapter 8, based on the existing work on image steganalysis, we proposed a
universal 3D steganalysis, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first stegana-
lytic algorithm in the 3D domain. The algorithm computes mesh features that are
sensitive to watermark embedding and uses them to train a binary classifier.
9.2 Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• A systematic, mathematical and empirical study, leading to an in-depth un-
derstanding of the relationship between the normal/DGC degradation and
the spatial perturbation of the mesh vertices. The relevant material has been
developed in Chapters 3 to 5.
• A logistic model describing the normal degradation of a triangle mesh as the
quantization level decreases and a method to calculate an appropriate mesh
quantization level given a tolerance for the normal accuracy, proposed in Chap-
ter 3.
• An exact closed-form formula, and a linear approximation of it, for the expec-
tation of the normal degradation when noise is added to a single vertex of a
triangle, obtained in Chapter 4. An approximation, and heuristic upper and
lower bounds, for the expectation of the normal perturbation when noise is
added to all three vertices of a triangle, derived in Chapter 4.
• Fast computation of the dithered quantization level of a vertex when a toler-
ance for the normal degradation is given and also a LSB-based 3D stegano-
graphic algorithm that can claim maximum capacity for the given tolerance of
normal degradation, presented in Chapter 4. In addition to the high embed-
ding capacity, a second advantage is user control by making possible to keep
the embedding distortion below a pre-defined threshold.
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• A robust 3D watermarking algorithm and a specific steganalytic algorithm
against the watermarking by Cho et al. [7] proposed in Chapter 6. A Lapla-
cian coordinate-based watermarking algorithm that is robust to 3D editing
operations, presented in Chapter 7.
• The first universal steganalytic technique in the literature for 3D triangle
meshes, based on a framework that has previously been used in image steganal-
ysis, proposed in Chapter 8. This steganalytic algorithm has been tested on
five well-known 3D watermarking/steganographic methods and has achieved
satisfactory detection accuracy on each one of them. More importantly, as a
universal method, it could possibly be used for breaking future watermark-
ing/steganographic algorithms.
9.3 Limitations
The main limitations of our work can be summarized as follows:
• The assumption that the meshes are “clean” with no significant amount of
noise when computing appropriate levels of quantization of mesh vertices in
Chapters 3 to 5.
• The linear approximation in Chapter 4 of the expectation of the normal degra-
dation when noise was added to a single vertex held only under the addition
of small amounts of noise.
• The fragility of the proposed high-capacity data hiding method in Chapter 4,
that is, the fact that it is not robust under the most attacks and that even
mild mesh processing operations may lead to the complete loss of the embedded
message bits.
• The fragility of the histogram-based watermarking method in Chapter 6 against
mesh editing operations and the fragility of the Laplacian coordinate-based wa-
termarking in Chapter 7 against common mesh processing attacks rather than
mesh editing operations.
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• The scope of the proposed steganalytic method in Chapter 8, that is, it only
works for those algorithms that hide information into the mesh geometry, not
into mesh connectivity, or into the data redundancy of polygonal list files.
9.4 Future Work
This thesis has provided a new understanding of the relationships between nor-
mal/DGC degradation and spatial degradation and has proposed some novel stegano-
graphic, watermarking and steganalytic algorithms for 3D models. However, there
is still a large scope for further improvements and several questions remained unan-
swered as summarized below.
Parameter Computation: In Chapters 3 and 5, there are two parameters
a and b in their respective developed mathematical models. As yet, we compute
them by means of fitting a model to the experimental results and cannot obtain
them directly without going through the fitting process. We believe that these
two numbers may be capturing interesting intrinsic properties of the triangle mesh
related to the number, size and shape of the triangles in the mesh. As a direction
for future work, we plan to develop methods for their direct computation and study
their relation with other intrinsic properties of the mesh.
Robust 3D Watermarking: The robustness against mesh editing operations
has been recently recognized as a basic property that a good 3D watermarking
should possess and thus has attracted the attention of researchers. However, as
yet, there exist only a handful of methods that offer resistance to mesh editing.
That means that more research effort should be directed towards developing mesh
editing-resistant watermarking algorithms. Mean value coordinates and harmonic
coordinates have demonstrated good behavior under mesh editing operations and
thus, they are good candidates as potential watermark carriers.
3D Steganalysis: Although the features extracted by the proposed method
in Chapter 8 have been shown to be adequate for the purpose of 3D steganalysis,
one would hope to come up with other features that are more sensitive to message
embedding and thus the improved detection performance. Another possible future
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direction for the 3D steganalysis work is to devise steganalytic algorithms based on
the modification of mesh connectivity rather than geometry.
Message Length Estimation: The proposed 3D steganalysis framework can
only respond to the question of whether a given 3D model contains secret information
and it is not capable of estimating the size of the information embedded within in
the model. Message length estimation has been found to be valuable information for
the steganalysts, whose ultimate goal is to extract and decipher the secret message,
especially in the absence of information on the steganographic scheme and the cipher
keys. One could probably attempt to tackle the message length estimation problem
for the 3D domain by using the ideas developed for hidden message length estimation
in digital images.
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